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THE HUMANISM OF PAUL ELMER MORE

M. D. C. Tait

IT is primarily, of course, as a critic of literature that Paul Elmer More commands attention, for the *Shelburne Essays* reveal critical powers of remarkable range and sensitiveness. Here, however, there will be no attempt to examine his critical work in detail; our concern is rather to trace the development of the philosophic and religious thought from which his work of criticism in principle derives. More was convinced (and here he is in accord with other exponents of contemporary American humanism) of the prime importance of relating the study of literature to a central body of ideas which might give it unity and direction. In the preface to his *Platonism*, the first volume of the series entitled "The Greek Tradition," he writes: "I can foresee no restoration of humane studies to their lost position of leadership until they are felt once more to radiate from some central spiritual truth. I do not believe that the aesthetic charms of literature can supply this want, nor is it clear to me that a purely scientific analysis of the facts of moral experience can furnish the needed motive. The former is too apt to run into dilettantism, and the latter appeals too little to the imagination and the springs of enthusiasm. Only through the centralising force of religious faith or its equivalent in philosophy can the intellectual life regain its meaning and authority for earnest men."

I

More's life was outwardly uneventful and the few facts of his career which have some bearing on his intellectual development are quickly told. He was born in St. Louis in 1864. After graduating from the local university he studied the languages and literature of ancient India at Harvard, where he was a class-mate of Irving Babbitt's. From the first he was profoundly influenced by that dynamic personality, and there began a friendship which was to be life-long. On leaving Harvard he went to Bryn Mawr where he taught Sanskrit and Greek. From 1901 to 1914 he was engaged in journalism, when he was successively Literary Editor of the New York *Independent* and *Evening Post*, and Editor-in-Chief of the *Nation*. From 1914 to his death in 1937 he was Professor of Greek and of Philosophy at Princeton.

He was brought up in the provincial environment of the Middle West and in a home of which the intellectual and religious life was dominated by a narrow Calvinism. His emancipated critics have been quick to assert that he never escaped these early influences, and that he remained provincial and puritanical to the end. Be that as it may, certainly as a young man he rebelled violently against the dogmatic religious teaching of his childhood, and whole-heartedly embraced the Darwinism of the day. But this soon dissatisfied him. At an earlier period he had "by a fatal mischance," as he

says, "fallen under the sway of romanticism," and to this he now reverted. How completely may best be seen in an early work entitled *The Great Refusal*, which is of little intrinsic merit but of some interest, because in it there is much thinly disguised autobiography. It has also the interest of contrast, in that it expresses a mood and point of view against which his whole later thought was a protest. For that reason we may stop over it just for a moment. It is a romance in the form of letters written by a young scholar to a woman called Esther with whom he imagined himself to be in love. The writer of the letters is an excessively sentimental young man, who after a short bout with the hard bad world teaching Latin to boys, finds such a life worse than death, decides that an active career among men is for him impossible, and gives himself up to the dream-life of his soul, which finds typical romantic expression. He is intensely preoccupied with his own emotional states. He dwells at length and for their own sake on the beauties of nature, and feels deeply the union of his own spirit and of all things with the one divine life in nature. He is a devotee of the cult of woman, whose beauty is a symbol of the presence of the divine in mortal things, and who therefore links earth and heaven. In a rapturous description of a sunset he writes to his love: "Thou art that star of Venus which I beheld in pure light midway between the clouds and ramparts of the earth, a fair white lustre contrasted with the burning vapours of our world." In love, the supreme principle of harmony, he hoped to find peace. But the Lady Esther for all her starriness had the good sense to see that such love was not the real thing, and, one suspects, this made the Great Refusal easier. Quite early in the series of letters the young man had begun to feel that in the deeper spiritual insight of Brahmanism there was to be found consolation for those "who find our western religions superficial and our philosophies mechanical." But this consolation can only be won through renunciation and abstraction from the illusory self with its cravings for all the things and creatures of this illusory world. So after returning to Esther flowers which she had given him from time to time and which he had kept pressed in his books—an act of abstraction which one fears might readily be misunderstood—our dreamer passes, as he says, "into the silence of communion which is most likened to deep sleep." The hero of *The Great Refusal*, I think we must admit, is a reflection of More himself when he wrote the book—and it is curious to find him displaying what later, in his essay on William Beckford, he signalizes and deprecates as the distinctive romantic trait, namely, "a morbid egotism which is born of the union of an intensely felt personality with the notion of infinity as an escape from limitations." Certainly the conception of Brahmanism in *The Great Refusal* may fairly be said to be a romantic one. The young scholar's cultivation of the inner life is little more than a means of escape from disagreeable realities. And as for metaphysics, the distinctive features of Hindu mysticism become blurred in a vague pantheism.

The critique of romanticism has been a prominent feature in the work

of contemporary humanists. Like the humanists of the Renaissance they have been concerned to affirm the distinctively human element in man. One of their number defines humanism as "the study and practise of the principle of human happiness uncomplicated by naturistic dogmas on one side and religious dogmas on the other"; but the affirmation of the contemporary in contrast with the Renaissance humanist has been made in opposition not so much to an excessive emphasis on the supernatural as to an excessive emphasis on the natural. The contemporary humanist has objected to romanticism as a form of sentimental and emotional naturalism which is in essential agreement with scientific naturalism in this respect: both types fail to recognize in man any element belonging to a different order from the rest of nature. Nature and human nature are one. For scientific naturalism man in his entirety is the product of, and determined by, the same forces which the physicist and biologist study. For the sentimental naturalist man is one with nature through feeling and impulse, in which rather than in reason his essential humanity and innate goodness consist.

The assumptions of romanticism then involve, as More puts it in his essay on Huxley, "a denial of Classical dualism and an illusory substitution of the mere limitless expansion of our impulsive nature for that true infinite within the heart of man which is not of nature, and whose voice is heard as the inner check, restraining, centralizing, forming." To More and his fellow-humanists this inner dualism of man's will is the essential fact of human nature. A recognition of it and of what it implies is the condition of all sound ethical and sociological theory and practice. The brotherhood of man cannot be realized on the naturalistic level of feeling and sentiment. This is the humanitarian fallacy which humanists like Babbitt and More attack with such vigour as sometimes to convey the impression that they stand in aristocratic aloofness from the ordinary concerns of the mass of mankind, and are suspicious not only of the methods but of the aims of the social reformer. Such is not the case, but there would be some truth in the criticism that they do less than justice to the values in humanitarianism, and fail adequately to recognize the function of the humanitarian motive in, for example, the Christian social ethic.

A recognition of the inner dualism of man's will is also the condition, though not of course the only one, of all literature worthy of the name. Art is not separable from life, and its criteria are inevitably bound up with moral criteria, even though these are distinct one from the other. The point has been well put by T. S. Eliot: "The greatness of literature cannot be determined solely by literary standards, though we must remember that whether it is literature or not can be determined only by literary standards." More would not limit the artist as Plato did in his most austere moments, nor of course would he require that literature be moralistic, still less religious, in intention. But he would insist that great literature is only possible if the artist has a sense of a higher and a lower in man, and of his

potentialities for good and evil, recognized and distinguished as such.

Obviously, More would not claim any originality for this fundamental doctrine. On the contrary, what he urges as a humanist is the necessity for renewed insight into the core of truth that has been handed down in a long tradition—which, however, the modern world has tended increasingly to reject, with disastrous consequences. We may hope, then, to arrive at some understanding of More's thought if we consider his interpretation of the tradition. In three stages of it, the Buddhist, the Platonic, and the Christian, he finds emerging with progressively greater clarity the principles of a complete humanism, complete because taking into account the religious instincts and needs of man.

II

One or two points in the Buddhist teaching may be noted which are reflected in More's own. In it he finds clearly discerned the distinction between a higher self or will of moral insight and a lower transient self. Basic in Buddhist thought is the sense of the transience of all things, and the longing to escape from the resultant pain which every human creature but the most insensible must suffer. "One thing," cried Buddha, "I announce to-day and always: Sorrow and its extinction." And again, "The transient is the sorrowful." Nothing in the world about us, nothing, still more emphatically, in ourselves, which can be named or conceived in positive terms is an enduring entity. The cause of sorrow is simply the craving for permanence which blinds us to the fact of universal transience, so that we construct a world of permanent entities to which nothing in reality corresponds. The cause of sorrow is thus of our own making. We can escape it through abnegation of all the activities of the illusory self, and by submission to the authority of the higher will. In the humility of this submission the reality of the higher will is increasingly discerned and the bondage to the lower will is broken.

More finds this doctrine significant in two respects which are closely related. First, the discursive reason here plays a subordinate role. This is not, as in romanticism, a substitution for reason of sub-rational feeling or impulse. On the contrary, reason is the indispensable instrument of analysis and the guide of conduct. But its function *is* instrumental. Reason interprets experience. It cannot of itself reveal the content of experience. This truth is clearly recognized by the Buddhist in holding that the higher self is not revealed or vindicated by any process of ratiocination but by immediate insight gained as the result of habitual virtuous activity. So More speaks of the fundamental fact of man's dual nature as "the last irrational fact behind which we cannot go." Monistic rationalism, he holds, whether of the scientist or of the metaphysical idealist, is an extreme attempt to fly in the face of immediate concrete experience and deny one term or other of the paradox. It is one of the "Demons of the Absolute" by which men's minds are possessed. He defines the dualist,

on the contrary, as a philosopher with a sense of humour. On this score, it must be admitted in passing, one feels some misgivings about More's dualism. There is almost no humour in him! But to return. A view of life which bases its inferences on the intimately known facts of consciousness and which is docile enough to submit to control by the whole range of experience is more reasonable than rationalism. There is nothing, said Pascal, which is so much in accord with reason as this disavowal of reason.

In the second place, the insight into the higher will and the blessedness thus secured are gained as the result of humility—submission to the authority of that will. Humility, in More's view, is an essential virtue of wide application both in humanism and in religion. But it has been an unpopular virtue ever since the modern world began to reject its Christian form and basis, and to place its trust more and more in the power of reason alone. Thus we have become increasingly confident that the good life for man can be realized and an era of indefinite progress ushered in through the ever increasing understanding and control of the forces of nature—in short, through science, which is the brilliant achievement of reason. The humanist is not so benighted as to deny the indispensable and impressive contributions of science to this end. But he holds that the claim of science to sole, or even paramount, competence in this respect is an instance of the most subtle and dangerous of all forms of pride—the pride of the intellect. Pride here, as elsewhere, begets blindness and is overtaken by nemesis. Babbitt has remarked that so far from material progress assuring moral progress they seem extremely difficult to combine, and in 1919 he warned us that unethical science is "perhaps the worst monster that has yet been turned loose on the race." No comment is called for.

More at first, and Babbitt always, was attracted by the strictly experimental basis of the Buddhist principle of morality, by the fact that it is completely free from all metaphysical and theological entanglements. But More came to feel that it fails to discern the proper limits of the law of dualism which it grasps so clearly, and thus becomes involved in hopeless inconsistency, and ends in an absolute mysticism which is well-nigh meaningless. What is the higher will? Certainly not the will and purpose of a personal God. Buddhism presents the remarkable phenomenon of a religion of peace which dispenses with God. Neither is it the will of anything that in Western thought is associated with the notion of soul. The elements and activities of normal consciousness, in so far as they can be positively conceived, are illusory, and out of all relation to the goal of blessedness. "Behold now decay is inherent in all things. Work out your own salvation with diligence," said the dying Buddha to his disciples. But salvation of what? Not of any permanent soul which persists through the cycles of birth, death, re-birth, but of what is indistinguishable from bare negation. "Pure spirit," More writes in his essay "Buddhism and Christianity," "absolved from all association with the body, pure substance devoid of all qualities, pure being beyond consciousness, are these anything

but illusory names for death?"

In such blank transcendence does the positivist morality of Buddha end. Though More always recognized the moral and religious values of Buddhism, he came to realize that a sounder basis for humanism must be sought in a philosophy which would avoid its extreme antitheses, and which would not deny significance to all the factors of normal consciousness. "Show me the man," Plato makes Socrates say in the *Phaedrus*, "who is able to see both the one and the many as they are in nature and I will follow in his footsteps as though he were a god." In Plato, More found not only a satisfying interpretation of experience at the humanistic level, but a humanism which itself provided the basis for the necessary fulfilment of humanism in religion.

Plato, of course, starts with Socrates. So properly does More, and with Socrates the sceptic, who was wiser than other men simply because he recognized his ignorance while they did not recognize theirs. The sceptic is one who questions the power of reason to explain the ultimate nature of things, and refuses to go beyond the immediate data of consciousness. These data fall into two main classes: those whose source is in impressions received from the world about us, and secondly, the data of our inner experience, desiring, willing, thinking, the sense of self- approval or disapproval, responsibility, and the like. More insists that the true sceptic must attend to both classes, but that most so-called sceptics are really dogmatists in disguise who without warrant regard as significant only one set of data, namely, the impressions which tell of a material order and the pleasurable and painful states of the body. Socrates, on the contrary, while not dogmatically denying the reality and significance of these data, was even more impressed with the content of inner experience, and especially of moral experience. He was aware of an immediate intuition of the distinction betwéen right action and wrong action, and of the self- approval or disapproval consequent on these. Hence when condemned he refuses to escape, as he might easily have done, and recognizes a responsibility to stay in the prison in Athens and suffer death. But the sense of responsibility implies that somehow he is free so to act and that he acts with a purpose—the purpose to realize a good. The cause of his sitting there in prison is not a mechanical one, that his muscles are bending the joints in the bones of his legs in a certain way, but that he has decided that it is better for him to sit there and meet death. Otherwise those bones and muscles would have been away off in Boeotia or Megara long ago, carried there by a different view of what is good.

As this example shows, scepticism in the sense of an absolute suspension of judgment is a practical impossibility. The exigencies of life force a man to draw inferences from one or another set of data and to govern his conduct accordingly. More would urge that the only causal relation of which we have any comprehension is that between the proposal in our minds to do something and the doing of it as the outcome of purpose, and he lays great

stress on the famous passage in the *Phaedo* where Socrates tells of his bewilderment in trying to elicit a principle of causation from the mechanistic theories of earlier thinkers, and substitutes for them the more intelligible principle of teleology. This conversion More regards as the most important and revolutionary event in the whole range of philosophy in that, as he says, "it marks a turning away from the outward-looking senses as interpreters of reality to a trust in intuition." The whole of Plato's philosophy is a drawing-out of the implications of Socrates' principle of self-knowledge.

Socrates gives different accounts of his moral intuition. Sometimes he describes it simply as his own higher self speaking to his lower self; sometimes in mythological terms as a divine sign. The voice is always a veto, never a positive command. "From childhood it has been with me," he says, "as it were a voice always warning me against something I had in mind to do, never urging me to act." Here and elsewhere in Plato's own developed psychology More finds a recognition of what he is fond of calling the inner check—and what Babbitt, in pointed contrast to the Bergsonian phrase, called the "frein vital." On the power of staying the mere heedless outreaching of vital energy and on submission to this inner check, depends the possibility of forming judgments and of clarifying our spiritual perceptions.

This is certainly not the fashionable psychology of the moment, and some of More's critics have either made merry with, or contemptuously rejected, his inner check with its "Thou shalt not," and what they regard as his gloomy gospel of control for the sake of control. But they forget the other half of the doctrine, the positive role of the imagination in the determination of the will which is made possible by the inner check. Imagination here, it is scarcely necessary to say, is not synonymous with fancy as opposed to reason and judgment. Rather it is the concrete picturing of truth. It is Plato's superlative power of thus giving vividness and vitality to our conceptions of the structure and laws of the spiritual order which makes him, for More, pre-eminent among all thinkers ancient or modern.

As a character conceived by the poet or a statue conceived by the artist is projected, so to speak, into the world of objective existences, so the ethical imagination projects the facts of the moral consciousness, our notions of justice, temperance, and the like, so that they become the constituents of an immaterial world. But though these ethical forms are in this sense the products of imagination, they are discovered to have a status, authority, and power independent of my thought of them. They are *both* subjective and objective. The spiritual realm of Ideas (and here the reference is primarily to the ethical Ideas) is not indeed an immediate fact of consciousness like the intuition of responsibility; but it is a corollary of that fact which we are forced to accept as we discover by experience that we are subject to the laws of the spiritual world just as surely as we are subject to the laws of the physical world. Submission to them results in the happiness

of order and peace for the individual and for society. The disregard of them ends in the misery of chaos and conflict.

The vision of the forms of goodness and beauty awakens the love of the soul for them, and the more completely they are embodied in conduct the more vividly their reality is discerned. This realization of a spiritual order, and the imitation in conduct of the ethical forms which are its structure, is what Plato means by philosophy. It is a way of life, and a way which embodies, More is convinced, the essentials of the humanist's ideal. It is sufficient to refer to Plato's conception of justice as the unity of the soul, the harmonious control and balance of all its faculties so that none is developed to excess but each performs its proper function in realizing the happiness of self-completeness. The humanist of the Platonic type will not differ in the details of his conduct from the Aristotelian who takes as his guide the law of measure, of virtue as the Golden Mean. But More would urge that, in the ever present dilemma of determining the true point of moderation between two vicious extremes, if we are not to slip into opportunism, our eyes need to be fixed, as Plato fixes his, on standards which are not of our own making, but eternal. "Things human," as Plato says, "cannot be known without things divine," and "God, not man, is the measure of all things." More writes: "Without this union of other-worldliness and morality there can be no genuine spiritual experience. With it the doors of the spiritual life are thrown open, though the mind refuse to take any further step in the mystery of faith."

But Plato supplements philosophy in the sense in which the term has just been used with a theology and a mythology, and this, More thinks, for two reasons (which few scholars, it should be said, would accept): first, because of the difficulty of finding an explanation in terms of logic for the relation between the world of forms and the world of phenomena. A beautiful object is said to participate in or imitate the form of beauty, and the form is said to be present in the object. But these are metaphors, and in the *Parmenides*, where the difficulties of rendering their meaning precise are exposed one after the other, Plato is forced to the conclusion that a rationalistic explanation is impossible. Yet he is none the less convinced that, if we are to avoid utter confusion of thinking, belief in the forms must be retained.

In the second place, though Plato always held that the primary ground of happiness is justice or righteousness, he came to feel that something more was necessary, namely, a theistic basis for morality and the faith that justice shall in the end be made operative in the world. Accordingly he introduced within the spiritual order a further dualism of forms and a god or gods—with the attributes of personality. Whatever one may think of this or of other points of More's interpretation, he is not, I believe, chargeable here with an uncritical attempt to turn Plato into a full-blown monotheist of the Christian type. He does not forget that Plato is a Greek with an utterly different tradition behind him—and he realizes fully that

the ambiguities and elusive metaphorical senses of the Greek word θεός would make any such hasty identification doubtful in the extreme.

In any case it is clear that Plato in the *Laws* supports morality by a doctrine of a God of providence and goodness, who in the *Timaeus* is described in mythological terms as a divine Craftsman working from a pattern of eternal forms and striving to mould his handiwork, the world, in their likeness. He cannot do so completely, for he meets and must contend with an obscure element of disorder which he never completely masters. The ultimate cause of the whole process is the purpose of the divine Craftsman that all things should be like himself, good. Man's effort to bring order into the disordered motions of his own soul is thus a ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, an imitation of God.

But here clearly we have passed from the sphere of the immediate knowledge of intuition and the corollary therefrom to the region of faith. Faith carries over into our view of the world our own immediate sense of the elements of the Socratic intuition, freedom, responsibility, and purpose. It does not reject the data of observation which tell of a material order controlled by mechanical law. Neither does it properly, in More's view, project our consciousness of purpose into that order, but rather "it infers the existence of a free and responsible agent whose purpose is operative in the world while he himself is transcendent to the world." Such a view, he writes, "reacts on our immediate intuition of ourselves from which faith draws its content. Our sense of freedom . . . is directed to an effort to conform our will to the will of God. The morality of self-satisfaction is thus transformed into the morality of duty, and the sense of purpose is caught up into and justified by a vaster teleology. The God of purpose we trust will not leave our deepest desires frustrate." Now here More remains courageously true to his Socratic scepticism and admits freely that the inference of faith is, at least initially, a kind of defence attitude or wish belief. But the strengthening of the moral fibre of a life lived in accordance with it would seem to indicate that it has a sounder and more objective basis than has the sentimental reverie from which the pathetic fallacy springs. And, on the whole, he thinks the inference of faith is more credible, as it is certainly less dogmatic, than that of the scientific rationalist who will allow inference from only one set of data, impressions arising from the material order.

Further, More holds, this inference of faith is properly and inevitably expressed in anthropomorphic terms. Only thus can be avoided both the confusions involved in the notion of impersonal immanent teleology whether in its ancient or modern forms, and the blank abstractions in which all purely rationalistic religion must end. The primitive faith of the savage, and the faith which underlies Platonism and is Christianity, are all alike anthropomorphic. The savage, however, has only a vague notion of personality. Superstition develops into religion as the notion of personality becomes clearer as involving these three factors, freedom, responsibility,

purpose. Growth in religion, then, is not away from anthropomorphism but toward a broader and deeper anthropomorphism. It remains symbolical or, if you prefer, mythical in that its conceptions do not exhaust the divine essence. But the symbol suggests a truth which is *less* inadequate than is some absolute of the reason.

The direction in which More's thought is moving is clear. For him, as for some of the early Church Fathers, Platonism is a *Praeparatio Evangelica.* But at the same time he is well aware that if it is a preparation, it is not the Evangel. Plato begins with philosophy, which is the dominating element and which possesses the certain truth of intuition and logical demonstration. He goes on to a theology and a mythology with diminishing degrees of truth. Christianity, on the other hand, begins with a myth which it regards as a fact of history. By myth we are to understand, not the simply fictitious, but the necessarily anthropomorphic form which, as More puts it, "any commingling of the two spheres of the divine and human, any revelation of God to man must take."

More, of course, takes cognizance of the argument that the study of comparative religion forces us to dismiss the faith of Christianity on the ground that it exhibits the same absurd myths and silly or vicious practices which were common in its Hellenistic and Oriental background. "How above all," he writes, can we "take with any seriousness the central dogma of the Incarnation and of the Eucharistic Sacrament when these merely repeat in more decent, because more emasculated form, the ancient abominations of the totemistic sacrifice?" He would reply that it makes all the difference whether you judge the end by the beginning or the beginning by the end. He welcomes the evidence in Christianity of the continuity of man's religious experience, and, failing to see along what lines the Christian expression of that experience can be further purified and deepened, he is prepared to accept the Christian revelation in faith as its divinely ordered consummation. To reject the possibility of the Incarnation out of hand is, he insists, an instance of the dogmatic refusal to recognize the possibility that an immaterial order can act on a material order. Mysterious it is, of course, but, in spite of the labours of the psychologists, not a whit more mysterious than my simplest act of conscious volition, as when I decide to move the muscles of my legs and walk from here to there. This, of course, is no more than a bare admission of possibility. But granted that, and the true sceptic, he insists, must grant it, the question resolves itself into one of evidence.

More is thoroughly conversant with the intricate literary and historical problems of New Testament criticism, and in dealing with them he consistently steers a middle course. He refuses to accept, on the one hand, the extreme position that, given a divine revelation, it must by its very nature be absolute, free of all ambiguity and obscurity, enshrined in a book of plenary inspiration, and interpreted by an infallible church. In the records there is patently much that is purely legendary, the result of the super-

stitious love of the marvellous to which all religion is prone. Obscurities abound in the texts, and inconsistencies which are irreconcilable by any sound canons of scholarship, and this not only in unimportant details but in essentials. It is strange no doubt, though not altogether unintelligible, that when the intellect of man has devised exact terms for its theology, "revelation," as More says, "should so stammer in its speech." But so impressed is he with the luminous and compelling truth amid all the obscurities and irrelevancies that he refuses to leap to the other extreme of denying the possibility of *any* revelation in a record so palpably imperfect; and he is prepared to accept, as he puts it, "a revelation which is authoritative without being absolute and reasonable without being rationalistic." "One may believe," he writes, "that Christ said of himself 'I am the way the truth and the life,' and yet the way though it fail not is but dimly traced, and the truth for its discernment needs the light of our broken human faculties, and the life must be verified by experience."

It is evident, then, that More would reject the view which assumes that nothing supernatural can be historical and which reduces the figure of the founder of Christianity to the stature of a moral teacher, with a message of social significance. Sound criticism of the text of the synoptic gospels, he believes, leads inevitably to the conclusion that, no matter how or when, Christ became conscious of his mission as the Messiah of Hebrew prophecy and of that within him which is more than human. Candid scrutiny of the whole tenor of his life and teaching refutes the views that he was either impostor or paranoiac as themselves disingenuous and hysterical. It is clear from the texts that so profoundly moved by his words and still more by his very being were those who knew him best that they were constrained to acknowledge and bow before his stupendous claims.

And in all this More sees not some monstrosity of psychology but that which conforms to man's deepest spiritual experience. "In the union of two natures," he writes, "divine and human, a complete philosophy will discern enacted as in a cosmic drama, the last expression of the mystery, the beginning of which lies in the dualism of mind and matter." This central dogma of the Incarnation, More regards as the one essential of Christian belief. In all else he pleads for freedom of interpretation, a freedom which he himself exercises with results that would no doubt be branded in many quarters as heretical in the extreme.

More held that in the theology of St. Paul there are certain elements springing from his rabbinical training which appealed to the legalistic Latin mind and have had through that medium a disastrous effect. He was nevertheless convinced that on the whole the theology of St. Paul, and still more the theology of the Logos, the Word made flesh, do not obscure or distort the historical figure of Christ. Here, rather, is made explicit in theological and philosophical terms (to the limited degree to which that is possible) his own deeper self-consciousness and the impression made by him on the disciples. The Greek term λόγος, unlike the English *word* and

the Latin *verbum*, has a range and complexity of meaning which is often baffling. It means not only the spoken word but the thought of which the word is the expression and can signify, besides much else, reason, idea, form, purpose. In the Christian doctrine of the Logos all these senses are interwoven. What interests More particularly is the use which the Fathers of the Greek Church made of it to bring the doctrine of the Incarnation into relation with Platonism. In that process, he writes, "the fine flower of the Platonic philosophy blossoms after long centuries in a strange garden." He believes also, conversely, that in this Platonic setting the most profound significance of the central doctrine of Christianity is discerned. In illustration we can glance at only two points in his elaborate study of this subject.

It will be remembered that for Plato man's moral and intellectual development depends on his vision and imitation of the world of forms. In the myth of the *Timaeus* the creative activity of the divine Craftsman consists in bringing order into the obscure element of disorder by imposing on it the forms, which are independent of him and by which his activity is limited. It is clear that all this lent itself readily to Christian adaptation.

The peculiar power and authority of Christ's moral teaching, More thinks, was due not so much to its content, but to its literary form—to the extraordinary vividness and condensation of spiritual truth, in other words, to his imaginative insight. "Never man spake like this man"—and for this reason, according to the theology of the Logos, that in his person the wisdom and goodness of Divinity are immediately manifest. The gap between the world of forms and the world of things is bridged. As Clement of Alexandria said, Christ did not proclaim the one and the many; he is the one and the many. Thus the Platonic doctrine of imitation as ὁμοίωσις θεῷ receives, as More writes "a precision and a dynamic hold on the imagination which as pure philosophy it could not possess."

On the other hand, More thinks that the Christian doctrine of the Logos as the purpose of God both creative and redemptive, while it contains elements which are alien to Platonism, is acceptable only in so far as it does not try to transcend the irreducible and paradoxical Platonic dualisms, God and forms, good and evil. Only so can be avoided the desperate extremes of rationalistic theology which, however logical, have revolted the elementary moral sense of man. In the death of Christ, More, without presuming to plumb the mystery, would see a God who, like the Artisan of the *Timaeus*, eternally seeks to "persuade necessity," to bring the goodness of order out of the evil of disorder. But More knows well that in Christianity there is present an element not to be found in Platonism, the element of sacrifice. In the Atonement he discerns not a legalistic irresponsible absolute of knowledge and power, but a God who does not remain aloof from, is somehow implicated in, the failure of his handiwork, and who in suffering seeks to redeem it, seeks to quicken men's dull perceptions and

win them from their selfishness and greed, their pride and cruelty, by the revelation of the measure of his love.

III

Because of his acceptance of revealed religion and a dogmatic theology the very title of humanist might be denied to More by some for whom it is of the essence of humanism to avoid all religious reference. Historically of course the conception has not been so restricted, and, in our own day, men who profess the most varied religious beliefs from the vaguest to the most explicit, as well as some who profess none at all, have called themselves humanists. As an attitude or point of view in literary criticism contemporary American humanism is "concerned primarily," as More writes, "with the manifestation of life in art and literature," with, that is, the content more than with the form of literature. It tends therefore to be preoccupied with what are ultimately questions of psychology and philosophy, thereby, its opponents urge, unduly neglecting in a work of literature precisely that which makes it literature. There is some truth in this charge, but the humanist would reply that criticism can never be adequate if it attends only to form. Art for art's sake is a mere fetish, and has led to an extreme view of the autonomy of the artistic imagination. In this view the artist must liberate himself not only from what Bergson called "the symbols of practical utility which are conventionally and socially acceptable" but from all traditional values, concepts, and forms of communication; thus he is enabled to discover and reveal reality as it is, or even to create reality in a world of the private imagination. The humanist, in obedience to his principle of balance and measure, firmly rejects this absolute of art as he rejects all absolutes. He would insist that it is a distortion of the true autonomy and creativity of the artistic imagination, and he further points out, as a matter of literary history, that by identifying the ultimate reality of human experience with its most undeveloped and unordered elements, as they appear for example in some of the stream-of-consciousness writers, this theory of an absolute of art has ended by dehumanizing art.

Accordingly the humanist's first task is, as More writes, "to put back into life the values of which a false psychology and philosophy have emptied it." In his first essay in the volume entitled *On Being Human*, he notes that all humanists are agreed on this as a prime necessity. But it is precisely here, he believes, that humanism as an isolated movement is doomed to failure, for the humanity which it seeks to vindicate it is content to regard as an isolated phenomenon in an alien universe. The humanist maintains certainly that there is in man a "higher nature which is not of nature," an "ethical will" which is his "centre," which does not merely react to stimulus, but in some measure controls and directs, which apprehends and seeks to realize values which are objectively real, not mere projections of his desires or rationalizations of his instincts. But this will

must itself be grounded in a spiritual order; otherwise and inevitably it becomes a function of purely "natural" forces, its fancied purpose turns out to be illusion, and the values it seeks to realize are robbed of all potency in the mind and heart of man in the face of his greed for wealth and lust for power. "Will not the humanist," writes More, "unless he adds to his creed the faith and hope of religion find himself despite his protests dragged back into the camp of the naturalist?" Babbitt, to whom all dogmatic and revealed religion was repugnant, felt this strongly, and wrote that in the inevitable struggle between naturalists and supernaturalists he was prepared to range himself "unhesitatingly on the side of the supernaturalists." But the meaning which Babbitt attached to the idea of the supernatural was too elusive, and the content of the religious insight (akin to that of Buddhism) which he wished to preserve was too indefinite, in More's view, to provide the needed metaphysical basis for humanistic values. And as for the positive humanism of the Aristotelian type favoured by Babbitt, it cannot, as More rightly says, "stand on its own feet." Did not Aristotle himself, after beginning the *Ethics* with a notion of virtue on a purely empirical plane as a principle of measure and mediation, end his book with "some very exalted chapters on divine meditation"? So it is that More turns to Platonism and to Christianity with a marked Platonic vein to find a basis for the humanistic values which, he was convinced, are as fundamental for literature as for life.

IMPASSE IN THE HOLY LAND

CLARIS EDWIN SILCOX

IN a striking little book published in 1918 and entitled *Jerusalem, Past and Present*, Dr. Gaius Glenn Atkins traced the history of the holy city and made this striking summary:

> In the 2,900 years between 1000 B.C. and 1918 A.D., Jerusalem has been besieged and captured twenty-four times. Its walls have again and again been levelled. Its very site has been plowed and sown with salt. It has belonged to the ancient Canaanite, to the Jew, to the Greek, to the Roman, to the Syrian, to the Chaldean, to the Arab, to the Turk, to Latin Europe, and to England. Blood enough has been shed there to brim all its reservoirs, deeds enough of shame and glory have been done there to make a record of mingled light and darkness never to be forgotten. It is associated with the faith of the Jew, the fanaticism of the Mohammedan and the adoration of the Christian. All the great religions, the great cultures, the great races have met before its walls and striven to possess it.

Against such an historic setting, we must seek to understand the significance of the present struggle for power in the Holy Land. Here, as elsewhere, we cannot escape history, even though new factors may modify the complexion of the existing impasse, factors such as pipe-lines and the defence of the Suez Canal. But behind all this is the conflict between competing nationalisms, competing imperialisms, competing ideologies—all permeated with religious fanaticism pursuing unholy methods of promoting what it deems a holy cause.

I

However we look at it, Palestine occupies a strategic position. It is, perhaps, as much the centre of the world as any land can be. There, three continents—Asia, Africa, and Europe—converge. There, East and West meet, for though it is slightly east of Suez, it lies in that part of the East which gave us the Ten Commandments and powerfully influenced the course of Western civilization. In ancient times, the armies of empire moved across it repeatedly, and its inhabitants had to keep a watchful eye on the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Seleucid rulers, the Persians, the Romans, the Ottoman Turks. Though it may have been partly protected to the east and south by contiguous deserts, its fertility made it an object of envy. It was a land flowing with milk and honey. It is not to be wondered at that the children of Israel resolved to make it their own and regarded it as the "promised land." Before the First World War—so one story runs—the Kaiser said that whoever held Palestine could control the world: an exaggeration, perhaps, but such a thesis could be supported. Once modernized, it might easily become a great *entrepôt* of international trade; as a centre of communications (including airways) and defence, it has a great importance.

Palestine had already been well settled when the trek of the children of Abraham began. Indeed, Moses had specifically warned his followers to remember that they were being given great and goodly cities which they had not built, houses full of good things which they had not filled, wells digged which they had not digged, vineyards and olive-trees which they had not planted. They were admonished to remember all this when they might be tempted to believe that *their* own power and the might of *their* own hands had gotten them this wealth. What is more, the original inhabitants did not yield their land to the Israelitish invaders without a struggle. The conquest of Canaan was a long and tedious process.

In that land, Israel, once installed, did evolve her own distinctive way of life and those institutions and customs which have exercised, especially through Christianity, a tremendous influence on posterity. Our civilization is the joint legacy of Israel, Greece, and Rome and it might be argued that the greatest contribution to this legacy was that of Israel. Her supreme gift to posterity was her ethical monotheism, her repudiation of idolatry of all kinds, her insistence on the validity of the proposition inherent in her slogan: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is One." Monotheism, while it may possibly lead to intolerance and a mild form of fanaticism, is a good faith for those who wish to live in an orderly, non-capricious, and understandable universe.

But with recurrent wars, numerous subjugations of their land, and possibly attractive economic openings in other lands, Israel was gradually pried loose from her hold on Palestine. Some of her people were carried away captive after the fall of Samaria (B.C. 721); others met a similar fate after the fall of Jerusalem (B.C. 586). And though some returned from these exiles to rebuild Jerusalem, others remained in the lands where they were taken. Some became assimilated (those "ten lost tribes" and all that!); others retained the Jewish way of life and continued to sing the songs of Zion in a strange land. The dispersion of the Jews thus began long before the destruction of Jerusalem at the hands of Titus in 70 A.D. Long, long before, the Jews had gone forth and settled in every notable *entrepôt* in the Mediterranean world. Alexandria in Egypt was about as Jewish a hundred years before Christ as New York is now. When the apostle Paul undertook his missionary journeys, he made straight for the synagogue in the Jewish quarter on his arrival in any major city. Even on the day of Pentecost, the birthday of the Church, there "were dwelling at Jerusalem Jews, devout men, out of every nation under heaven" of which an imposing list is given. Whatever made the Jews wander took place long before the crucifixion of the Nazarene. After 70 A.D., and perhaps even more after the insurrection under Bar-Kochba (132-5 A.D.) the Diaspora was increased; but it had already begun centuries before.

If the children of Israel seeped out of Palestine and went to the four corners of the world, they still retained a devotion to Zion, the city of their God. Not even the destruction of their temple destroyed their loyalty;

for the Jewish people, "a peculiar people," were the people of "the book," and down through the centuries they cherished the hope of a "return to Zion." This hope was incorporated in their daily prayers, in their liturgy, in their accustomed greetings on festal days—"Next year in Jerusalem!" Has such perseverance ever been surpassed or even equalled?

Such magnificent persistence in unquenchable hope does, however, raise a number of queries. First, it is relatively clear that such optimism, however admirable, does not in itself convey to the optimists any right, moral or legal, to the land which they, either voluntarily or under compulsion, had abandoned centuries before. They may have a right to Palestine, but if they have, it must rest on other foundations.

Secondly, the fact that the prophets of Israel had foretold a return with rejoicing, while interesting and significant, adds nothing to such a claim of right. It helped to preserve the buoyancy of their faith in dark days, and was used by their religious teachers as an argument for maintaining the separateness of those called upon to fulfil "the mission of Israel." But there are different methods of interpreting prophecies. The British-Israelites, for example, have their own system, and often the attempt to interpret such prophecies not as poetry but literally leads to strange aberrations, even to mild lunacy. Non-Jewish groups have preserved the hope of the prophets, but when they sing of "Mother dear, Jerusalem" they are not envisaging an ancient city in Judah, but the eternal City of God, the blessed end to the pilgrimage of life.

Thirdly—and this observation is put forward with some hesitation—the very nostalgia for Palestine, carefully cultivated for more than two thousand years, may have been responsible for some of the anti-Semitism which has left such a sorry trail in almost every age. What are the epithets flung at the Jews? "Usurious" Jews? Yes, but also "wandering" Jews, "international" Jews. The Jews have retorted with much justice that they have always sought to be good citizens of the country of their residence, but the very insistence of some of their religious leaders on their destined return to Palestine must have militated against their complete identification with the people among whom they were temporarily living, and so condemned them to a sense of homelessness which was mirrored with distortions in the reactions of their inconsiderate hosts. It is often said that the Jews are unique because, of all peoples, they alone have "no national home"; this may be true, but it is also true that nations with a strong national consciousness will suspect any people who, while living among them, openly cultivate a nostalgia for some other country altogether. It might even be argued that the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and the activities of the Zionists in stimulating migration to Palestine, quite apart from the hostility of the Arabs, brought out into the open in many countries the antagonism of the Gentile world. Even in Communist Russia, which took stern steps to combat anti-Semitism, there was bitter opposition to Zionism.

Fourthly, there are many insuperable difficulties confronting the desire of the Jews to return to Zion and to transform it into a Jewish commonwealth. We may ignore for the time being the question of the optimum population of the country although Lowdermilk's enthusiasm (in his *Palestine, Land of Promise*) over its absorptive capacity may be justified. We may also ignore the existing opposition of the Arabs and assume that by some miracle not only would their opposition cease but that they, in turn, might be willing to accept the popular role of "displaced persons" and look for another homeland in order that the Jews might come in without limitation. We may also ignore the probability that many, perhaps most, Jews would not wish to return to Palestine. Even so, there remains the rather obstinate fact that Palestine is a Holy Land not only to the Jews but also to the Christians and to the Moslems, and that any solution which satisfies the Jews *alone* will probably be no solution at all.

Philip Graves called Palestine "The Land of Three Faiths," and so it will probably remain so long as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam survive. During the Byzantine period and down to the capture of Jerusalem by the Arabs in 637 A.D., Jerusalem was a purely Christian city. Five centuries later, between 1095 and 1299, to wrest the so-called holy places from the impious hands of the "infidel," the flower of Christian Europe's nobility and fighting man-power poured out their blood in a movement which, wrote Dr. Atkins, "whitened every road between the Alps and the Dead Sea with the blood of pilgrims and warriors and bled Europe for two hundred years. The West probably lost a larger proportion of the population through the wars of the Crusades and the pestilence and famine incident thereto than it ever lost before or since. . . . When the Crusades were done, the great spiritual, intellectual and artistic impulses which are the glory of mediaevalism and whose broken fragments are still our richest treasure, were exhausted." The Crusades may have been, and probably were, an incredible folly; nevertheless, they did reveal the concern of Christian Europe for the land where the feet of the Saviour, in the days of his flesh, had trod. (Also, perhaps, for a bastion against possible attacks from the East!) If blood poured out constitutes a valid claim to a land, the countries that sent the *élite* of their chivalry on those half-mad expeditions have some right to an interest in the fate of the Holy Land.

Nor can the Mohammedans be ignored. They have occupied Palestine with a few slight interregnums since 637 A.D. Islam has held Palestine continuously as long as Israel ever did—or longer. It is true that the Arabs of 637 A.D. were far more praiseworthy and generous rulers than the Ottoman Turks who captured it in 1076 A.D. The Arabian culture, whatever its defects, was a great culture and added much to the culture of Europe itself, especially in Spain, but up to the end of the First World War, Ottoman rule was mis-rule and a blight. The Ottoman Empire was Mohammedan, to be sure, but the Arabs did not like it any better than the Christians.

There are several hundred million Moslems in the world and to them, as well as to the Jews and the Christians, Palestine is a Holy Land. To expect several hundred million Christians and several hundred million Moslems to turn over the land of their holy places to a few million Jews who might transform it into a Jewish state, and to do this without mental reservations, is wishful thinking.

Fifthly, possession is nine-tenths of the law. Even despite the large Jewish migrations since 1919, the Arabs are still in a great majority in Palestine, and their opposition to the possibility of becoming a minority is steadily growing. When Allenby entered Jerusalem in 1917, the Jewish population of Palestine probably did not exceed 58,000 out of a total of 700,000. In 1936, the total population was approximately 1,372,000. Of this 390,000 were Jews, 865,000 were Moslems, and 104,000 were Christians. The Arabs do not believe that the country should be handed over to the Jews, and who is going to take the responsibility of forcing them to surrender it?

II

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 was accomplished almost entirely by British arms, with the assistance of possibly 100,000 Arabs of whom some 20,000 were reported to have been killed in action. In 1915, a Zion Mule Corps was recruited from Palestine and Egypt, aggregating 700 men, and later in 1917 three completely Jewish battalions consisting in all of about 6,000 men served in the Near East. That is for the most part the *specifically* Jewish contribution to victory over Turkey. But the total number of British forces involved in the operations against Turkey was 1,400,000 exclusive of the Navy. These facts are significant.

Colonel Lawrence may have exaggerated the contribution of the Arabs, but it was real, and though it is true that there was no revolution of Palestinian Arabs against Turkish rule, the possibility of such a revolt (as George Antonius points out in *The Arab Awakening*) had been precluded by the promptness with which the Turkish authorities hanged the potential Arab insurgents! On November 2, 1917, the date of Balfour's letter to Lord Rothschild, it was clear that whatever might happen in Europe, Turkish rule in Palestine was doomed. In the following month, Allenby was to enter Jerusalem. Why, then, did the British government choose this particular time to issue the famous Balfour Declaration?

The suggestion that Lloyd George offered the Jews the national home as a gesture of thanks to Dr. Chaim Weizmann for his help with TNT does not make sense. Such conduct might have been appropriate at the court of Haroun-al-Raschid, but hardly at 10 Downing Street! The real reasons are clear enough, although they are too often forgotten.

In the fall of 1917 the war as a whole was going badly. General Allenby's advance on Jerusalem was one of the few bright spots. The fact that the

United States was at last in the war and building its bridge of boats was a basis of real hope. But the Russian Revolution was on, and the Kerensky provisional government was tottering. On November 7—five days after the Balfour Declaration was announced—the Bolsheviks proclaimed that Kerensky had been overthrown. It looked as if the eastern front would crumble. If it did, could the Americans get enough men on the western front to meet the potential exigencies of the situation? Lloyd George himself has told the story in *The Truth about the Peace Treaties:*

> The support of the Zionists for the cause of the Entente would mean a great deal as a war measure. Quite naturally Jewish sympathies were to a great extent anti-Russian, and therefore in favour of the Central Powers. No ally of Russia, in fact, could escape sharing that immediate and inevitable penalty for the long and savage persecution of the Jewish race. . . . Another most cogent reason for the adoption by the Allies of the policy of the Declaration lay in the state of Russia itself. Russian Jews had been secretly active on behalf of the Central Powers from the first; they had become the chief agents of German pacifist propaganda in Russia; by 1917 they had done much in preparing for the general disintegration of Russian society, later recognized as the Revolution. It was believed that if Great Britain declared for the fulfilment of Zionist aspirations in Palestine under her own pledge, one effect would be to bring Russian Jewry to the cause of the Entente. . . . It was believed also, that such a declaration would have a potent influence upon world Jewry outside Russia, and secure for the Entente the aid of Jewish financial interests. In America, their aid in this respect would have a special value when the Allies had exhausted the gold and marketable securities available for American purchases. Such were the chief considerations which, in 1917, impelled the British Government towards making a contract with Jewry.[1]

Without this explanation, it is difficult to understand the reason for the Balfour Declaration. And it must be remembered that all the reports coming out of Russia at this time interpreted the Bolshevik Revolution as inspired by Russian Jews. It was this that gave credence later to that bizarre forgery, "The Protocols." Consequently, when the declaration was issued, continues Mr. Lloyd George:

> Millions of leaflets were circulated in every town and area throughout the world where there were known to be Jewish communities. They were dropped from the air in German and Austrian towns, and they were scattered throughout Russia and Poland. I could point out substantial and in one case decisive advantages derived from this propaganda amongst the Jews. In Russia, the Bolsheviks baffled the efforts of the Germans to benefit by the harvests of the Ukraine and the Don, and hundreds of thousands of German and Austrian troops had to be maintained to the end of the war on Russian soil, whilst the Germans were short of men to replace casualties on the Western front. I do not suggest that this was due entirely, or even mainly, to Jewish activities. But we have good reason to believe that Jewish propaganda in Russia had a great deal to do with the difficulties created for the Germans in Southern Russia after the peace of Brest-Litovsk.[2]

Then follows this ominous statement: "The Germans themselves know that to be the case, and the Jews in Germany are suffering today [1938] for the fidelity with which they and their brethren in Russia and in America discharged their obligations under the Zionist pledge to the Allies."

[1] Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (London, 1938), II, 1121-2.
[2] *Ibid.*, II, 1140.

Of course, one need not deduce from this that either Lloyd George or Balfour was insincere. Nevertheless, that is the clue to the mystery. But what is, perhaps, the reprehensible part of the declaration is its purposeful ambiguity. Before the decision was made, Lord Curzon framed a cautious memorandum on the wording in which he asked for a clarification of the mystical phrase "a national home in Palestine for the Jewish race." Note his comment: "For important as may be the political reasons (and they seem to me exclusively political) for adopting such a line of action, we ought at least to consider whether we are encouraging a practicable ideal, or preparing the way for disappointment and failure."[3] After explaining what he thinks might possibly be done for the Jews, he asks: "If we contemplate no more, is it wise to use language which suggests so much more?"

But when the question came up for final action before the War Cabinet, Lord Curzon withdrew his objection and the declaration in all its notable ambiguity was issued. The Cabinet had been warned of the dangers in not stating more precisely what it meant, but it went ahead. The conclusion seems incontrovertible; it intended the declaration to be ambiguous, and out of that fact has come much of the existing difficulty. The Zionists could, when they wished, interpret it one way; the British could interpret it another way; both could try to persuade the Arabs that it was really mostly orange juice and hardly castor oil at all; and the Arabs would not need to believe either of them!

Shortly before Husain, who had been the leader of the Arab revolt, died in exile (June, 1931), he gave George Antonius certain important interviews, in which he made it clear that he retained a touching faith in Britain but not in Lloyd George. He said: "The English, my son, are an honourable kind, in word and in deed, in fortune and in adversity. I say honourable. Only his Excellency the estimable, energetic Luweed Jurj [Lloyd George] is something of an acrobat and a fox. I say a fox, saving your presence."[4]

Worse still! With the Balfour Declaration, Palestine had actually been given away three times! In the negotiations between the British and Husain which began in February, 1914 (before World War I had begun), the Sharif's price for a revolution was the independence of Arab countries south of latitude 37° N. This would have included Syria and Palestine. The British demurred only in regard to certain specified areas—*Palestine was not mentioned*—which, they claimed, "cannot be said to be purely Arab and must on that account be excepted from the proposed limitation." Later, they urged the exception on the ground that "French interests were involved." Husain was quite magnanimous in his reply, as revealed in the MacMahon correspondence, and without yielding his position agreed to postpone pressing the issue until the war had been won. On that understanding, the revolt began.

[3] *Ibid.*, II, 1123-4.

[4] George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938), 183.

Then, in the spring of 1916, came the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Russia, France, and England. Lloyd George refers to it as a "foolish document" and admits that "the Arabs were not informed of the transaction." It was the Bolsheviks, on attaining power, who made the agreement public. According to this foolish document, Palestine was, on the annexed map, a "brown area" in which there was to be "established an international administration the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other allies and the Shereff of Mecca." The collapse of Russia in 1917 provided a good excuse for ignoring it later, but Russia had not entirely collapsed when the Balfour Declaration was issued. One of the most amazing and amusing details of the scheme provided that the most advanced parts of the Arab world were to be placed under European or international control, while it offered a moderate independence to the culturally most backward areas!

Finally, the Balfour Declaration, for the biblical and non-biblical reasons suggested above, was published on November 2, 1917, with its ambiguous proposals for the establishment of *a* (not *the*) Jewish national home and with safeguards intended to protect the rights of those at the time resident in Palestine. Five days later, the Bolsheviks assumed power.

III

Chickens come home to roost, and the Arabs, when all these feats of acrobatic diplomacy became known, felt that they had been sold down the river, even if they did receive a real and significant amount of independence as a reward for their services. And then when the Zionists, in their efforts to implement the Balfour Declaration, began to stimulate migration, especially from eastern Europe, and to talk openly not only of a national home but of a Jewish state which should be as "Jewish as England is English and Canada is Canadian,"[5] Arab resistance visibly hardened and has gone on hardening ever since.

The Palestinian Arabs and their fellow-Arabs in other lands suspected that sooner or later they were to be turned out of their country to make room for those who would establish a truly Jewish state. Nor, unfortunately, was anything adequate done by the Zionists to allay their suspicions. No one denies that the Zionists with their huge capital investments have done some marvellous things in Palestine, but they failed to do the one thing pre-eminently needful, that is, to understand or to endeavour to understand sympathetically how the Arabs felt about it. Hence, the Arabs cannot be blamed for any coldness they may have shown in the Second World War; and it is not surprising that some of them were beguiled by the propaganda of Hitler and Mussolini. Once bitten, twice shy!

They have good ground for complaint, and their feelings cannot be ignored even though the plight of the displaced Jews in Europe is appalling

[5] **A. Revusky,** *Jews in Palestine* (New York, 1936), 307.

and the wounds of Jewry cry out for some balm in Gilead, or in Palestine, or in the United States, or in Canada, or wherever there is still a Christian conscience that has not gone to sleep. Two wrongs do not make a right, and one cannot honestly solve the problem of the displaced European Jews by threatening to displace Arabs. That bitter problem cannot be solved by nations who leave the entire solution to the Arabs and refuse to do anything about it themselves. That is something for Canadians to ponder.

When Theodore Herzl tried to convert the Sultan to his scheme of a Jewish national home in Palestine, he held out the hope that the great Jewish financial houses would ease Turkey's monetary worries. Even this did not convince the Sultan. Then Herzl sought the ear of the German Kaiser and suggested to him that only a Jewish home in Palestine would make possible the completion of the Berlin-Baghdad railway. When that failed to accomplish anything, Herzl directed his attention to Britain and even for a time seemed willing to consider the Uganda alternative.

The Zionists are now urging that a Jewish state, an integral member of the British Commonwealth, would be a valiant defender of British interests in the Near East. But events in Palestine seem to indicate that a Zionist state would, quite naturally, consider first and always the interests of the Zionist state itself. Nor does there seem to be in Zionist circles today any adequate understanding of the absolute necessity that Britain should do for the Arabs, under the circumstances, full justice. And some of them quite forget that if it had not been for the continued resistance of Britain to Nazi Germany, when Britain stood alone, and when even Russia seemed to be in league with Germany, there would probably be no displaced Jewish persons in Europe to worry about, and no Jewish homeland anywhere. Hitler would have seen to that. They seem to ignore the fact that Britain, rendered tragically poor by the war, needing for her recuperation some easement from the expense of large armies, and short of man-power in her factories, has to pour men and treasure into Palestine to offset the vicious stupidities of the terrorist gangs and to prevent the violation of her pledges to the Arabs by those Jews who are being smuggled into Palestine under suspicious circumstances. They even seem quite ready, if they cannot get everything they want from Britain, to invite Russia to do some fishing in these troubled waters.

It may be urged that the Jews are desperate, that the Zionists feel that it is now or never, that one cannot expect equanimity and cool judgment in a people who have suffered so terribly under Hitler. All this is probably true, but the fact remains that Britain has tried to discharge the responsibilities of her ambiguous and mutually contradictory pledges in the face of overwhelming difficulties, and as a result faces the antagonism of both Jews and Arabs. The situation today seems all but hopeless.

None of the various solutions proposed offers much promise of success. Sometimes, it seems as if the very insistence of the Zionists on the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, in terms agreeable to their own

aspirations and irrespective of the feelings of the Arabs, will only create a new focal centre of anti-Semitism not alone in the Near East but in the whole world, and will alienate a vast amount of that very real sympathy for, and desire to understand, the Jews which their persecutions at the hands of the Nazis have brought them. This would seem to be the all-important danger to be averted, and it is necessary to say so, even though it may hurt some whom no true friend of Israel would willingly hurt. Let it not be said tomorrow that the Jews seem to have a positive genius for making enemies!

Perhaps, when the United Nations is functioning with greater assurance, it may be able to cut the Gordian knot by declaring Palestine—the Holy Land—a Federal District of the World, and establishing on Mount Zion the capital of the world government that shall be. The Zionists might not welcome this, as it might spell the end of their ancient nostalgia. However, in the name of the rising internationalism emerging in our world, it might also rebuke the rising nationalism of the Jews. And in a more spiritual sense, this might be the higher fulfilment of prophecy, since the administration of the *One World* would be buttressed by a common respect for the sanctities of the *One God*—Jewish, Christian, and Mohammedan.

If the Zionists would only lift their eyes above the crudities and horrors of the moment, they might see on the far horizon the promise of the real fulfilment of the mission of Israel—peace on earth among men of goodwill. They might see the light and truth of God going forth out of Jerusalem. They might see the Holy Land becoming a land in which all the nations of the world were blessed. They might see the peace and prosperity of Zion —the City of God—coming not by might, nor by power, but by the Spirit of God. Will they see it in time?

Otherwise, the Holy Land will become unholy; that which was intended to be for the healing of the nations will prove only a curse and an abomination; and the international Jew may begin his wanderings again.

PHILOSOPHICAL TRENDS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA

THOMAS A. GOUDGE

THE nineteenth century was largely a formative period in American philosophy. Historical circumstances were unfavourable to the development of indigenous systems of thought, and philosophical conceptions nearly all came from Europe. What happened to these conceptions after crossing the Atlantic is a story that deserves to be better known than it is. Not only does it possess intrinsic interest as a chapter in the history of ideas, but it also helps to illuminate the doctrines expounded later by such "typically American" philosophers as Peirce, James, and Dewey. Moreover, it serves to cast a significant light on certain aspects of American civilization which emerged during the century. My purpose in the present paper is to relate this story in its broadest outlines.

It is reasonably accurate to say that the philosophical trends of the period were four in number. Until the middle of the century, Transcendentalism was the dominant mode of thought outside academic circles, while the Scottish philosophy of Common Sense prevailed within the universities. After 1860, the mantle of the Transcendentalists fell on the St. Louis Hegelians, that remarkable group of enthusiasts for classical German philosophy which was formed in the Middle West. The last thirty years of the century witnessed the arrival of Evolutionism in both the Darwinian and Spencerian versions. Its impact soon swept away the Scottish doctrines, and left a permanent effect on the intellectual life of the country.

I

Transcendentalism was the form which philosophical romanticism first took in America. It has been characterized as an inheritance from Kant admixed with elements from the systems of Fichte and Schelling.[1] This was, indeed, its primary source. But in the case of such a major representative of the movement as Emerson, the influence of Platonism was also paramount. Both these sources were superimposed on the native moral earnestness which was carried over from the Puritan tradition. One might say, therefore, that Transcendentalism was an amalgam of Platonism, Puritanism, and German romanticism, with the third of these as the most important.

Teutonic ideas came to America in two ways. The first was through the American edition of Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection*, published in 1829 with a long introduction by James Marsh, President of the University of Vermont. This work, which was saturated with the spirit of Kantism,

[1] H. G. Townsend, *Philosophical Ideas in the United States* (New York, 1934), 78 ff.

became a veritable source book for American romantics. The second medium was provided by young intellectuals like Bancroft, Ticknor, Hedge, Henry James Sr., and Edward Everett, who made pilgrimages to Germany in the first few decades of the century, and returned full of admiration for the culture they had discovered. Emerson was expressing a common opinion when he said of Everett that he had "an immense advantage in being the first American who sat in the German universities and brought us home in his head their whole cultural methods and results."[2] Such men laid the foundations for Transcendentalism.

The movement itself was restricted mainly to New England. The principal advocates, Emerson, Channing, Parker, and Ripley, were Unitarian clergymen who sought a more adequate formulation for their theology. They felt that the pallid negativism into which their faith had fallen was doubly ineffectual. On the one hand, it made little progress in the struggle against rationalistic materialism which portrayed the individual as a mere puppet of natural laws, and reduced his consciousness to a by-product of physical forces. On the other hand, it was out of harmony with the new spirit of the times. This was the period when American society was changing from an agrarian and commercial economy to an industrial one. Vast natural resources were beginning to be exploited by men of energy and initiative. The age of Jackson had given fresh content to notions of political democracy. If Unitarianism was to be a vital factor in the community, it required a philosophy that would express the dominant motifs involved in these changes. That is to say, it needed a philosophy which was both idealistic and individualistic.

Transcendentalism proved to be the answer to this need. By accepting Coleridge's distinction between understanding and reason—the former yielding scientific knowledge, the latter yielding that deeper revelation of feeling which is wisdom—the basis was provided for a philosophical idealism. Hence, in place of the doctrine that intellect is the sole source of truth, the Transcendentalists affirmed the primacy of feeling and intuition. The pronouncements of the heart are always to be preferred to those of the head. In opposition to determinism, they defended the doctrine of free will. Man has a direct awareness of his freedom to act. In contrast to the view that consciousness is a mere epiphenomenon, they stressed the active, creative role of mind in the world. As Emerson put it in his lecture on "The Transcendentalist": "The materialist insists on facts, on history, on the force of circumstances and the animal wants of man; the idealist on the power of Thought and Will, on inspiration, on miracle, on individual culture."[3] From this it was but a step to the exalting of "self-reliance" as an important moral value. Thus the note of individualism was sounded. The releasing of man's creative potentialities required that he should be freed from the limitations of a mechanistic philosophy, and be given a

[2]*Journals* (London, 1913), VIII, 225. [3]*Works* (London, 1903-21), I, 329-30.

faith which would encourage him to develop the richness of his inner life.

Another facet of Transcendentalism was its opposition to doctrines which separated man from nature, and regarded natural phenomena as inimical to the concerns of the soul. On this point it was thoroughly monistic. Just as Kant had argued that the empirical world is really the product of the mind's activity, so the Transcendentalists declared nature to be the embodiment of spirit in the world of sense. Their affirmations usually took the form of pantheism. Nature is an incarnation of God. The Divine Essence is at work in all things. It expresses itself objectively in the language of physical events, subjectively in the language of human feelings, intuitions, and thoughts. Such an attempt to interpret nature in terms of mind is a typical feature of philosophical romanticism. The Transcendentalists adopted it as a basis for establishing the harmony of the inner and the outer worlds. It is interesting that while these doctrines were being preached, contemporary economic developments were giving a concrete demonstration that nature, so far from being hostile to man, is highly amenable to his will.

Pantheism predisposes its adherents to take an optimistic view of life. Since God is everywhere, all that happens is in accordance with the Divine Nature, and must therefore be good. Without worrying about the metaphysical difficulties involved, the Transcendentalists accepted this conclusion. Ultimately, they urged, there can be nothing sinful in the character or action of a rational being. Imperfection or imperfect action there may be, because the whole power of God is not exerted. Yet every act, so far as it goes, is just what it should be, and is in harmony with God's will. This extreme optimism stood in sharp contrast with the teachings of Puritanism. But it was in full agreement with the expansive mood of the age.

Being intimately bound up with the concerns of the pulpit, Transcendentalism was less intent on theoretical consistency in its ideas than on making them a guide to conduct. Certain anticipations of Pragmatism therefore emerge in its pronouncements. This is particularly true of Emerson. In his famous address on "The American Scholar" he says: "The preamble of thought, the transition through which it passes from the unconscious to the conscious, is action."[4] Elsewhere, he declares that the mind "melts knowledge into act." Sharply stated, this can only mean that ideas have their origin in practical activity, and also find their outlet in action. Such a linking of theory with practice was to become a central theme of the pragmatic school more than half a century later.

Transcendentalism proved to be, on the whole, a liberating creed. True, it contained a strong dash of *Schwärmerei* and a predilection for mysticism which might have made it obscurantist. But this tendency was more than counterbalanced by its other elements, which combined to make it a progressive influence in American culture.

[4] *Ibid.*, I, 94-5.

II

The academic world looked on all this with profound suspicion. Transcendentalism appeared to it as an unbalanced if not a dangerous doctrine. The fact that certain members of the movement were outspoken in condemnation of slavery, and that Parker, for example, had been indicted for obstructing the operation of the Fugitive Slave Law, seemed to confirm the subversive character of the new ideas. Even the aloof Emerson was *persona non grata* at his own university of Harvard for a time because of his unorthodox views. The denominational colleges on the Atlantic seaboard during this period were highly conservative institutions. Their primary function of training recruits for the ministry obliged them to hold fast to tradition, and discourage adventures of ideas. It also required them to embrace a philosophy which would be a bulwark against intellectual radicalism.

They found the requisite point of view in the Scottish philosophy of Common Sense. From the works of Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart, and William Hamilton they obtained "an eminently safe philosophy which kept undergraduates locked in so many intellectual dormitories, secure from the dark speculations of materialism and the beguiling allurements of idealism."[5] It likewise served as an antidote to scepticism, and to high-flown speculation on first and last things. The stronghold of the movement was Princeton College. The chief spokesman was James McCosh, President of Princeton, who expounded "the principles of common sense" in several ponderous volumes.

As might be expected, both the presentation and the content of these principles were unspectacular. The Scottish philosophers had no nonsense about them. They restricted themselves to what could be established by factual observation and cautious inference. No subtle analyses interrupted the orderly march of their logic; no dubieties disturbed the general atmosphere of assurance. Historically controversial points were dealt with by appealing to "self-evident principles," or to the "intuitions of the mind." Their use of the term "intuition" had little in common with that of the Transcendentalists. McCosh was careful to explain that intuitions were not to be confused with vague feelings or premonitions. There was nothing mysterious about them. They were simply the vehicles of direct and certain knowledge.[6] Among the more important were the intuitions of the external world, of the uniformity of nature, of mathematical truths, of the self, and of moral values. The whole superstructure of knowledge rested on a foundation of indubitable propositions.

The Scottish philosophers defended a dualistic position in both episte-

[5] I. W. Riley, *American Thought* (New York, 1915), 120.

[6] One of the most influential discussions of the cognitive function of intuitions is contained in Levi Hedge's text-book, *The Elements of Logick* (1816). An avowed disciple of the Scottish school, Hedge was the first professor of philosophy at Harvard College (1810-32).

mology and metaphysics. Mind and matter were regarded as distinct and independent elements. Matter, as that which is extended and resistant, they held to be directly apprehended in knowledge. Things are just what they appear to be; though, of course, what appears in a particular perception is only part of a more complex object. Truth consists in the conformity of ideas to things. The test of truth is unprejudiced observation of the facts, or valid inference therefrom. Mind as that which thinks, feels, and wills is directly apprehended as a unitary and enduring self. The universe is made up of a vast plurality of physical objects and events, together with a plurality of human minds. It exists in space and time, both of which are independent realities. In short, the world is precisely what common sense takes it to be. A sound philosophy reaches the same general conclusions as does the plain man. The only difference is that it states these conclusions in a systematic and logical fashion.

This declaration gave assurance to those solid citizens faced with the problem of adjusting themselves to the ideas that were flowing into the country from Germany. As the writings of Kant began to be known, it was agreed that his philosophy could have significance only if it was translatable in terms of Common Sense. One writer remarked in the influential *New Englander* in 1857, that "some competent mind should give us in the language of Reid and Edwards, the entire work of Kant, translating sentence by sentence, and chapter by chapter, as they occur in their order, with here and there such short footnotes as might be necessary." Only then could it be ascertained whether Kant was "worth anything or not."[7]

From the standpoint of those administering the colleges, the Scottish philosophy had a number of merits. Its method encouraged students to think, but prevented them from thinking too much. Intuition prescribed the limits within which reasoning was necessary. The conclusions reached were in accord with the opinions of the respectable man in the street. The presence of dualism in the universe excused one from the labour of working out a unified system of thought. Above all, the Scottish philosophy had the good sense to render unto theology the things that were theology's. It did not try to compete with revealed religion. On the contrary, it offered an eminently suitable supplement to religious instruction. Finally, in a period when Jacksonian democracy and the demand for extended suffrage were challenging established political beliefs and practices, the Scottish philosophy helped the colleges to remain a stabilizing influence in the community.

During the final quarter of the century, the philosophy of Common Sense gradually disappeared as new winds of doctrine began to blow through college lecture halls. Yet its effects lingered on in American thought, and can be detected in such developments as Peirce's "Critical Common-

[7]Quoted in J. Dorfman, *The Economic Mind in American Civilization* (New York, 1946), II, 701.

sensism," James's "Radical Empiricism," and Dewey's "Philosophy of the Common Man."

III

While the sober principles of Reid and Hamilton were being taught in the East, the philosophy of Hegel began to flourish in a corner of the Middle West. At first blush, it is hard to imagine a more unlikely spot for the ardent study of Hegel than St. Louis in the eighteen-sixties. Yet this turbulent frontier city, full of grandiose plans to become the nation's capital, illustrated some of the major Hegelian theses. It was a centre of continual change and movement, of the clash and reconciliation of opposing tendencies. It exhibited the unity and homogeneity of a metropolis in the making, before social classes had clearly emerged. The majority of the population were European immigrants, a large number of whom had come from Germany. These people brought with them something of the intellectual atmosphere of their homeland, which for several decades had been dominated by the thought of Hegel.

The founding of St. Louis Hegelianism was due to one of these immigrants, H. C. Brokmeyer, in collaboration with a native-born American, W. T. Harris. Brokmeyer was the prophet of the movement. His powerful personality attracted followers, and his oracular interpretation of Hegel kept enthusiasm at a high pitch. Harris, a young Connecticut schoolmaster who migrated to St. Louis in 1857, was converted from Transcendentalism by Brokmeyer, and became the chief propagandist of the school. He assiduously expounded Hegel's ideas in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* which he founded in 1867. This periodical, the first of its kind in the country, played a vital role in providing a vehicle for the younger generation of philosophers. Continuing until 1893, it carried the maiden articles of Peirce, James, Royce, and Dewey. At its inception, however, it was designed primarily to be the mouthpiece of Hegel in the New World.

The St. Louis group accepted Hegelianism almost without modification. They saw the universe through the eyes of their master as the expression of Absolute Reason, whose dialectical laws obtain everywhere. Thus, the ceaseless activity of nature, the on-going processes of history, society, and culture, the growth of personality—all move through the three stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The cosmos is an arena of perpetual strife and reconciliation. Yet it is also a unity. The one is in the many and the many in the one. Underlying the apparent separateness of things there is continuity. Hence, personal experience is continuous with public institutions, thought is continuous with action, mind with nature, induction with deduction, and so on. Everything is connected with everything else in a single rational system; and only this system is fully real.

Unlike the Transcendentalists and the Scottish realists, the St. Louis Hegelians sought to show the limitations of individualism in social thinking.

Metaphysically, they contended, the individual is less real than the community or nation of which he is a part. Indeed, it is through participation in the affairs of the community that he achieves full stature as a person. So long as he merely pursues his own private ends, he is dealing with that which is ephemeral and insignificant in the light of the whole. Individualism is an essential step in the development of national consciousness. But it must be *aufgehoben* if that consciousness is to come to full fruition. This conclusion was related to another important trend of the times, the dawning sense of nationhood in America after the Civil War. St. Louis was a very appropriate point of origin for the expression of this, since the city was almost in the centre of the continent and served as a link between East and West.

Another phase of the St. Louis movement was its interest in social reform through education. This was a logical consequence of its acceptance of Hegelianism. For Hegel, the thought of unreflective persons was saturated with delusions of which they were unaware. The plain man, so far from possessing ultimate truth, lives in a realm of appearances. Only by moving away from the standpoint of common sense, and following the path of rational thought, can he gain a comprehension of the real character of his world. Education of a philosophical kind is therefore essential to the development of his humanity. It is also essential to the improvement of social conditions, for it shows him how to bring his institutions into accord with the ultimate nature of things. This educational task was the one to which Harris increasingly devoted his energies. He became Superintendent of Schools in St. Louis, and later United States Commissioner of Education. To the end of his life he remained convinced that the doctrines of Hegel were of great importance in providing enlightenment for the average citizen and raising the level of his social life.

But the nation was not in a frame of mind to be converted to Hegelianism. Expanding industrialism continued to put a premium on individual enterprise and the principles of laissez-faire. The achievements of experimental science were turning men's minds away from metaphysical speculation to the study of scientific method. The revolutionary implications of Darwinism were attracting universal attention. Consequently, when, in 1879, Harris accepted the invitation of Bronson Alcott to found a school of philosophy in Concord, the project was foredoomed to failure. Alcott apparently hoped that a transfusion from Hegel might revive moribund Transcendentalism. In any event, he believed that Hegel's dialectic would help to counteract the materialistic tendencies of current scientific thought.[8] However, the school lasted less than a decade. In its brief heyday, it offered a varied programme of courses, including lectures by such notables as McCosh, Benjamin Peirce, James, and Fiske. But the philosophy of Hegel receded more and more into the background.

[8]Cf. Van Wyck Brooks, *New England: Indian Summer* (New York, 1940), 332 ff.

It was not surprising that this philosophy—the greatest speculative synthesis of modern times—should leave its mark on American thought. Nor was it surprising that Hegel's ideas should be modified to suit native intellectual needs and interests. Peirce, Royce, and Dewey all provide illustrations in point. Peirce's metaphysical categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) and his espousal of an "objective logic" have a decidedly Hegelian flavour. Indeed, he himself declares: "My philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume." Royce's objective idealism, with its doctrine of the Absolute Will as the ultimate reality, is very close to Hegelianism. Dewey was at the start of his career an avowed Hegelian. Although he soon deserted this position in favour of instrumentalism, many of his mature conceptions, such as the public character of experience, the continuity and interconnection of events, the importance of philosophy for education and social reform, reveal traces of his youthful association.

IV

The last, and perhaps the most influential, trend in philosophy during the century was produced by the arrival of evolutionary ideas in America. The controversy which resulted has been described as "the storm which broke the stagnant air and aroused many American minds from dogmatic torpor."[9] Discussion was precipitated on two levels, the scientific and the philosophical. Darwin's biological hypothesis was the subject-matter of debate in the former area; Spencer's evolutionary speculations, the subject-matter in the latter. These two levels, although logically distinct, were frequently confused in the heat of the argument.

The chief scientific figures involved were Asa Gray and Louis Agassiz. Gray, the noted Harvard botanist, wrote one of the first reviews of the *Origin of Species*, in which he warmly supported Darwin. The review gave a brilliant summary of the evidence for the mutability of species, and restated the case for the theory of natural selection through the struggle for survival. The zoologist Agassiz, like his teacher Cuvier, remained a bitter opponent of evolutionary conceptions, and defended the notion of fixed biological species. He declared it far more likely that species had arisen through successive acts of creation than through a purely natural mode of development. His judgment here was undoubtedly influenced by his religious beliefs rather than by scientific evidence. The extreme form of supernaturalism to which he adhered made the theory of evolution seem almost a blasphemy. He declared that he would outlive "this mania." Yet when he died in 1873, practically all the scientists of the country agreed with Gray's estimate of Darwinism.

Among other defenders of the theory, Chauncey Wright deserves special mention. A man of clear and acute mind, Wright argued that Darwin's hypothesis belonged exclusively to biology, and had no religious, philosophical, or social implications whatsoever. This position forced him to

[9]Morris R. Cohen in the *Cambridge History of American Literature*, III, 229.

wage a war on two fronts. Hence, he opposed equally St. George Mivart's theological attack on Darwin in *Genesis of Species*, and Herbert Spencer's philosophical defence of Darwin in the *Principles of Biology*. John Fiske's conclusion that evolution is compatible with theism seemed as unjustified to him as Agassiz' conclusion that evolution is incompatible with theism. In short, Wright resisted all attempts to make the evolutionary hypothesis yield a philosophy, or to disprove evolution by means of some philosophical dogma. As a positivist, he was convinced that science is metaphysically neutral.[10]

But his was a voice crying in the wilderness. The age was ripe for a "philosophy" of evolution, and the comprehensive system of Spencer was ready to hand. From 1870 until 1890, Spencer enjoyed a far greater vogue in America than in his own country. By the end of the century more than 300,000 volumes of his work had been sold in the United States. This popularity was due largely to the fact that the *Synthetic Philosophy* became the intellectual counterpart of major social trends of the day. Thus, people who were living in a competitive economy found it easy to believe that the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest were grounded, as Spencer said, in the very nature of the cosmos. His theory of progress made articulate the feelings that accompanied the national expansion. Individualism received support from his political philosophy, which strongly opposed state intervention in any phase of social life. Peirce summed up the situation bluntly but forcibly when he remarked that the theory of evolution met with such a favourable reception "because of the encouragement it gave to the greed-philosophy."[11]

In addition to his popular appeal, however, Spencer made a profound impression on the learned world. As a recent writer has said: "It was impossible to be active in any field of intellectual work in the three decades after the Civil War without mastering Spencer."[12] Many of the younger philosophers whetted their wits on the *Synthetic Philosophy* by locating the flaws in its loosely-knit arguments. Particularly vigorous criticism came from those who were formulating the new Pragmatic doctrines. They accepted the philosophical importance of Darwinism, but disagreed with Spencer's interpretation of it. Peirce, for example, attacked his nominalism, his mechanistic conception of development, and his failure to draw the full metaphysical consequences of evolution. In the highly speculative scheme that Peirce himself favoured, not only the cosmos but also its laws were the products of evolutionary growth. James, after a brief period as a Spencerian, expressed dissent in a paper entitled "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence." He there argued for a far more

[10]For an interesting discussion of this whole matter, see Philip P. Wiener's article, "Chauncey Wright, Darwin and Scientific Neutrality" (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, VI, 1945, 19-45).

[11]*Collected Papers* (Cambridge, Mass., 1932-5), VI, 199.

[12]R. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Philadelphia, 1944), 20.

teleological view of mind than Spencer was willing to admit. The dry, pedantic style of the *Synthetic Philosophy* also exasperated him. He found little to admire in a mind "so fatally lacking in geniality, humour, picturesqueness and poetry; and so explicit, so mechanical, so flat in the panorama which it gives to life."[13]

The basic difference between Spencer and the Pragmatists arose out of their respective treatments of the individual's relation to his environment. Spencer regarded the environment as something to which the individual always adjusts himself. The whole lesson of evolution, he believed, was that the organism must come into harmony with its surroundings, or perish. Ideas promote this adaptation by changing the internal responses of the person to the world. The Pragmatists, on the other hand, stressed the plasticity of the environment, and the power of man to mould it so as to make it satisfy his needs. In this respect, human evolution is qualitatively different from purely organic evolution. Furthermore, ideas promote adaptation by being instruments for changing the world, not passive reflections of it. History proved to be on the side of the latter interpretation. When the century drew to a close, Pragmatism had emerged as an influential doctrine, whereas Spencer's star had set.

The passing of evolution from a controversial to a widely accepted theory, allowed some of its effects on American thought to be discerned. Broadly speaking, it did the following things. First, it caused philosophers to take time and change more seriously than they had done for centuries. The ancient Greek notion of *becoming* was restored to a central position in philosophy. Secondly, it encouraged thinkers to substitute dynamic concepts for static ones, especially in ontology. Substances were replaced by functions at numerous metaphysical points. Thus, the conception of matter as a substratum that is fixed and unalterable, was challenged by the conception of it as a complex process. Similarly, the view of mind as a permanent, spiritual entity was challenged by the suggestion that it is a developing function which can only be understood in terms of its origin. The bifurcation of human nature into a physical and a mental component, differing *toto caelo*, became less easy to defend in the presence of the hypothesis that both are activities having a high degree of interdependence. Thirdly, evolution gave support to those philosophers who were seeking to link ideas with actions. The biological doctrine that organic functions exist because of their value in promoting survival, seemed to favour the conclusion that ideas, likewise, serve the purpose of helping the individual to live in his world. They must be "guides to action." Finally, evolution gave new meaning to the contention that man is continuous with nature, by envisaging him as having "emerged" from more elementary natural forms. Emergent evolution made it possible to elaborate a naturalistic view of man without having recourse to the extremes of mechanism and determinism. These were the major consequences of Darwinism which appeared as problems on the agenda of twentieth-century philosophy.

[13] *Ibid.*, 108.

KEATS THE APOLLINIAN:
THE TIME-AND-SPACE LOGIC OF HIS POEMS AS PAINTINGS

ROBERT WOOSTER STALLMAN

THE soul of a Keats poem is intelligible only by having regard to the poet's conception of time. Time is Keats' cardinal theme, figuring either as the total intention of his poems or as the obsessive motif of his minute particulars. His basic motivating intention, as disclosed within the framework of his poems, was to arrest in formed orders of meaning this fundamental of philosophic thought. It is time that is tragic, Spengler writes, and it is by the meaning a culture intuitively attaches to time that one culture is differentiated from another. The same principle holds, I believe, for the artist or poet: it is the artist's conception of time that singularly differentiates him. Of the two poets in Keats—the poet who most passionately affirms, and the poet who most passionately denies, time—it is the intensely time-conscious poet who has affinities with Hardy and Shakespeare.

> O aching time! O moments big as years!

I

Time is felt by the poet with all the intensity of an opposition. For all is change, and in the moment now lies the burden of the moment before and the moment after. Keats' poetry, charged with emotions arising from the contemplation of "the gradual sand that through an hour-glass runs," is filled with the intensity of Marvell's time-sense:

> But at my back I always hear
> Time's winged chariot hurrying near. . . .

Like Proust, Keats was obsessed with this time-conflict. Everywhere in his poetry, not only in the later poems expressing his premonition of death, but equally in the earlier ones, like "On Death" (1814) or "When I Have Fears" (1818), time was the enemy. That was his greatest torture: his profound and painful consciousness of time's uniquely occurring onceness and irreversibility, the impossibility that "a rose should shut and be a bud again." The same contradiction in futuristic terms is stated in the sonnet to Rice ("O that a week could be an age"):

> So could we live long life in little space,
> So time itself would be annihilate. . . .

But only art annihilates time. Art distils the fleeting moment, fixing time-free Porphyro's "endless minutes."

Keats' problem as artist was to transcend his time-consciousness. The past is "an immortal youth," he remarked to Severn, "just as there is no *Now* or *Then* for the Holy Ghost." On the same general theme Severn

noted: "He was the first to point out to me how essentially modern that Spirit [of the past] is." Keats states this problem in his "Laurel Crown" sonnet to Leigh Hunt (1816).

> Minutes are flying swiftly, and as yet
> Nothing unearthly has enticed my brain
> Into a Delphic labyrinth—I would fain
> Catch an immortal thought. . . .

Within the time-limit of the sonnet, what is attempted, a present vision, fails to materialize:

> Still time is fleeting, and no dream arises
> Gorgeous as I would have it. . . .

Instead of evoking a sense of suspended time, the poem conveys a sense of time's direction. Instead of being, the poem is becoming. Keats' theme here is the failure of the poet to triumph over time. MacLeish states the problem thus:

> A poem should not mean
> But be.

His "Ars Poetica" fails, as does Keats' sonnet, by the dictum of its own expressed theme. Keats even invites us to sympathize with his declared failure. In the sonnet "To a Young Lady" (1815) he again fails to triumph over time. The time-logic of the poem (its thought being expressed as a future action unarrested in "this mighty moment") is futuristic. The problem of the artist is to triumph over time: to arrest time is the function of art.

The poetry which arrests time point-wise may be described as the poetry of the moment. Keats' poetry, at its best occasions, is a poetry of the moment and the near and the still. His greatest poems render an Apollinian pure-present: their time-logic is a point-present now. This is the thesis of my discourse. My analysis and definition of Keats as Apollinian derives its method (and much of its terminology) from Spengler's time-and-space criteria of art in his *Decline of the West*.

II

Every work of art possesses its own time-destiny-or-space conception. The "world-impression" in the art that is *Apollinian* (the name used by Nietzsche and Spengler) is devoid of time-distances, disengaged point-wise from future and from past, ahistorical, bounded by finite time and finite space, "Euclidean static," "wholly contained in the instant." The "world-feeling" revealed in the art that is *Faustian*, in blunt opposition to the *Apollinian*, is an ideal of temporal and spatial infinity, unbounded perspectives of past and future, a conception of destiny as "infinitesimal" and of the soul as ultrahistorical, a quest of spirit into distances and depths

("space"—in Faustian idiom—is for Spengler a spiritual image and the prime-symbol of our Western culture). "From the Classical ideal followed unreserved acceptance of the sensuous instant, from the Western a not less passionate wrestle to overcome it." The Apollinian soul, "Euclidean and point-formed," is somatic, conceiving of its inner world plastically; it exhausts itself in the completeness of the momentary sense-present. The Faustian, roving beyond all horizons and sensuous barriers towards infinity, is personative and confessional (e.g., the "pure soul-agony" of Lear); and thus the tangible sense-world—"the Apollinian world in all its powerful sensuous corporal presence"—is disprized, the body for the spirit.

In Faustian mode, Keats' "Bright Star" and "When I Have Fears" represent repudiations of the Apollinian world-feeling of moments and foregrounds. Their world-feeling or destiny-idea is pictured in "world-becoming scenes widened to infinity." In both poems time is conceived as space. Keats is here making a stand against the destiny he comprehends ("When I have fears that I may cease to be"), and we as beholders of the poet's boundless world-horizons,

> The moving waters at their priestlike task
> Of pure ablution round earth's human shores,

do not stand before his perspectives, but are taken into them, into uncharted distances, inner distances, horizons symbolizing the future:

> then on the shore
> Of the wide world I stand alone. . . .

The planetary perspective of these Faustian poems partakes of Moneta's vision in *Hyperion*:

> of enormous ken,
> To see as a god sees, and take the depth
> Of things. . . .

Or it partakes of the poet's vision in the same poem:

> I rais'd
> My eyes to fathom the space every way,

which is Faustian again and again. "When I Have Fears," in theme and in thematic time-space symbols, has its modern counterpart in MacLeish's "You, Andrew Marvell." In both poems time is felt as distance.

> And here face down beneath the sun,
> And here upon earth's noonward height,
> To feel the always coming on,
> The always rising of the night.

We feel time's direction (noon to dusk).

> To feel creep up the curving east
> The earthly chill of dusk and slow
> Upon those under lands the vast
> And ever-climbing shadow grow. . . .

The poem ends as it began.

> And here face downward in the sun
> To feel how swift, how secretly,
> The shadow of the night comes on. . . .

This "swift-time" of the poem is fixed in "slow-time" (the "slow time" of Keats' "Urn" ode), and the space-feeling formed as of the moment. Thus the Faustian movement-quality contests against that Apollinian static which the circle form of the poem effects.

These two opposing qualities, one, according to Spengler, the essence of the Western soul and the other the essence of the Classical soul, are likewise projected into Keats' poems. In Keats the Faustian "soul-dynamic" and the Apollinian "spiritual-static" contest against each other and render those polarities of contradictions in his poetic theory and practice: between reality and dream, concretion and abstraction (aesthetic sensuousness and "cold philosophy"), body and spirit. Keats' unreconciled opposites are at basis the oppositions between his Apollinian time-sense and his Faustian time-sense. The former manifests the purely present; the Faustian time-feeling affirm's time's direction, declares the time-conflict, or reckons existence in terms of past and future. The one *is*, the other *becomes*. The opposition between these time-views (to cite a comic occasion) is declared by Burns in his confession "To a Mouse."

> Still thou art blest, compared wi' me!
> The present only toucheth thee:
> But och! I backward cast my e'e,
> On prospects drear!
> An' forward, tho' I canna see,
> I guess an' fear!

III

The arts are triumphs over time and space. The art of painting, so Lessing decreed, is made manifest in a control of space; the art of poetry, like that of music, is made manifest in a control of time. (It was Hazlitt's claim that "poetry more than painting triumphs over time and space.") The aim of all the arts, as John Peale Bishop states in his essay on "The Discipline of Poetry" (*Virginia Quarterly Review*, Spring, 1936), "is to present the conflict of man with time. . . . And the famous release which the arts afford is essentially a release from time." Keats was a poet of space, as Allen Tate suggests in "A Reading of Keats" (*American Scholar*, Winter, 1945). "He was a poet of space whose problem was to find a way of conveying what happens in time. For it is time in which dramatic conflict takes place, and it is only by conversion into dramatic actuality that the parts of the verbal painting achieve relation and significance." Poetry can no more ignore the concept of space than painting can ignore the concept of time. This precept, which contradicts Lessing's dogma, has its perfect example in Uccello's "Battle Piece." Uccello's charging horses men are arrested in timeless prancing, and the impression they convey, a-

Bishop observes in his descriptive analysis in "Poetry and Painting" (*Sewanee Review*, Spring, 1945), is one of absolute calm. "The moment the painter has chosen to depict is that of the first contact between the Florentines and the Siennese, a moment all action, a moment composed in space of many actions, and yet, in point of time, but a moment." Perspective converts the temporal element into space, for perspective introduces the painter's consciousness of time. "The opposing bodies of men and horses are not pitted against each other merely in battle; they are here opponents in space. The lifting and lowering of lances, the raising and breaking of swords, all those movements which in life could not have achieved their meaning unless in time, are here brought into spatial relations, and create their meaning by simply being." Uccello's landscape is a landscape *in being*. In the great poems of Keats, and in descriptive fragments of the poetry as a whole, there is this same fixation of suspended action and this same state of absolute calm. Spengler contends that the Renaissance did not "revive" the real Classical, but he concedes that Renaissance art, at moments, succeeded in achieving the Classical feeling for "perfect *nearness*, for pure, restful and *liberating* space-effects, bright and tidy and free from the passionate movement of Gothic and Baroque. It is not Classical, but it is a dream of Classical existence, the only dream of the Faustian soul in which it was able to forget itself." The recurrent quest of artists in our Western culture for the Classical is projected into Keats' attempt to treat *Hyperion* "in a more naked and grecian manner" (letter to Haydon on January 23, 1818), though this is only *apparently* a revival of the Apollinian way of feeling. Yet at moments, notably in the great odes, *Lamia*, and the Chapman sonnet, the illusion of an Apollinian art is seemingly fulfilled. In the greatest works of art (as Ezra Pound asserts) we experience a liberation from time-and-space limits.

This quality of pure being, which characterizes the Greek soul, was for Keats the required immediate prelude to creation. Since "poetry should be tranquil and sumptuous," the moment of creation should be one of tranquillity. The sole aim of poetry (for Keats) was the submission of mind to things in their eternal aspect, to the real. The creative spirit attained this vision only in moments of wise passiveness (the "passive contemplativeness" of the Classical being), in self-detachment and self-annihilation, in states of "negative capability."[1] The mind in aesthetic experience submits to sensations of the instant: all intellect is suspended,

[1]This creative condition of pure being is defined in a famous passage of Keats' letter to Richard Woodhouse (October 27, 1818):

> As to the poetical Character itself (I mean that sort of which, if I am any thing, I am a Member; that sort distinguished from the Wordsworthian, or egotistical sublime; which is a thing per se, and stands alone), it is not itself—it has no self—it is every thing and nothing—it has no character. . . . A poet is the most unpoetical of any thing in existence, because he has no Identity—he is continually in for and filling some other Body. The Sun, the Moon, the Sea and Men and Women who are creatures of

and the soul (as Yeats likewise reports) passes into a slight trance. Creation, particularly in its initial phases, did not mean for Keats—or again for Housman—an activity of the intellect. The experience of the poet (for Keats) is located in the point-present now, the point-present now being identical with static-unconsciousness. The submission of the conscious to the unconscious (according to John Middleton Murry) is Keats' declared philosophy, and by means of it he achieved his greatest works. He not only celebrates tranquillity as theme (the tranquillity of emotions harmonized in aesthetic experience), but creates tranquillity in immediacy. What the poetry reflects, on its great occasions, is this extra-temporal quality of being.

Where the temporal relation of things is conceived as of a present mode, the present transposes into sensuous immediacy. Thought in Keats is conceived as of a time-free present and felt consequently "as immediately as the odour of a rose." In D. H. Lawrence's preface to *New Poems* (1920) poetry is defined as the instantaneous expression of image in "the insurgent naked throb of the instant moment." Keats and Coleridge are the least reflective and the most sensuous of all our poets, Keats creating that "spot of time" which Wordsworth translates into past or future. Wordsworth embraces the past and Shelley the future, as Keats embraces the present. Shelley's thematic perspectives, perspectives of life not yet brought to pass, are futuristic. To operate through the future is to repudiate the sensuous particulars of present reality. Shelley's poetic experience possesses the Faustian tendency, from particular to infinite. Wordsworth dictates what his senses are going to perceive or what his senses have perceived, transposing his sense-impressions into memories, overriding thus the sense-present. In Wordsworth's famous preface to *Lyrical Ballads* (I quote John Crowe Ransom's reading), Wordsworth "is repeatedly on the verge of laying down the principle that poetry looks necessarily to the past. For example, he says poetry is essentially an emotion *recollected*, it is not itself

impulse are poetical and have about them an unchangeable attribute; the poet has none, no identity—he is certainly the most unpoetical of all God's Creatures.

Or earlier, in his letter to Reynolds (February 19, 1818):

> Man should be content with as few points to tip with the fine web of his soul, and weave a tapestry empyrean full of symbols for his spiritual eye, of softness for his spiritual touch, of space for his wandering, of distinctness for his luxury.... Now it is more noble to sit like Jove than to fly like Mercury—let us not therefore go hurrying about and collecting honey, beelike buzzing here and there impatiently from a knowledge of what is to be aimed at; but let us open our leaves like a flower and be passive and receptive—budding patiently under the eye of Apollo and taking hints from every noble insect that favours us with a visit.... I had no idea but of the morning, and the thrush said I was right.

Though he afterwards called this mood of languorous indolence his "1819 temper," it is the mood not only of "La Belle Dame sans Merci," *Hyperion*, and the great odes, but also of the earlier "Sleep and Poetry" and *Endymion*. It has expression in the vision of Moneta; it pervades the "Ode to Psyche" and the "Ode on Melancholy"; it forms the whole theme of the "Ode on Indolence." The prose counterpart to the "Ode on Indolence" is to be found in the letter of March 19, 1819.

the original emotion. . . ." His "Intimations of Immortality" is a perspective of the past, and of the future as viewed from the past. Conversely, Shelley's "Music When Soft Voices Die" anticipates retrospection. Here the futuristic Shelley, as Kenneth Burke phrases it, "is looking forward to looking back. The form of thought is naturalistic and temporalistic in terms of *past* and *future*. But the form of thought in Keats is mystical, in terms of an *eternal present*. The Ode ["On a Grecian Urn"] is striving to move beyond the region of becoming into the realm of *being*."[2] The static quality of "On a Grecian Urn" mirrors Keats' imagination, static in that instant of sensation of things as they are, the perception of which is felt and not reflected upon. So it is with entire poems or with their minute particulars. "Or with a finger stayed Ixion's wheel" is the "objective correlative" of Keats' static imagination.

As a painter is known by his spatial power, so a poet is known by his temporal power. The poet's temporal power is manifested in his control of language. It is by controlling his word sequences in time that the poet, according to Bishop, "seems to control time; it is upon their sensuous disposition that he must depend to convey a sense of duration." Though Keats was not wholly absorbed in sensuousness, his "O for a life of sensations rather than of thoughts!" operates everywhere across his poetry. He is the poet of sensuousness *par excellence*. One thinks also of Verlaine and, among modern American poets, John Peale Bishop. Keats' sensations transpose into sense-impressions not only of all five senses but of their synesthesia, wherein one sense-impression is translated into terms of another. "Every separate impression of the senses affected Keats so intensely," one scholar of this subject (Mrs. Erhardt-Siebold) asserts, "that he was afraid through a combination of sensations to destroy the immediate feeling of the moment; for him, feelings were concrete realities." And so they are. Point-present sensations transpose into realities. The Greek, Spengler remarks, "*felt* the marble with his eye, and the thick tones of an aulos moved him almost *corporally*." The tangibleness of such concretions as

his ample palate took
Savour of poisonous brass and metal sick

impart that sense of duration by which the poet seemingly controls time. For the impact of these sense-units, which delight in themselves and surprise when so beaded together, fixes the beholder's sensibility, if only for the instant, and halts his awareness of temporal progression.

[2]This note occurs in Burke's "Symbolic Action in a Poem by Keats (*Accent*, IV, 1943, 32). Burke's note on the comparative time-senses of Keats and Shelley supports my definition of Keats as Apollinian. His observation may very well derive from the same source. Spengler's influence on Burke (as on Tate's critical ideas and on Bishop's poetic conceptions) is, I think, considerable. Relevant to the above time-logic in Keats and Shelley is Ransom's passing comment in "The Tense of Poetry" (*Southern Review*, I, 1935, 223, 225, 228-9). For analyses of "On a Grecian Urn," compare John Middleton Murry's "Beauty is Truth" (*Symposium*, October, 1930), Cleanth Brooks's "History without Footnotes" (*Sewanee Review*, Winter, 1944), and F. R. Leavis' essay in *Revaluations* (1936).

IV

Keats is a painting-poet. What is the time-and-space logic of Keats' poems as paintings? The landscape or scene in Keats' poems (the opening landscape of *Hyperion* is emblematic) is qualified by these specifications: the figures are static and two-dimensional; the season, except in *Lamia*, is winter or late autumn; the hour, "'tis the witching hour of night" or (as in *Lamia*) the "blushing shut of day." The atmosphere is static.

> No stir of air was there
> . . . . . .
> But where the dead leaf fell, there did it rest.

It is everywhere "bitter chill" and "serene" and "hush'd" and dark. The Saturn of *Hyperion*, whose energies seem immobilized by the weight he bears, conveys the sensation of motionless stillness: "It seem'd no force could wake him from his place." The lovers of the "Ode to Psyche," depicted in *fête champêtre*, are similarly "pedestal'd," "like a statue in solitude," "quiet as stone."

> 'Mid hush'd, cool-rooted flowers, fragrant-eyed,
> Blue, silver-white, and budded Tyrian,
> They lay calm-breathing on the bedded grass;
> Their arms embraced, and their pinions too;
> Their lips touch'd not, but had not bid adieu. . . .

Even "The Eve of St. Agnes," though here these qualities operate in contrasted patterns, is characterized by the same attributes: coldness and darkness and silence predominate. Thus the noise, from the "dusky gallery," is "scarcely heard." "The boisterous, midnight, festive" music affrays Porphyro's ears, but only

> in dying tone:—
> The hall door shuts again, and all the noise is gone.

Though the poet lends motion to these lovers, they pass "like figures on a marble urn." Madeline is as static as those carved angels she is equated with, and Porphyro, like those sculptured figures in "purgatorial rails," has the same two-dimensionality.

The figures of Keatsian landscapes, like the picture-gallery characters of Chaucer's Prologue, are painted in relief or carved as in a frieze with time-free immobility. "The Classical statue," Spengler says, "is a piece of present 'Nature' and nothing besides. The Classical poetry is statuary in verse." The "masque-like figures on the dreamy urn" of the "Ode on Indolence" bear resemblance to the attitudes of a Corinthian vase. The figures are formed with Euclidean separateness, two-dimensionally posed "side-faced." Eliot has remarked on the ways in which the creator's passions and desires may find satisfaction in his works of art, perhaps taking the form of a predilection (in a painter) for certain colours or tones or lightings. One of Keats' predilections is for this "side-faced" pose: "And sidelong fixed her eyes on Saturn's face." A recurrent tendency in Keats,

G. Wilson Knight notices (in *The Starlit Dome*), is "to image a poised form, a stillness suggesting motion, what might be called a 'tiptoe' effect." It is the motion caught in Gaudier's "Dancer," a figure in which movement is detected rather than stated. Or again, as alternative to this somatic attitude, the poet represents himself or his figures in attitudes of repose:

> Ye cannot raise
> My head cool-bedded in the flowery grass—

or in reclining postures resisting change:

> The cloudy swoon came on, and down I sunk,
> Like a Silenus on an antique vase.

Action is arrested in moods of "drowsy indolence," of "ardent listlessness." The mood of the poetry is thus akin to the mood of the creation of the poetry. It was Keats' conviction that poetry has its origin in the unconscious, that there is a close connection between aesthetic experience and waking-dream, near-sleep, or trance-like ecstasy. The words "sleep" or "drowsy" invade almost every poem. (Recurrently in *Endymion*, Professor Thorpe points out, the great experiences occur when Endymion has passed from states of physical to spiritual awareness.) The poems seem weighted down as by the heavy incense of some sense-lulled and perfumed dream. Their mood is the drugged mood of the "Ode on Melancholy." This static mood may be described as Apollinian, and "the wakeful anguish of the soul" as pure Faustian.

The time of day in almost every Keats poem (one exception is the "Ode on Indolence") is evening or night. A catalogue of Keats' allusions to night includes almost every title in the collected poetry. The poems are subtilized with the "embalmed darkness" of the "Ode to a Nightingale." They image "dark vapours" or "sullen mist"; they are all (except *Lamia*) "embower'd from the light." Their hour is "the drowsy hour" of "grey time." Only *Lamia* has "the fullness of light, the clarity of atmosphere, the great noon-calm of the South" which characterizes Florentine fresco (as Spengler defines it); only the "Ode on a Grecian Urn" seemingly approaches the Hellenic ideal of nearness, sharpness of outline, sensuously definable depths, order of figures in plane layers, stillness, etc. "In general, every art and every culture has its significant times of day. The music of the 18th Century is a music of the darkness and the inner eye, and the plastic of Athens is an art of cloudless day." Darkness is Faustian; stillness is Apollinian. These polarities in Keats render, in "The Eve of Saint Mark," the line "All was silent, all was gloom."

Though Keats' poetry is a poetry "of the darkness and the inner eye," it is a poetry of *timeless darkness*, independent of time-of-day, ahistorical, as is the "pure timeless brightness" of Classical vase-painting and fresco. For darkness predicates space and denies time. "The candle affirms and the sunlight denies space as the opposite of things," Spengler writes in his essay on "The Form of the Soul." Space filled with darkness imparts a

diminished time-value. The converse of this principle is stated in a key sentence quoted from Wilhelm Worringer and expounded by Joseph Frank in his distinguished analysis of "Spatial Forms in Modern Literature" (*Sewanee Review*, Spring, 1945). "Space filled with atmospheric light," Worringer states, "which binds objects together and cancels out their individual self-containedness, imparts a temporal value [*Zeitlichkeitswert*] to things, drawing them into the cosmic merry-go-round of appearances." In Keats' poems as statuary or paintings, the temporal element in perception is lessened by the two-dimensionality of his figures and by the characteristic atmosphere of *imagined* darkness. "Time gives birth to Space, but Space gives death to Time."

The space-painting of *Hyperion* is at once affirming its spatial dimension and denying its temporal element.

> Deep in the shady sadness of a vale
> Far sunken from the healthy breath of morn,
> Far from the fiery noon, and eve's one star,
> Sat gray-haired Saturn, quiet as stone,
> Still as the silence round about his lair. . . .

Saturn's world is without time, time being removed from it.

> Far sunken from the healthy breath of morn,
> Far from the fiery noon. . . .

The boundaries of that distant realm (spatial depth as "time become rigid") are thus the boundaries of imaginary space and imaginary time. The location of the "Ode to Psyche" is likewise in an imaginary space-time world. Its dream-world is imaged in the spatial figure of "wide quietness."

> And there by zephyrs, streams, and birds, and bees,
> The moss-lain Dryads shall be lull'd to sleep. . . .

"The Eve of St. Agnes," notwithstanding its specific dating and locale (compare Dante's time-of-day specifications for every episode of the *Purgatorio* and the *Paradiso*), is disengaged from distances of time and place and conveys as timeless myth an event of momentary meaning. The poem is defined by that logic of time and space which Coleridge finds in Spenser's *Faerie Queene*, that "marvellous independence and true imaginative absence of all particular space or time. . . . It is in the domains neither of history or geography; it is ignorant of all artificial boundary, all material obstacles; it is truly in land of Faery, that is, of mental space." This same timeless quality defines *Hyperion*, *Lamia*, and "La Belle Dame sans Merci." Though Lamia flees into distant places (as in the scene of lines 171-84) and the Knight-at-arms dreams alone in space (the Faustian destiny-idea), Keats' figures do not roam in the infinite but are confined, like Homer's heroes, within a limited geographical horizon. The whole of "The Eve of St. Agnes" is "hoodwink'd with faery fancy." The cold mansion with its "carved angels ever eager-eyed," Porphyro "entoiled in woofed phantasies,"

and "St. Agnes' charmed maid," all belong to a dream-world of no time or place. Keats, no less than Spenser, places you (to quote Coleridge again) "in a dream, a charmed sleep, and you neither wish, nor have the power, to inquire where you are, or how you got there."

In the introduction to *The Decline of the West* Spengler states: "In the world consciousness of the Hellenes all experience, not merely the personal but the common past, was immediately transmuted into a timeless, immobile, mythically-fashioned background for the particular momentary present. . . ." In Keats' poetic consciousness past and future, as arraying perspectives in his poetry, are absent and (transposing here Spengler's wording) Keats creates "the 'Pure Present,' which so often aroused Goethe's admiration in every product of the Classical life and in sculpture particularly." "This Pure Present, whose greatest symbol is the Doric column, in itself predicates the *negation of time* (of direction)." The pure present is a moment of time perceived spatially, as, again, Joseph Frank observes (in his examination of spatiality in Proust's novels): "It is perception in a moment of time, that is to say, space." *Pure time is not time at all.* The soul of Keats, passionately devoted to the here and the now, is embodied in his greatest poems as literally timeless. Since they effect an illusion of duration, imparting a minimized time-value, they tend, I suggest, towards spatiality.

V

The foregoing attributes characterizing Keats' poems as paintings have been determined by a temporal and spatial approach to the poems as works of art. Analysis of this kind, the analysis of one art in terms of the logic and the medium of another art, must necessarily be tested on the plane of aesthetic experience. That Keats' poems are painted perspectives removed from time and therefore literally timeless is a perception that must be felt —imaginatively felt—as an aesthetic truth. The perfect occasion is the Chapman sonnet. This famous poem is situated in time (so too is Marvell's "To His Coy Mistress"), even as MacLeish's "You, Andrew Marvell" and John Peale Bishop's "Perspectives are Precipices" are poems situated in space. Time in the Chapman sonnet is defined in space-images: the time-limit of the poem is one moment, an instant of briefest pause. The first part creates a timeless myth:

> Much have I travell'd in the realms of gold,
> And many goodly states and kingdoms seen;
> Round many western islands have I been
> Which bards in fealty to Apollo hold.
> Oft of one wide expanse had I been told
> That deep-brow'd Homer ruled as his demesne;
> Yet did I never breathe its pure serene
> Till I heard Chapman speak out loud and bold.

The traveller's past emotion is telescoped into that one sudden instant, the first moment after "I heard Chapman speak out loud and bold." The last part enacts this point-present emotion. This emotion of one moment is

embodied in two space-images.

> Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
> When a new planet swims into his ken. . . .

The second space-image is polarized with the first:

> Or like stout Cortez when with eagle eyes
> He star'd at the Pacific—and all his men
> Look'd at each other with a wild surmise—
> Silent, upon a peak in Darien.

In its temporal structure the Chapman sonnet is polar and not periodic. It is timeless. Past and future are subtilized into an impression that is purely now. In time-logic the poem is Apollinian point-present. It ends upon the theme of stillness and thereby imparts a final tranquillity, that absolute calm which Ingres regarded as the goal of all great art. In its stellar and horizontal perspectives of limitless space (the prime-symbol of Faustian art), in its sense of discovery and its spiritual extension (Euclidean land was without horizon), in its planetary vision, "On First Looking into Chapman's Homer" is Faustian through and through. To the contrary, however, the spatial depth Keats here imagines is space as "time become rigid," space fixed and thus Euclidean static. When we gaze into the distance with all our senses, Spengler remarks, space "floats around us, but when we are startled [like "stout Cortez"], the alert eye sees a tense and rigid space."

In the figure of Hermes, "like a stoop'd falcon ere he takes his prey," Keats again evokes that moment of pause between two movements, that static moment which Spengler designates as the Classical motive: "The ancient art is an art of the near and the tangible and the timeless. It prefers motives of brief, briefest, pause between two movements: the last moment before Myron's Athlete throws the discus, or the first moment after Paeonius's Nike has alighted from the air, when the swing of the body is ending and the streaming draperies have not yet fallen:—attitudes devoid equally of duration and direction; disengaged from future and from past." Likewise the time-area of the "Ode to a Nightingale" is a moment of reverie, the moment just after that imagined draught of Hippocrene and just before that awakening from "perilous seas, in faery lands forlorn."

> My heart aches, and a drowsy numbness pains
> My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk,
> Or emptied some dull opiate to the drains
> *One minute past*, and Lethe-wards had sunk. . . .

The poem's point-present creation of joy-pain sensations is timed by that ever immediate "one minute past." As in the famous line of the sonnet "To Homer" (Rossetti called it the greatest line in Keats), "There is a budding morrow in midnight," or again as in the "Ode to Autumn," where the past (spring) and the future (winter) are pregnable in the present (the autumnal insect choir foretells the coming winter), so in the "Ode to a Nightingale" the past and the future coexist simultaneously in the moment now. The present is sculptured in the "Ode on Melancholy," carved as

upon a frieze. Melancholy "dwells with Beauty"—

> She dwells with Beauty—Beauty that must die;
> And Joy, whose hand is ever at his lips
> Bidding adieu; and aching Pleasure nigh,
> Turning to Poison, while the bee-mouth sips. . . .

In attitudes of becoming, each of these five pedestalled figures is frozen in the mode of become. "Joy, whose hand is ever at his lips Bidding adieu," is an image reckoned in the pure present.

The statuary forms on the urn, in the "Ode on a Grecian Urn," have this same extra-temporal quality of being. The imagined action immobilized upon the urn is of a frozen moment: the moment just before an imaginary action.

> Fair youth, beneath the trees, thou canst not leave
> Thy song, nor ever can those trees be bare;
> Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss,
> Though winning near the goal—yet, do not grieve;
> She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss,
> For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair!

Here the "Beauty that must die" is fixed in art and "cannot fade." Each of these "marble men and maidens overwrought," whose "silent form dost tease us out of thought As doth eternity" is the "foster-child of silence and slow time"—forever fixed in timeless immobility. The state of immediacy for these lovers, as Kenneth Burke defines it, is an eternal prolongation of the moment "prior to fulfillment—not exactly arrested ecstasy, but rather an arrested pre-ecstasy." Their somatic attitudes of becoming are removed from existence into being, from time into eternity. As time-symbols of eternity, they are symbols of Keats' own Apollinian point-present time-sense. Again in the "Ode on Melancholy," but here in one word, there is the same concentrated fixation of soul to that which is steadfast and now: "Then *glut* thy sorrow on a morning rose."

Though the Towneley vase, as Colvin suggests, may be the source for Keats' Grecian urn, the observation Middleton Murry makes is the critical one: the urn of this sculptured drama "is not some hypothetical actual vase, but the Urn of his imagination." Imagination, contemplating the urn, attains for a moment a vision of reality. The theme intended by the poem is not the supremacy of art over time or nature, but the supremacy of the imaginative vision of time over time's domination. The ode declares this vision in the form: "Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty." (This direct abstraction is, I think, clearly a violation of the concrete plastic method of the poem.) The temporal element shifts from present to future.

> When old age shall this generation waste,
> Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe
> Than ours, a friend to man, to whom thou say'st,
> "Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty,"—that is all
> Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.

The urn is the symbol of a vision in which the drama of human life is

arrested under the aspect of eternity. This is the meaning of the poem, as Middleton Murry explicates it in "Beauty is Truth" (*Symposium*, October, 1930). "More exactly, the Grecian Urn is the symbol of a possibility of vision. All human action, all human experience, can be thus arrested in enchantment. All the visible and invisible drama of human life can be thus seen, or imagined, under the aspect of eternity. . . . That is why the 'silent form dost tease us out of thought as doth eternity.' "

"Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty": this enigmatic proposition has meaning only in relation to the total intention concretely embodied in the poem itself. The proposition is addressed here to the figures on the urn.[3] Thus, the meaning of "Truth" is located in the fourth stanza: "Truth" corresponds to "reality."

> What little town by river or sea shore,
> Or mountain-built with peaceful citadel,
> Is emptied of this folk, this pious morn?
> And, little town, thy streets for evermore
> Will silent be; and not a soul to tell
> Why thou art desolate, can e'er return.

That key word "emptied" points to the poet's attitude towards reality, as F. R. Leavis says. In contemplating this scene, since it does not belong to the timeless world of the urn, time intrudes. Here the fantasy world of pure joy, imaged in the beauty of the timeless urn world, is destroyed by time's painful intrusion in the image of the emptied town to which

> not a soul to tell
> Why thou art desolate, can e'er return.

The poet's vision of eternity, of which the urn is symbol, we as observers experience momentarily. The urn itself is "silent form" and it speaks by "teasing us out of thought." "It is as enigmatic as eternity is," Cleanth Brooks declares, "for, like eternity, its history is beyond time, outside time, and for this very reason bewilders our time-ridden minds: it teases us." The "Ode on a Grecian Urn" achieves the dictum of its theme. The same achievement is Proust's; his novels (as analysed by Frank in the essay cited) present their characters discontinuously, not submerged in a continuous time-stream, but spaced "motionless in a moment of vision." Keats' ode, its sculptured figures "motionless in a moment of vision," *creates* (as Proust defined the experience) "a fragment of time in its pure state." To experience pure present, that is eternity. And

> that is all
> Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.

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[3] "For them Beauty *is* Truth because their experience is limited to the beautiful as depicted on the Urn . . ." (Letter in the *Times Literary Supplement* for February 5, 1938, by G. St. Quintin). He reads the "ye" of the final line as addressed to the urn figures. This reading—the only possible critical reading—points our interpretation into, rather than out of, the framed meaning of the poem as poem. Tillotson quotes St. Quintin's letter in his preface to *Essays in Criticism and Research* (1942).

THE PROBLEM OF ALTRUISTIC MOTIVATION IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY[1]

H. W. WRIGHT

THAT men do frequently act unselfishly is, of course, a fact. But what motivates them to such altruistic behaviour is still an unsettled question. Can it be said that among the original springs of human action there is one which on occasion impels the individual to seek the good of his fellows rather than his own private interest? Or is altruistic action motivated by enlightened prudence—meaning in this case the self-preservative and egoistic drives, modified by an understanding of the mutuality of all individual human interests? This question, always important for an understanding of human nature, has taken on a new urgency in our day. The history of Soviet Russia has demonstrated what can be achieved in time of peace by the co-operative effort of all the members of a great modern nation. The atomic bomb has given warning to mankind that the nations of the world must learn to co-operate in order to escape destruction. Thus no one can question today the imperative, even desperate, need for more thorough-going and effective co-operation in both the national and the international fields. The only remaining doubt concerns the relation of such complete and far-reaching co-operation to the freedom of human individuals. The Western democracies believe that individual citizens can be induced to co-operate voluntarily in the pursuit of common national goals, and that a world government can likewise be based upon a willing co-operation between nations. Totalitarian regimes undertake to make such co-operation compulsory. They proceed on the assumption that the degree of co-operation requisite to conserve human welfare can be obtained from a citizen-body only if it is enforced by governmental machinery and the organization of social life. Of these two political doctrines, that one is probably destined to prevail which is most in harmony with the nature and constitution of man. The answer to the problem of which doctrine fits human nature best depends very largely upon the facts of human motivation. Is there an original altruistic motive operating in kindly and helpful, in patriotic, public-spirited, humanitarian action, or does all such altruistic behaviour spring from the basic self-preservative drives directed by prudential intelligence?

This problem of the nature of altruistic motivation is by no means a new one. It has been discussed and debated at great length by the philosophers and moralists of the past.[2] At present, anyone who wishes to

[1]The substance of this paper was read at the 1946 meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association at Queen's University, May 15-17.

[2]This is particularly true of English moral philosophy. During the two centuries beginning with Hobbes in the seventeenth, and continuing to J. S. Mill in the nineteenth, the principal alternative views on altruistic motivation were defined, and many of their social and moral implications made clear. Hobbes held that all human impulses are ego-

know the real facts and find out what conclusions they warrant turns naturally and hopefully to scientific psychology. It must be admitted at the start that present-day psychology gives no clear and simple answer to the question of what motivates human beings to act unselfishly. This is not because psychologists of our day in attacking such a problem are content to express and defend on speculative grounds their own individual opinions, thus continuing the controversies of the past. It is rather because empirical and experimental studies in this field of psychological research have brought to light a great variety of facts relating to this mode of behaviour, and because these facts, while pertinent and evidential, are not easy to interpret and often appear to point in different, even opposite, directions. In dealing with this problem, as with many other problems of human behaviour, the psychologist of today is not handicapped by paucity of factual information: he is embarrassed by the amount and complexity of it. When, however, we review the results of psychological studies in this field, consider what they imply in the way of general conclusions regarding different aspects of altruistic behaviour, and then seek to correlate these partial interpretations, there emerges a total view of the dynamics of

istic or self-regarding, motivated by the striving of the individual to obtain pleasure and avoid pain. Apparently unselfish motives, according to Hobbes, spring from the pleasure-pain expectations of the agent, supported by the rational organization of the state to set limits to human selfishness. The scope of such hedonistic calculus was later extended by Paley to include divinely ordained rewards and punishments in the world to come. In the meantime, moralists holding this view saw the need for some other psychological factor to account for the hedonistic appeal of altruistic modes of behaviour. This they found in the "law of association of ideas," identical in principle with the "law of conditioning" in contemporary psychology. This principle, discovered by Aristotle, was first applied to altruistic behaviour by Gay, and systematically formulated by Hartley. If, to use the familiar example, a piece of metal is associated with exchange value, it becomes, as money, a direct source of satisfaction. So modes of action associated with the rewards and penalties affixed by social authority become themselves invested with pleasure or pain expectations. The theory that human motivation is always egoistic and hedonistic culminated in the utilitarianism of Bentham, who held that the only interest man is adequately motivated to consult is his own, which consists in increasing the sum-total of his pleasures. Bentham made full use of the principle of association, and dealt with both the psychological and the political factors which affect the prudential pleasure calculus. The opposite view—that there is a primary altruistic motive of love, pity, or sympathy, inherent in human nature—had also its able exponents. Shaftesbury was the first to attribute cardinal importance to natural affections springing from love, goodwill, and sympathy, which as emotional impulses prompted men to social duty. Hutcheson further stressed the complete disinterestedness of benevolent motivation. Both Hume and Adam Smith acknowledged fellow-feeling or sympathy as an original principle in human nature. Butler agreed with Shaftesbury that there is an altruistic or benevolent impulse in human nature, while he added, as a distinctive characteristic of man, the power of rational reflection which in the two forms of conscience and reasonable self-love regulates and adjusts the social and the self-regarding motives. J. S. Mill accepted the egoistic hedonism of Bentham and the utilitarian school but, at some expense to logical consistency, held that the rational dignity of man leads him to prefer the higher intellectual pleasures to the lower, and that, since each man desires his own happiness, it follows that the general happiness is desired by all.

altruistic motivation which is, I believe, substantially true to the facts of human nature and conduct.

The psychologist may observe any form of behaviour as he finds it in the case of particular individuals whose responses he studies intensively and biographically, endeavouring in this way to relate the actions, habits, and dispositions which he finds in his subjects now to the events and experiences of their previous life-histories, back to childhood and infancy. This method, called "clinical," was introduced by Freud, adopted by his followers, and is exclusively relied on by psychoanalysts. It is also widely employed by psychologists generally, who agree in regarding it as one of the two scientifically valid methods for the investigation of human nature and conduct. The clinical method has been found particularly helpful in the study of behaviour disturbances and personality disorders which usually have their source in a conflict of motives that has arisen in the previous life of the patient.

Because clinical study is thus well suited to throw light upon the inner, persistent springs of human action, some leading psychologists regard it as our principal source of information regarding human motives and motivation. One of these, A. H. Maslow, has reached definite conclusions concerning altruistic motivation.[3] Among the basic motivating needs of mankind, he asserts, are love needs. These are, he believes, next in strength and efficacy to physiological and safety needs. Love needs, as he conceives them, are not identical with sex needs or with maternal needs. They are broader, and include the need to give and to receive warm affection. The evidence on which he relies is the fact, in his opinion well established by clinical observation, that in our society the thwarting of love needs is the most commonly found core in cases of maladjustment and of severe psychopathology. It is worthy of passing mention that love in this sense of personal affection plays a more important part in the Freudian psychology than is generally supposed. Freud affirms that such tender emotion (which of course differs from love in the primary Freudian sense of *libido* or sexual energy) is responsible for friendly, helpful behaviour on the part of group-members, and, as evoked by parents, teachers, and the like, makes children amenable to education in the "latency" period between infancy and adolescence.

Experimental studies of altruistic behaviour, particularly in children, have brought to light other facts which may appear to point toward a different conclusion. Objective studies of behaviour by the experimental method, which some psychologists regard as superior to the clinical, have convinced them that habits of helpful, other-regarding behaviour are acquired by human beings in childhood just as all other socially adaptive habits are acquired—through the experimentally attested modes of learning, such as trial and error, conditioning, effect, etc. To be sure, the child must

[3] A. H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation" (*Psychological Review*, L, 1943, 361).

be motivated in order to learn, by whatever method. But the motives operative in learning altruistic modes of action are no different, these psychologists find, from those which impel him to acquire other adaptive habits. They are mainly the security and safety drives, i.e., the desire for the bodily necessities and comforts in the way of food, clothing, shelter, and care which only parents, family-members, and the adult world generally can supply, and the urge to escape the pain of punishment and other penalties consequent upon adult disfavour.[4]

Further light has been thrown upon the way in which human beings acquire altruistic modes of acting and thinking by the recent researches of social psychologists in the field of cultural anthropology. Detailed studies of the social culture of primitive human groups have shown that the socializing of the human individual is not limited to the acquisition of specific habits of helpful, co-operative behaviour but includes, along with these, the understanding and adoption by him of socially accepted standards, beliefs, attitudes, and points of view which approve and enjoin such altruistic conduct. In thus introcepting in early life the norms and rules of behaviour prescribed by the social tradition of his people, the group-member is motivated, these writers point out, not merely by the self-preservative drives but also by self-esteem, the desire for favourable recognition by his fellows, for social standing and good reputation. The cultural pattern of every human group carries with it, they show, an ideal of what is excellent and admirable in individual character and conduct. By this socially accepted ideal all group-members, except a few "deviants,"

[4]Floyd H. Allport in his influential *Social Psychology* (Houghton Mifflin, 1924) offered an explanation of the psychological antecedents of social behaviour which has since been followed by the majority of American psychologists. Allport maintained that: (1) At the outset social stimuli are in no way different from non-social. (2) Since in infancy the safety and well-being of the human individual depend upon the ministrations of others, these social stimuli must acquire through conditioning a distinctive and pervasive significance (p. 76). (3) Appropriate reactions to such social stimuli have also to be differentiated by the learning process (p. 78). (4) It is only such subsequently learned adaptive habits that may be properly termed social (p. 76). P. T. Young, who in his important work *The Motivation of Behavior* (Wiley, 1936) adopts the experimental approach to this problem, states agreement with Allport that the significance of social behaviour is exactly the same as non-social, *viz.*, the biological adaptation of the individual to his environment (p. 145). Young holds that all the primary human drives, such as hunger, thirst, sex, and similar organic urges, have specific bodily mechanisms, and operate to restore physiological equilibrium (p. 136). He further believes that there are other secondary drives built up through social influences, which enable man's biological appetites to find satisfaction through association and co-operation with others (p. 428), the leading example being the "prestige" motive whose biological utility is clear, since social success is an aspect of biological success (p. 395). Many other American text-books of psychology uphold the theory that social, including altruistic, motives exist not in their own right but because they contribute to the satisfaction of biological needs, e.g., J. F. Dashiell, *General Psychology* (Houghton Mifflin, 1937), 123; L. E. Cole, *General Psychology* (McGraw-Hill, 1936), 340; and N. L. Munn, *Psychology* (Houghton Mifflin, 1946), 228.

estimate their own worth, and hence are impelled by the powerful motive of self-esteem to conform to its dictates.[5]

Thus we see that experimental investigation of the acquisition of socially adaptive habits by children, supplemented by scientific study of the moulding of individual personality by social norms and culture-products, furnishes little evidence that the love impulse is an important factor in the motivation of altruistic behaviour. Many psychiatrists have been convinced by their own clinical observations that the content of social morality consists wholly of conventionally approved rules of behaviour upheld by the group tradition, which are obeyed by individuals because they fear the penalties which society will inflict and the guilt they will themselves feel if they disobey them. To be sure, these psychiatrists mostly follow Freud in believing that our social conscience is a legacy from our parents, a product of emotional attachment to them in infancy. In this way Freud assigned to the love motive (in the primary Freudian sense of *libido*) a necessary function in the genesis of altruistic behaviour—but only in the first beginnings of the human life-history. Later on it is, according to Freud, the "reality principle," i.e., the intelligent anticipation of the painful consequences of uninhibited self-indulgence, which leads the individual to conform to the dictates of social custom. Once the "super-ego" or social conscience is acquired in infancy through emotional identification with parents, its stereotyped rules of social duty retain their authority undiminished and unmodified by the experiences of later life.

To hold this latter view that socially approved modes of altruistic behaviour owe their influence and authority over the individual wholly to the teaching and example of parents in infancy and the sanctions imposed by society to enforce them is to neglect quite inexcusably the facts discovered by the Swiss psychologist Piaget.[6] Piaget devoted years to a carefully planned and well controlled investigation of children's behaviour, both in game-playing and the social relations of everyday life. He found that in playing marbles, a favourite amusement, the little boys of five and six regarded the rules of the game as decrees of some external, superior authority, that of the older boys or their fathers, or even their grandfathers, and, as such, to be unquestionably obeyed (except in the rare cases, perhaps, where a violation would go unnoticed). But he found that as these boys grew older they gained an increasing insight into the purpose and social utility of the rules, so that by the age of ten or eleven they willingly accepted and followed the rules as the understood conditions of there being any game at all between equal participants. In the case of the so-called

[5]Although he is by no means a behaviourist, and rejects the biological theory of motivation as inadequate to explain the development of human personality, Gordon W. Allport appears to agree with this view as to the psychological antecedents of altruistic behaviour. Cf. G. W. Allport, *Personality, a Psychological Interpretation* (Holt, 1937), 425.

[6]J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (Kegan Paul, 1932), chap. 1, "The Rules of the Game."

moral virtues like truth-telling and justice and generosity, he observed a similar progress in the children. When questioned, the younger boys said that lying was wrong because parents and teachers had pronounced it wicked and would punish them for it, while the older boys had gained some insight into the social relations involved and the fact that unless truth-telling were general people could not get along peaceably, could not work or play together.

The discoveries of Piaget regarding the influence of developing intelligence upon the moral judgments and social standards of children may well seem to round out a tenable explanation of altruistic behaviour in terms of motivation that is, broadly speaking, egoistic. Granted the needs for food and shelter, to escape pain and injury, and to have self-esteem and social recognition, operative in the experiences of family life and the social world, then developing intelligence can to some extent be counted on to make clear to the individual that altruistic, co-operative modes of behaviour *pay*, in terms of true self-interest and lasting satisfaction. Lest, however, we be led by these considerations to conclude that the love impulse plays no essential part in the motivation of altruistic behaviour generally speaking, it is necessary to remind ourselves of another incontrovertible fact. The importance of this fact has been fully demonstrated by psychological studies of the causes of delinquent and neurotic behaviour in childhood and youth. It is that there is little likelihood of a child's gaining an insight into the personal advantages of altruistic behaviour unless he has the chance actually to experience the benefits of co-operation with others in work and in play. But he will scarcely have gained such indispensable experience if he has never felt much or any liking for others, for companionship with them, or for taking a hand in their games or tasks. Consequently, in cases where the springs of human affection have been dried up through parental neglect or harshness,[7] or the absence of educational opportunity or facilities for social recreation, it is improbable that the unfortunate individual will listen to, or be much moved by, anything his reason may tell him as to the real advantages to be gained from exchange of helpful services with others.

Psychological investigation of the dynamics of altruistic behaviour as seen in the lifetime and social adjustments of human individuals shows it to have, we now see, a complex and changing motivation. The love impulse in the little child undoubtedly impels him to try to help, and so to please, those for whom he feels a warm affection. In learning to take account of the wishes and comfort of others in his early training for social life, the child is motivated chiefly by the basic security drives. With the growth of consciousness of self, the desire for favourable recognition by others plays a leading part in prompting the youthful member to adopt those modes of altruistic conduct which are approved and sanctioned by the

[7]P. M. Symonds, *The Psychology of Parent-Child Relationships* (Appleton-Century, 1939), chap. v.

culture of his social group. Increased understanding of his relations to his fellows in society, and of the interdependence of his activities and interests with theirs, is also an important factor in redirecting the individual's egoistic motives upon socialized and co-operative goals. And throughout, the motive of love or liking for others exerts a very real, if often indirect, force impelling the individual to associate with them in play and in work and thus to gain the experience of social give and take which is necessary if his intelligence is to assist him in making a satisfactory social adjustment.

We have now to apply these conclusions to the larger world of organized social life and to consider what motives impel men to unselfish, public-spirited action in the civic, national, and international fields. This question, though primarily a psychological one, has momentous social and human importance today. The future of democracy, now in the balance, will be determined to a very great extent by the capacity of men for voluntary co-operation, both as fellow-citizens in the national state and as members of the international community. The capacity of human beings for such far-reaching and effective co-operation as democracy proposes is dependent upon the strength and scope of the altruistic motives in the nature of man. It is consequently not surprising that thoughtful people, deeply concerned for the future of civilization and the human race, should be looking for scientific information about those altruistic motives in human nature which can be relied on to impel individuals to act co-operatively, generously, humanely.

In view of the complex and varied nature of altruistic motivation, it is not strange that psychologists, on the basis of the evidence, should fail to agree as to which one of the many drives that play a part in altruistic motivation is chiefly operative in the field of large-scale social interaction. Some leading psychologists believe that men are, and always will be, impelled to co-operate industrially and politically, nationally and internationally, by an expansion of the goal-objects of the motives of self-preservation and self-esteem to include the several groups of which the agent is member. This expansion of the scope of self-interest takes place, they hold, through an understanding of the interdependence of all individual interests. We find this view well illustrated in an article by Professor D. K. Adams,[8] who takes his text from Piaget's well-known studies, mentioned above, of boys' behaviour in their marble games. Professor Adams does not believe that there is any non-egoistic motive strong enough to induce the individual citizen to put the common or national good before his own private good. But he does believe it possible for the individual citizen to gain an insight into the *identity* of his own interests with those of society. In his opinion the prevalence of such insight, enlisting egoistic motives in support of the social good, is what explains the willing co-operation between citizens of a free democracy in pursuit of a common

[8]D. K. Adams, "A Note on Societies" (*Character and Personality*, XI, 1942, 50-63).

national goal. An important factor in evoking such an insight is, he thinks, the general frustration which results from unenlightened self-seeking.

Other well-known psychologists believe that the love impulse, along with the sympathetic appreciation and accord that it engenders, is the dominant force which impels the individual citizen to put the common good before his private interest. One of these is E. C. Tolman whose social psychology is patterned very largely on the Freudian model.[9] Also using the word "identity," but in a different sense, Professor Tolman sees in the "general Freudian notion of identification" the psychological basis for co-operation, not merely in the nation-state but in the international community. The identification which Tolman has in mind, however, has its basis not in the intellect but in impulse and emotion. It is, he says, the identification of the individual with some whole group which he wants to love and be loved by. In so far as the individual does thus identify himself with such a group, he tends to feel at home with it; he feels its goals to be his goals, its fortune to be his fortune, and its prestige to be his prestige.

Most psychologists today would agree that identification as understood by Freud and emphasized by Tolman does frequently occur, but they are inclined to think of it as an abnormal symptom, a compensatory or defensive device, rather than as a controlling factor in normal social organization. Under the stress of intolerable frustration or deeply injured self-esteem, people do gain relief and substitute-satisfaction by identifying themselves with outstanding figures or militant groups in the contemporary social world, or with heroes of the stage, screen, or novel. But the Freudian concept has social and political applications more extensive than this which merit serious consideration. Freud held that the individual identifies himself with fellow group-members because they all share with him a common love for the same leader who stands in the position of kind elder brother and father surrogate. This common tender tie, he says, is what prevails over the hostile impulses of group-members, and prompts them to deeds of friendly service. Certainly, love for, and loyalty to, the person of the sovereign or monarch has played too large a part in impelling fellow-subjects to co-operate in the national interest to permit us to dismiss the Freudian theory as extravagant or fantastic. Loyalty to king and country, as the dominant form of patriotic motivation, historically speaking, would seem to have psychological sources very like those pointed out by Freud. His theory also throws light upon the psychological factors operative in the rise of contemporary dictators and dictatorships. To be sure, devotion to the common leader which identifies the faithful is not a visible mark which distinguishes a comrade, a spiritual brother, a fellow-traveller, from the common run of people in a national population. We see the consequent utility of coloured shirts, salutes, handgrips, and other symbols of partisan

[9]E. C. Tolman, "Identification and the Post-War World" (*Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXXVIII, 1943, 141-8).

allegiance. Tolman stresses the importance of symbols and rituals, of flags, songs, and the like in the kind of identification he has in mind, of the individual with the group.

Between these two views of altruistic motivation, the one hinging upon increased insight and understanding and the other upon love originally aroused in the family situation, G. W. Allport mediates with the concepts of *ego-involvement* and *participation*.[10] He considers the human individual's desire for recognized social position, for status in the community, insatiable. When, however, a man's social pursuits realistically engage his ego and fulfil its status-seeking motives, he becomes, Professor Allport would say, a true participant in co-operative activity. When individuals thus become participants or team-mates in the performance of social tasks, the motivating tensions of the one are relieved by the work and success of another. "Your tensions can be relieved by my work, and my tensions by your work, provided we are participants."[11] Now it seems clear that this can happen only when there is such an identification of feeling and purpose between participants as Tolman and the Freudians have in mind. Certainly we cannot obtain the full measure of personal satisfaction from the achievements of others unless there is a community of experience and emotion between ourselves and them which causes us to feel their triumphs and failures, their dangers and escapes, as our own. It is the merit of the Freudian theory to have seen this and to have recognized the further highly important fact that such emotional identification carries with it, and is reinforced by, friendly feeling, comradely love.

We are driven to conclude, therefore, that if the average citizen is to be impelled to co-operate with others in the pursuit of an inclusive social good, he must do more than perceive the identity of his own interest with the welfare of his fellows. It is doubtful if such merely intellectual assent would suffice to redirect his egoistic motives very effectually upon the social goal. He must go further than this, and merge his feeling and interest with others in a shared loyalty to a common objective or goal. It appears then that the Freudian concept of identification is sound in attributing altruistic motivation in the social group mainly to a shared loyalty to a common external object which creates emotional ties of comradely affection between participant members.

When we apply this principle to political and industrial co-operation in a democracy, a question at once arises concerning the external object of the love and loyalty which is to be the motivating agency. One thinks at once of personal leaders and leadership. When we remember the part played by leaders like Churchill and Roosevelt in evoking the maximum co-operative war effort from their respective nations, and the need of capable, dominating leadership in all military operations, we cannot fail to

[10] G. W. Allport, "The Psychology of Participation" (*Psychological Review*, LII, 1945, 117-32).

[11] *Ibid.*, 122.

be impressed by the power of such leadership. But political leadership in a free democracy is insecure and generally short-lived, at the mercy as it is of changing winds of popular favour and disfavour, and all the ups and downs in the game of party politics. Furthermore, men thrown into positions of highest authority by our election machinery often lack those magnetic qualities which evoke admiration, loyalty, and love from the mass of the people. Hence the conclusion seems inescapable that the external object which must be principally relied upon in a democracy to arouse that allegiance and devotion in a citizen-body, which identifies its members as co-participants in a common task, can be nothing more, or less, than the agreed-upon goals of national endeavour.

Now it must be admitted, however reluctantly, that national goals as compared with personal leaders, are ineffective evokers of enthusiastic loyalty, of whole-hearted devotion. They are generalized and abstract, not concretely individual; they exist largely as ideas in men's minds, not as flesh and blood actualities. Furthermore, national goals are somewhat vaguely conceived, even by the enlightened and articulate. It is often hard to make them definite and intelligible even to oneself, still more so to others, and consequently allegiance to them is not readily or adequately expressed. The result is that this kind of loyalty does not in most cases manifest itself openly, and when it does exist is not easily detected and appreciated—certainly not as easily as devotion to a personal leader. Hence it does not act very effectively as an identifying factor, joining together in a community of emotion and participant endeavour many people of diverse cultural backgrounds, occupations, tastes, and ambitions.

These facts all conspire to raise a question of gravest moment for the future of democracy. How are fellow-citizens to discover in each other this basic loyalty to national goals which, when consciously shared, will evoke from them the *we-feeling* of comradeship in a co-operative enterprise? One thing at least may be said, though it suggests no easy answer to the question. There is only one way in which it can be done, and this is by direct personal contact and communication. This is of course no new idea. Allport, in the article above-mentioned, refers to the emphasis which Dewey and Follett have placed in their writings upon primary face-to-face association as the underlying, basic condition of voluntary co-operation in industry and the state. Personal communication is not limited, as many seem to think, to the exchange of ideas and opinions through the medium of talk. It operates through the media of outward action and emotional expression as well as language. We perceive from the actions of others what they are trying to do, what their purposes are, and how they go about realizing them. We perceive from the facial expressions of others, gestures, etc., what their feelings are and, in many cases at least, what circumstances have aroused them. Personal communication is thus a complex and many-sided activity through which beliefs and opinions, feelings of like or dislike, and goals of action along with the means employed to attain them, are conveyed and

oftentimes shared. Hence it accomplishes far more than the written or printed message ever can. If given a chance, such direct personal interchange cannot fail to reveal something of the total personality of each communicant, and give some telling indication of his permanent interests, guiding convictions, and controlling loyalties. Only through such communication can individuals as different in upbringing, tastes, and ambitions as those which comprise the population of a great modern nation become aware of the beliefs, goals, attitudes, and sentiments which they share in common. And such degree of mutual understanding, with the sympathetic appreciation of common interests and loyalties which it induces, appears to be the only substitute in a free democracy for that shared devotion to a personal leader which identifies group-members emotionally and motivates them to mutually helpful behaviour.

Growing awareness of the importance of personal communication is evidenced by investigators in the field of industrial psychology. In his writings on industrial management, F. J. Roethlisberger holds it to be a prime condition of better co-operation in large-scale industry that channels of communication shall be opened between management and the mass of the workers, so that friendly, companionable relations shall be encouraged all along the line.[12] Real, unimpeded communication does not now occur, he points out. Management and workers not merely differ in outlook and attitude, they talk a different language. Hence such messages as are transmitted up and down the line do not, in most cases, convey the meaning intended. What is needed is direct personal contact, and, to bring this about, nothing can take the place of the personal interview. He therefore contends that, if industry is to become more genuinely co-operative, adequate and ample provision must be made for interviews between representatives of the workers and the managerial staff. In the conduct of such interviews, he believes that the rules formulated for industrial interviewing by the celebrated Hawthorne investigators should be followed. The gist of these rules is that such interviewing will be successful in proportion as each participant refrains from trying to instruct, admonish, or exhort, and is able to penetrate the screen of defensive attitudes and face-saving devices which the other has thrown up, and to discover his deeper personal beliefs, convictions, and purposes. In short, two persons, two selves, come in this way to confront one another and become personally acquainted.

Recent studies of counselling techniques as employed in psychotherapy, like those of Professor Carl R. Rogers,[13] give added testimony to the importance of personal communication as the prime condition of the establishment of co-operative relations between human beings. The full and free expression of hostile impulses and negative emotions by the subject gives them social objectivity and furnishes the needed common ground in

[12]F. J. Roethlisberger, *Management and Morale* (Harvard University Press, 1942).
[13]Carl R. Rogers, *Counselling and Psychotherapy* (Houghton Mifflin, 1942).

objective fact for a joint exploration of the subject's problem. Once this is done, the subject is freed from the grip of his defence mechanisms which have had the effect of linking him not with the real community but with a pseudo-community of his own egocentric imagination. The way is opened for co-operative thinking on the part of the subject and the counsellor, involving a progressive insight into the former's situation. The attainment of such joint insight is accompanied by a re-arousal of social interests and altruistic impulses in the subject, and makes him ready for new courses of action which bring him into mutually helpful and satisfying relations with his family and occupational associates.

The testing and training of men drafted for military service has brought to public notice a disconcerting amount of emotional instability and nervous disorder in our population. What a psychologist, Dr. N. O. Cameron, has written about paranoia holds true to a large extent of all neuroses.[14] Paranoia he describes as a disorder of communication, that conjoint activity by which two or more persons share the same object or act in its meaningful context. Paranoiac attitudes and actions, he says, grow out of a breakdown in the machinery of social co-operation. The mutual sharing of plans, acts, and consequences that goes to make up genuine communication gets replaced in certain persons by a species of solitary behaviour governed by a biased interpretation of the facts of daily life on the basis of their own preoccupations and grievances. Surely we have here more than a hint of one potent cause of the lack of the will to co-operate in a social culture like our own where competition is pervasive and incessant, and social contacts are, to a great and growing extent, mechanically intermediated, reactive, and impersonal.

[14]N. O. Cameron, "The Development of Paranoiac Thinking" (*Psychological Review*, L, 1943, 221).

GEORGE HERBERT AND THE HUMANIST TRADITION

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UNLESS one is content with abstract definition one can no longer discuss the meaning of humanism without concern and even trepidation. Perhaps if one is ready to admit that this meaning is subject to change, and that the persistence of the word from the Renaissance to the recent embalming of "The Hundred Best Books" is another indication of the poverty of language, one may avoid the trip and stumble which use of the term so often occasions.

In our day the word humanism has frequently been employed defensively by those who resist the implications of science for modern life, and by those who seek to conserve amid the disturbing flux of social and cultural values some ideal construction of values gleaned from a reading of the past. For Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More (whose thought is characteristic of this defensive kind of humanism) the word clearly implies restrictive habits of thought and feeling, and this, I think, despite a healthy insistence on objectivity and aesthetic discipline. Unlike the humanists of a younger time, these men praise the fugitive and cloistered virtue, and draft an ethic out of inhibition.

Yet there are still among us those for whom the word is wide enough and deep enough to contain all of man's capacity and all of man's destiny. My own approach to the problem is historical and relativist. This essay is, in a sense, a study in the contraction of a word-value, and will contend that the value of humanism, like the value stored up in any word of long life, is by no means constant and can even contradict itself in a changed historical context.

From this point of view it is instructive to re-examine the work of George Herbert, not only to gain a surer understanding of his poetry, not only to demonstrate the danger of static critical touchstones and catch-phrases, but also to observe a cultural phenomenon in motion. Herbert's poetry has usually been regarded as the typical expression of Anglican humanism. However, by analysing the imagery within the frame of its social reference one can detect the tradition in the process of transforming itself into something quite unlike the Anglican humanism of a generation before.

Most students have found in Herbert a quality of religious feeling intimate yet moderate in expression which places his work in the direct line of descent from the *via media* of Hooker and the spirit of the Elizabethan compromise. Hutchinson's critical examination of the text has saved Herbert's reputation from any taint of the romantic agony. Certainly there would seem to be no evidence, psychological or factual, to justify Palmer's "placing all the happier poems at the beginning of the Bemerton section, and then passing through poems of reflection and restlessness to

poems of suffering and death."[1] The sense of crisis is never absent from Herbert, but it is crisis tentatively if not finally resolved in a quiet, reasonable, though intense faith.

While recognizing these qualities in Herbert which seem, by hindsight at least, to typify the spirit of the humanist tradition as it unfolds from the theology of Hooker, we must bear in mind that Herbert was not an Elizabethan and did not write under the pressure of those forces which went into the making of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*. The court of Charles may have been no more than a stone's throw in time from the court of Elizabeth, but it no longer represented the collective energies of the English nation; and the Church of Laud, no matter what it may have owed in theory to Hooker's conception of the Christian Commonwealth, was no longer, in the fullest *practical* sense, the Church of England. Division within the state and Church (and finally between state and Church) destroyed the Elizabethan synthesis, both secular and ecclesiastical. It is to this period of disintegration that Herbert's work belongs, and unless one is to regard humanism as wholly timeless and abstract, one is not apt to seek the Elizabethan synthesis of values in a Caroline country parish on the eve of civil war.

This is not to deny the resemblance of Herbert's "British Church" to the Church of Hooker, or to deny in Herbert the presence of the humanist idea. On the surface at least the tradition seems unbroken, and it is from the Elizabethan compromise that Herbert derives his theoretical values. But to the historian of cultural change the exciting paradox is this: by his very reception of the Elizabethan humanist idea in a period of rapid disintegration and change, Herbert alters the tradition and imparts to it a new direction. The direction, for Anglican poetry at least, was now to be away from humanism and towards mysticism. Elizabethan humanist values, persisting abstractly into a period which rejected their social origins, take on an independent life of their own. It was to be a short life. It could not be sustained. The materialism of Hobbes and the nonconformist spirituality of Bunyan were the carriers into the next century of the motive forces of the English Revolution. There would be within the dominant hard-headed culture of the coming age no Anglican poetry and little Anglican prose to match in quality or intensity the work of a George Herbert or a Lancelot Andrewes. Such religious fervour as there was would be evangelical and quite outside the Anglican tradition.

To understand Herbert's unique place in a moment of cultural metamorphosis (for such his moment unquestionably was), it is necessary to look backward as well as forward. The origins of Elizabethan (and Anglican) humanism are clearly social and political. Paul Elmer More admits that "if challenged to state the motive that started the Church of England on her peculiar course, the historian is likely to reply that it was political

[1]F. E. Hutchinson, "George Herbert," in *Seventeenth Century Studies Presented to Sir Herbert Grierson* (Oxford, 1938), 151.

rather than religious."[2] Sir Herbert Grierson, in assessing the spiritual quality of Elizabethan Anglicanism, states:

> . . . I do not ascribe it specifically to Anglican doctrine or to Anglican bishops generally—who were often as narrow and at heart as puritan as their opponents—but to the political situation, and not least to Queen Elizabeth. That strong-minded, worldly-minded, unscrupulous little lady it was who saved Shakespeare for us and gave him the chance . . . to present his picture of life which, whatever be its imperfections, is instinct with the finest spirit of a humanism, penetrating, just, and sympathetic. And it was she who saved England from passing from an infallible Pope to an infallible John Calvin; who in her endeavour to keep the door open for Catholic as well as Protestant made it possible for the English Church to retain and recover some of the most attractive and humane features of the old faith and . . . to cultivate reasonableness, to dispense with infallibility, and to appeal to history and reason, and produce men like Hooker, George Herbert, Henry Vaughan, Andrewes. . . .[3]

One notes here, despite the emphasis on the political genesis of humanism, the assumption of a continuous tradition from Hooker through the Caroline period, a position which, in so far as poetry is concerned, this essay questions. What Grierson overlooks, of course, is that the compromise between the old faith and the new spirit, between the old aristocracy and the new middle class, was no longer effective by the reign of Charles. But the recognition of the social origins of Elizabethan humanism is important, and particularly so because of the clear association here within the humanist tradition of Shakespeare and Hooker, of the secular and ecclesiastical.

One must remember that in Hooker's view "the English Church and the English nation are identical in membership, for every Englishman is a Christian and every Christian in England is an Englishman."[4] Hooker resists both Puritanism and Roman Catholicism as forces making for division between church and state, and his concept of the national Church headed by the monarch fully reflects and complements the secular compromise effected between Court and City by the unifying role of the Crown. Indeed, Hooker's conception of the monarchy as the all-embracing symbol of national life corresponds to Shakespeare's. "Our Kings . . . when they take possession of the room they are called unto, have it painted out before their eyes, even by the very solemnities and rites of their inauguration, to what affairs by the said law their supreme authority and power reacheth. Crowned we see they are, and enthronized, and anointed: the crown a sign of military, the throne, of sedentary or judicial, the oil, of religious or sacred power."[5] The king becomes a symbolization of both secular and spiritual values. He is subject to law, but the law now natural to Englishmen is that very dynamic of national life which the monarchy embodies and expresses.

[2] P. E. More, "The Spirit of Anglicanism," in *Anglicanism*, ed. P. E. More and F. L. Cross (Milwaukee, 1935), xxi.

[3] *Cross Currents in English Literature of the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1929), 205.

[4] G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York, 1937), 441.

[5] *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book VIII, chap. II. Reprinted in *Anglicanism*, ed. More and Cross, 689.

By adapting medieval political theory to the needs of the new nationalism, and by finding the just and workable balance between the claims of the feudal and *bourgeois* segments of society, Hooker presented the first clear rationalization of the Elizabethan compromise. Nor was his *Ecclesiastical Polity* idealist or abstract. It articulated the realities of Elizabethan political and church life. The love of moderation—the very accent of reasonable compromise implicit in the work—is evoked by the practical needs of the time.

Consequently, one cannot insist too strongly on the fact that Anglican humanism was at first a rationale possible for theology only because church and state coexisted as an organic whole. The *Ecclesiastical Polity* gave impressive sanction to a settlement arrived at in secular practice. Hooker's expression of the Elizabethan spirit is paler than Shakespeare's because it is necessarily formal. And it is in secular literature that the values of Elizabethan humanism are realized most characteristically. In reconciling the explosive force of Renaissance individualism with the demands of social order, Shakespearean tragedy gives profound (if unconscious) expression to the age. Shakespeare's prince not only is the fulfilment of the Renaissance wish for unrestrained power, but also, as in Hooker, is subject to the very forces he symbolizes. Lear's kinghood is a mockery once the realm is divided, and individual aspirations, formerly collectivized in the symbol of the crown, are permitted to operate separately and therefore destructively.

Shakespeare's understanding of man alive, realizing himself not in spite of society but through it, is the essence of Elizabethan humanism whether secular or churchly. Within a conception of freedom as an aspect of necessity the humanist idea grew. Acknowledging both the glory and the corruption of the flesh while savouring the life of the spirit, seeking the full realization of man's capacities, denying none of his appetites, yet countering boundless egotism with an awareness of the social limit, Elizabethan humanism achieved a fusion of the spiritual and courtly values of the past with the restless, aggressive, even pecuniary urge of the Renaissance. In Spenser an aristocratic Platonism mingles with a distinctly *bourgeois* ethic. In Bacon the love of good Latin is not yet incompatible with a devotion to science and the dedication of man's powers to the conquest of nature. In theology new confirmation is given to the doctrine, medieval in origin, and to be denied by Puritanism, that worldly and other-worldly values are continuous and cohere in a Christian humanism that need not divorce the orders of nature and grace.

This "unified sensibility" of Elizabethan humanism is neither restrictive nor exclusive. Its interest in the classical past is not antiquarian. It is not aloof, nor is its gaze turned inward. It is the thought and feeling of an age alive—and it wears good flesh!

The quality of Herbert's humanism must be seen and felt against the fullness of the Elizabethan experience. This has never, in my opinion,

been seriously attempted. Critical studies of Herbert have been limited for the most part to an analysis of the metaphysical element in the style, or to an appreciation of his specific religious sensibility.[6] Too little attention has been given to any concern Herbert may have shown in his poetry for the world about him. While most critics have speculated as to why Herbert left the court for the church, the question has been approached biographically. In general it seems agreed that no matter what attraction the secular life may have had for Herbert, and no matter what the reason for rejecting (or losing) it may have been, his essential nature as a poet and as a man was realized in the church. No one can doubt the sincerity of his religious convictions. No one can quite imagine him as a Cavalier poet writing Platonic masques for Henrietta Maria.

However, in considering the biographical problem, it should be recognized that the struggle in Herbert's mind, while intensely personal, is more than personal. The conflict of worldly and other-worldly values reflected in the poetry represents, surely, a crack in the great tradition. This conflict is foreign to the synthesis embodied in the *Ecclesiastical Polity* and, in its fullest implications, indicates a departure from the idea of a continuous Christian Commonwealth which is at once worldly and other-worldly. I am not suggesting that Herbert quarrels with Hooker's doctrine. I am suggesting that by Herbert's day the social assertion of Hooker's doctrine no longer fits the facts. This consideration cannot be overlooked in any estimate of Herbert's place in the humanist tradition.

A very un-Elizabethan world comes through in the texture of Herbert's poetry. As one would expect, the poems abound in references to the Court. Indeed, the tradition of royalist symbolism persists even in a die-hard republican and regicide like John Milton. As I have shown elsewhere,[7] the crown remains in Milton as the inevitable symbol of power and grandeur —despite the anti-royalist context. Milton's contradictory use of the courtly tradition illustrates one aspect of the break-down of the Elizabethan synthesis. Herbert's treatment represents still another aspect of this disintegration.

It is surely a significant paradox that the Puritan revolutionary makes positive use of the royalist symbol while the Anglican aristocrat uses it negatively. This does not, of course, imply that Herbert is more properly Puritan in tone than Milton. It is simply that Milton concerns himself with the realities of social power and, for lack of any other, must use an inappropriate literary tradition. Herbert, on the other hand, is not concerned with *real-politik* and the exercise of power. The strength-suggestion of the royalist symbol is thus lost to him. And the moral and spiritual values which the Elizabethan could also evoke with the symbol of the crown have detached themselves and dwell apart.

[6]This is not meant to disparage the important work of critics like Joan Bennett and Helen C. White. I am merely urging that a further dimension can be examined profitably to supplement our knowledge of Herbert.

[7]*Milton's Royalism* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1943).

This denuding of a symbol once rich in positive suggestion cannot be explained by simple linguistics or attributed to personal caprice. Nothing points more clearly to the fragmentation of Caroline culture than the realization that both Herbert and Lovelace were the King's men. In the Cavalier group some semblance of the old tradition is left. Something of Spenser appears in the poetry of Lovelace and Suckling—the trappings, the gay colours, the grace, the chivalric stance. But the heart and brain have been removed. Compare the artificial and ornamental Platonism of the Cavaliers with the valid and real balance of ideas in Spenser, a balance in which Platonic idealism is tempered with a sense of present reality.

The "sage and serious" note of Spenser is proper now to the revolutionary moralist who would behead a king, or, refined from all association with courtly life, accompanies Herbert on his lonely walk with God.

As we shall see, Herbert's reference to the Court, while negative, is not hostile, never *anti*-royalist. He does not write like a man with a grudge. There is something more than personal disappointment involved in his representation of royalism. It is true that failure to win quick preferment at court may have affected his decision to take orders. It should be remembered, however, that Spenser felt keenly his neglect by the court and could lash out against it from a deep sense of injury. Nevertheless, the values held. Spenser is sometimes like an indignant child stamping his foot at his mother and threatening to leave home. But he never does.

There is no such personal hurt, no sense at all of sharp injury straining for reconciliation, in Herbert's feeling toward the Court. There is, instead, a quiet revaluation, a separation of what now appears as intrinsic from the mere crust of the tradition. This is a deeply meditative and not a wilful or petulant process of mind which reshapes Herbert's whole universe of symbolic reference. He seeks:

> . . . the pliant minde, whose gentle measure
> Complies and suits with all estates;
> Which can let loose to a crown, and yet with pleasure
> Take up within a cloister's gates.[8]

The crown which Charles V of Spain put aside to enter a monastery has become more suggestive than the crown which still adorns the head of another Charles. In its social reference the royalist symbol is almost

[8]"Content," 13-16. Herbert's treatment of royalism should be contrasted with the bitter, highly personal anti-royalist imagery of Donne's early work. (See M. A. Rugoff, *Donne's Imagery* (New York, 1939), 151-6). One feels that in Herbert the Court is not rejected *politically*, but rather is identified, through a religious perception transcending both political and personal considerations, with human pretension and pride. "Man is all weaknesse; there is no such thing As prince or king" ("Praise," 9-10). Kingliness as a *virtue* is proper not to the pride of flesh but to Heaven:

> Where ev'ry one is king, and hath his crown,
> If not upon his head, yet in his hands.
> —"To All Angels and Saints," 4-5.

always used negatively by Herbert, although God retains his kingship in a completely other-worldly realm. And the King of Kings himself is *sometimes* made to discard his formal majesty:

> Hast thou not heard that my Lord Jesus di'd?
> Then let me tell thee a strange storie.
> The God of power, as he did ride
> In his majestick robes of glorie,
> Resolv'd to light; and so one day
> He did descend, undressing all the way.
>
> The starres his tire of light and rings obtain'd,
> The cloud his bow, the fire his spear,
> The sky his azure mantle gain'd.
> And when they ask'd what he would wear,
> He smil'd and said, as he did go,
> He had new clothes a making here below.[9]

Splendour and pomp are appropriate to created nature, but not to man, not to the Son of Man. And even in the nature imagery the royalist reference can be negative:

> Then went I to a garden and did spy
> A gallant flower,
> The crown Imperiall. Sure, said I,
> Peace at the root must dwell.
> But when I digg'd, I saw a worm devoure
> What show'd so well.[10]

It is not surprising, therefore, that the soul's redemption and the song made for the soul's rejoicing should deny courtliness. Herbert seeks Christ in

> . . . great resorts,
> In cities, theatres, gardens, parks, and courts[11]

only to find him at last amid "a raggèd noise and mirth Of theeves and murderers." One feels again and again in the poems that Herbert has reached for the unified experience of Hooker, for the synthesis of worldly and other-worldly values. And he has failed. As a poet he must make a different song unaided by those who had been his fellows.

[9] "The Bag," 7-18.

[10] "Peace," 13-19.

[11] "Redemption," 10-11. In the Eucharist, Christ's presence is apparent

> Not in rich furniture or fine aray,
> Nor in a wedge of gold. . . .
> But by the way of nourishment and strength,
> Thou creep'st into my breast.
> —"The Holy Communion," 1-2, 7-8.

Herbert's altar is never courtly. See also "Sion." The suggestion is never Puritan. The "British Church" is not Puritan. The objection is not so much to papal symbolism as to kingly (and therefore worldly) symbolism. And the objection is sometimes a little wistful, never strident.

My God, a verse is not a crown,
No point of honour, or gay suit,
No hawk, or banquet, or renown,
Nor a good sword, nor yet a lute.

It cannot vault, or dance, or play;
It never was in *France* or *Spain;*
Nor can it entertain the day
With a great stable or demain.

It is no office, art, or news,
Nor the Exchange, or busie Hall.
But it is that which while I use
I am with thee; and *Most, take all.*[12]

Here the whole range and sense of the chivalric tradition is questioned. And in the last stanza the symbols of commerce fare no better. Indeed, the significance of Herbert's curiously negative treatment of the Court cannot be fully understood unless one notices his distinctly hostile use of the symbols of wealth and trade. The Court, in Herbert's symbolization of it, seems impotent. But the Exchange is vicious. The acquisitive urge menaces the present and will destroy the future. Everywhere Herbert sees about him the evidences of successful greed, sees the new vulgarity of money challenge and threaten the old dignity of the land. The strains and stresses that were to put the landed gentry under one violent banner and the merchant and the yeoman under another had been increasingly evident since the death of Elizabeth. Herbert cannot accommodate himself to the sharp new ethic emerging in Puritan sermonizing, an ethic which would justify the new man to the old God. Even John Donne could bless the Virginia planters and could find it in his heart to comfort the London merchant with the assurance that "Riches is the metaphor in which the Holy Ghost hath delighted to express God and Heaven to us."[13] In Herbert,

Man is God's image, but a poore man is
Christ's stamp to boot.[14]

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[12]"The Quidditie." It is certain that Herbert is very conscious of the courtly symbol and deliberately seeks to create an un-courtly kind of verse. He is constantly aware that his work stands aside from the tradition and all that the tradition of courtly verse suggests.

He sometimes, as in "Dulnesse," makes a deliberate contrast between the courtly love poem and his own kind of love lyric to God.

The wanton lover in a curious strain
Can praise his fairest fair,
And with quaint metaphors her curlèd hair
Curl o're again.

Thou art my lovelinesse, my life, my light,
Beautie alone to me;
Thy bloudy death, and undeserv'd, makes Thee
Pure red and white.

[13]*Donne's Sermons*, ed. Logan Pearsall Smith (Oxford, 1920), 46.

[14]"The Church-Porch," stanza 64.

Only once is Christ expressed in the metaphor of gold. Herbert is addressing the Virgin Mary:

> Thou art the holy mine whence came the gold,
> The great restorative for all decay
> In young and old.[15]

But this is an ironic flirtation with gold. While the suggestion of wealth hovers in the word and thickens it, the supposed restorative and medicinal properties of gold really inform the meaning of the metaphor. And the specifically *social* virtue of wealth is always clearly denied. Man has dug gold out of the dark cave and made it bright; now it un-mans man.

> . . . . . .
> Nay, thou hast got the face of man, for we
> Have with our stamp and seal transferr'd our right;
> Thou art the man, and man but drosse to thee.
> Man calleth thee his wealth, who made thee rich,
> And while he digs out thee, falls in the ditch.[16]

The active social role of wealth comes out in "The Church Militant," Herbert's one deliberate poetic venture into the theory of church, state, and history. He traces the flight of religion before the successive invasions of sin from Abraham's time to Laud's. Through Judea, Greece, Rome, Egypt, Spain, and Germany the spirit of religion travels, coming to rest in England and "giving the Church a crown to keep her state."[17] This last is good Hooker, and is meant to be. But sin "travell'd westward also."[18] And sin will prevail as it has in other lands and other times.

> Then shall Religion to *America* flee.
> They have their times of Gospel ev'n as we.
> My God, thou dost prepare for them a way
> By carrying first their gold from them away;
> For gold and grace did never yet agree.
> Religion alwaies sides with povertie.
> We think we rob them, but we think amisse;
> We are more poore, and they more rich by this.[19]

There is surely a hint of irony in the suggestion that the exploitation of the colony will further degrade the English while ennobling their American victims. At least Herbert does not share Donne's trust that the planters are holy men prayerfully extending God's kingdom beyond the seas. Nor does the vision of a new empire kindle positive hope for the future. Even the virtues of poverty inadvertently raised up in America will perish soon.

> Yet as the Church shall thither westward flie,
> So Sinne shall trace and dog her instantly.
> . . . . . .
> The Church shall come, and Sinne the Church shall smother.[20]

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[15] "To All Angels and Saints," 11-13.
[16] "Avarice," 10-14.
[17] "The Church Militant," 91.
[18] *Ibid.*, 104.
[19] *Ibid.*, 247-54.
[20] *Ibid.*, 259-60, 266.

Against the unleashed force of avarice neither King nor Church can prevail. Here and throughout the poems the treatment of the wealth symbol is as hostile as the treatment of royalism is negative. In one poem there is what appears at first to be a trade image with positive religious suggestion. Herbert sells his soul to God.

> . . . with open eyes
> I flie to thee, and fully understand
> Both the main sale and the commodities;
> And at what rate and price I have thy love.[21]

But the transaction is in a commodity not to be had on the stalls or in the warehouses. And the price God charges is the world itself and all of the world's profit.

This distrust of riches, this fear of the merchant's world has, of course, nothing in common with the cry which later is heard from St. George's Hill. Herbert is no revolutionary. His ideal poverty has small reference to real or social poverty. He is never impelled, as Winstanley is, to banish wealth by banishing poverty. The mood, on the social level, is negative, passive, fatalistic.

Is this not a long leap backward from the positive, all-embracing synthesis of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity?* The crown no longer saves the Church, nor does it "keep her state." The ideal which emerges from Herbert would seem to be pre-Elizabethan, pre-nationalist, pre-mercantile. It involves the renunciation of courtly and *bourgeois* values (both halves of the Elizabethan synthesis) and reaches after a society, admittedly unobtainable, where trade is little and princes need not be great.

Yet the mark of the Hooker tradition is to be found on every page of Herbert. It is in the light of Hooker's philosophy of the *via media* that Herbert sees and interprets his own age. It is Anglican thought and the still solid fact of the Anglican Church itself which appear as the constant in a world of flux. Herbert's mind is no *tabula erasa* receiving raw impressions from the social environment. He regards his world in a particular way. He looks for values he has learned to expect. Tradition—the tradition of Anglican humanism—directs his gaze, guides his appraisal.

In "The Church-Porch," a poem written before he took orders, Herbert presents his humanist ethic. The poem is a plea for the controlled life, the

[21] "The Pearl," 32-5. In "The Elixir" he compares the grace of God to the philosopher's tone "that turneth all to gold." But this is analogy, not metaphor. There is a difference between a parallel and an equation. Herbert never uses wealth as *in itself* expressive of value. There is never, as there so often is in Donne, an equation between goods and the good. Treasures there may be in heaven but they are not as the treasures of earth. The opposition of spiritual wealth to social wealth is complete and consistent throughout.

> He that hath made a sorrie wedding
> Between his soul and gold, and hath preferr'd
> False gain before the true,
> Hath done what he condemnes in reading.
> —"Self-Condemnation," 13-16.

middle way between continence and abstinence ("Drink not the *third* glasse"). Balance is the prescription for the social as well as the personal life. Wealth and the profit motive already appear as dangerous, but not yet fatally so:

> Gold thou mayst safely touch; but if it stick
> Unto thy hands, it woundeth to the quick.[22]

Poverty is idealized, but for the attention of the alms-giver. The good life still seems to be possible for the courtier or merchant whose ways are sane.

But even in "The Church-Porch" it is apparent that Herbert is engaged in special pleading without hope that his notions will easily prevail. The feeling that Englishmen are not what they once were is evident throughout the poem, and, indeed, is the motive for preaching the verse sermon at all:

> O England! full of sinne, but most of sloth,
> Spit out thy flegme, and fill thy brest with glorie.
> Thy Gentrie bleats, as if thy native cloth
> Transfus'd a sheepishnesse into thy storie.[23]

In "The Church Militant" (as we have seen) sermonizing and exhortation on the text of Hooker is to be abandoned for prophecy, a prophecy of relative failure for church and state within the limits of history. Herbert seems to have realized, as Simcox suggests, "that after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the submission of the chieftains of Ulster, and the tardy pacification of the Netherlands, the English gentry were for the first time since the Field of the Cloth of Gold without a rational object of public concern."[24] Sloth has stilled the impulse of the gentry to action, and the

[22] "The Church-Porch," stanza 28. [23] *Ibid.*, stanza 16.

[24] G. A. Simcox, "Sandys, Herbert, Crashaw, Vaughan," in *The English Poets*, ed. T. H. Ward (London, 1902), II, 194. I do not wish this to be interpreted as a value judgment on Herbert. The social attitude, in terms of Herbert's moment in history and in contrast with the more positive political faith of the immediate past, seems negative and even defeatist. It is a point of view which cannot be associated with any of the forces currently in motion. However, I am only concerned here with indicating the nature and origin of the shift in values away from Hooker's Elizabethanism. I would not argue that the shift is a deterioration. Indeed, *on the positive side*, Herbert's religious and artistic sensibility frees the Anglican spirit from those considerations which threatened to substitute a kind of nationalist perfectionism for the ecclesiastical perfectionism of Rome. From this point of view, and in its ultimate implications, Herbert's sense of the perseverance of sin is not negative. In "The church Militant" he repudiates the doctrine of divine fulfilment *within history*, and looks to a judgment outside and beyond history which will terminate and punish sin. If the church is the City of God she is not impregnable and the enemy is always somehow within the gates. The church by herself cannot overcome sin. Finally, "Judgment may meet them both and search them round" (line 269). The church, within history and therefore under divine judgment, is powerless to fulfil herself. Fulfilment is by the grace of God at the end of time. This does not negate the church or the need of men for the church as the means of grace. It does negate the medieval identification of the church with the Kingdom of God. And by positing a judgment *on* history it implies a meaning and a purpose for history and for the church in history. This is a Reformation insight. Yet Herbert is essentially Anglo-Catholic. His doctrine of grace is Catholic, his religion is sacramental as well as personal, and, as our analysis of the symbol-

drive of the age is expressed no longer in terms of a precarious but real alliance of the interests of land and money. Avarice destroys the old balance, and with it man's hope.

But the Church of England still possesses the solidity and rationality (if not the permanence) of the ideal construction of values. "The British Church" contains the congealed thought of Hooker:

> A fine aspect in fit array,
> Neither too mean, nor yet too gay,
> Shows who is best.
> Outlandish looks may not compare,
> For all they either painted are,
> Or else undrest.[25]

The gaudy Roman church on the hills and the bare Puritan church in the valley represent the extremes which a rational Anglicanism shuns.

> But dearest Mother, (what those misse,)
> The mean, thy praise and glorie is
> And long may be.
> Blessèd be God, whose love it was
> To double-moat thee with his grace,
> And none but thee.[26]

In the institution of the Church itself values persist which no longer characterize society. Within the Church— and only within it—Herbert contemplates a happy union of sense and soul, of nature and grace.

> Doctrine and life, colours and light, in one
> When they combine and mingle, bring
> A strong regard and aw.[27]

Nature, if not society, can still at times be regarded with joy.

> Heark, how the birds do sing,
> And woods do ring!
> All creatures have their joy, and man hath his.[28]

It is this *admission*, at least, of sensuous enjoyment which marks Herbert as a humanist by contrast with the sober-sides Puritanism gaining every-

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ism shows, his poetry reveals no sympathy with the telling Reformation idea of "vocation" which justifies man's economic and worldly aspirations. His theology retains the positive Catholic conception of freedom stripped of its emphasis on sanctification. The pressures of the age would not let him rest at this point. But it is a point beyond which he cannot pass. The sense of the perseverance of sin and of the ultimate breach between history and divine fulfilment contributes to obstruct the quest for mystical experience or the retreat into medievalism.

The note of disillusion with the positive claims of church and state is indeed present. But when considered apart from the political context in which it was expressed, Herbert's essentially scriptural insight into the nature of history remains a corrective to perfectionist notions whether ecclesiastical or secular.

It is not possible here to examine the relation of theological ideas and sociological forces to the *quality* of Herbert's work. I hope to do some justice to the matter in a full study of the aesthetic of Anglican poetry in the seventeenth century.

[25] "The British Church," 7-12.
[26] *Ibid.*, 25-30.
[27] "The Windows," 11-13.
[28] "Man's Medley," 1-3.

where about him. The order of nature is not despised, although it is transcended.

> True beautie dwells on high. Ours is a flame
> But borrow'd thence to light us thither.[29]

The loveliness which Herbert finds in nature is akin to the loveliness of the Church-service, "neither too mean, nor yet too gay." This is nature seen and felt through the glazed window of the "British Church." It is nature enjoyed contemplatively rather than experientially.

The humanist creed of Hooker, then, abstracted from Hooker's world, provides Herbert at once with a critique and a solace. The tradition is alive. It would be false to regard its persistence as merely static. For Herbert's work reveals a significant interaction between the intellectual tradition as such and the disturbing pressures of Caroline society. Only a crude and utterly mechanical criticism could see in Herbert nothing but the effect of social disintegration. But surely it is quite as crude to read Herbert only in the light of the tradition. A humanism emptied of its original social content and reference, and holding to its moral and aesthetic values in relation to a rapidly shrinking range of experience, is necessarily something other than itself. A new and different synthesis has emerged.

One must remember that even the "double-moat" does not always guarantee the Church. Sin—the sin of avarice—will prevail. No institution, no construction of social values, is secure. The mind must turn inward to find the permanence it seeks.

Before the battle was joined, before the practical implications of Herbert's social fears were finally realized in the Civil War, an inner synthesis of values is discovered and held. The apparent contradiction between his devotion to the "British Church" and his fatalistic view of the church as a social institution can be resolved in a deepening sense of intimacy with God, which almost transcends the church as institution, as place of collective worship, and approaches mystical communion. By the music of the church service, Herbert is almost transported beyond churchliness altogether:

> Now I in you without a bodie move,
> Rising and falling with your wings.
> We both together sweetly live and love,
> Yet say sometimes, *God help poore Kings*.[30]

I say "almost transported"—but never quite. The consciousness of tension invades the mystical moment and curbs it. He is never able to shake off a quite unmystical kind of awareness. He can rise over fear into a pity which still has in it the distant echo of fear. "God help poore Kings"—impotent prey of the world and bound to the world, as Herbert himself is bound.

As strong as this unfulfilled impulse towards mysticism is the yearning, again unrealized, towards medievalism. I have already noted the monastic

[29] "The Forerunners," 28-9. [30] "Church-Musick," 5-8.

ideal of poverty which underlines Herbert's despair for the unbalanced social order. On the religious level this direction is indicated not only in Herbert's priestly practice (which brings to mind Chaucer's "povre persoun of a toun") but also in the fascination which at times Roman Catholicism held for him. The saints and the Virgin beckon:

> I would addresse
> My vows to thee most gladly, blessèd Maid,
> And Mother of my God, in my distresse.[31]

The middle way is not so easy to travel when it is no longer in the middle. But travel it Herbert does. The inner balance is kept. The manner, though not the matter, of humanist thought, determines the nature of a synthesis which is almost mystical, almost Romanist, almost free of social conscience or concern—but never entirely any one of these. A quality and habit of mind steeped in a great tradition turns from an outer tangible world upon which it can make no impress and in which it can no longer "its own resemblance find," to the construction of an inner world where conflicts can be at least tentatively resolved. Conflicts recur: tensions return as quickly as they depart. One does not find evidence of a chronological development in Herbert's poetry. After the sermonizing of "The Church-Porch" his quality develops in depth and not in time. In this inner synthesis of awareness and withdrawal, crisis is never fully resolved nor is the synthesis ever quite destroyed.

Herbert's more characteristic poems are, as Grierson has observed, love lyrics to God. The form and tone of these poems are thus both old and new to English poetry. The courtly poem has been transformed into a verse prayer which is quite unlike any prayer before it or, indeed, after it. The style is of the court and not of the court. The tone is humanist and yet not humanist. The effect is unique in literature.

The values which coexist as an entity in Herbert could not coexist for long. One feels sure that if Herbert had lived into the Civil War, either a desperate loyalty would have made him partisan, a somewhat bewildered clerical Cavalier, or defeat would have hastened the impulse toward either the mystical or the medieval destination implicit in his view of contemporary life.

In the men who follow and who owe most to Herbert's influence the spell is broken and the inner synthesis dissolves. For Crashaw the medieval flight is consummated in a highly romantic Roman Catholicism. Vaughan, dismayed by the triumph of the barbarian, turns away from the Renaissance tradition and carries forward Herbert's incipient mysticism. For certainly when Vaughan moves but one inch beyond his master he enters a world of strange white light which would have set the eye of any sturdy Elizabethan to blinking. In his poetry the humanist tradition is finally cancelled out, to reappear and disappear in new forms and under new urgencies, at once traditional and novel, but always in motion, never still, never quite the same.

[31] "To All Angels and Saints," 8-10.

CANADIAN FOLK-SONGS

MARIUS BARBEAU

THE folk-lore of French Canada is too vast and varied to lend itself to summary treatment. Its hoard, whether amassed and centralized or still awaiting the harvester, is so rich in cultural traits, in traditional narratives, pictorial patterns, tunes, and verse-forms, that it cannot be rendered by mere statistics and and chapter-heads. It must be sampled in actuality, as a gourmet samples old wines or cheese; its contents have to be picked up on sunny mornings, as a gardener culls flowers or scented herbs. In this culling there is a need for wisdom, knowledge, and profound human interest.

To indicate the extent of this literature it is enough to declare that more than 9,000 folk-songs with over 5,000 melodies have so far been recorded either for the phonograph or in musical script. These compositions belong to every conceivable type of oral literature—chronicles, miracles, *mystères et jeux*, *complaintes* or "come-all-ye's," mnemonic lines, canticles, "exempla," love lyrics of all sorts, shepherd tunes, workaday songs with long and lilting refrains, dances of several kinds, rigmaroles, drinking chants, lullabies, and carols. The majority of these originated in France, over two hundred years ago; yet, one must not forget, a minority were made up on this side of the Atlantic—about one out of twenty on the St. Lawrence, and one out of fifteen or so in Acadia.

Folk-tales and legends, it is needless to say, also abound everywhere in French America. They now seem to surpass the present-day resources of the motherland. Traditional crafts and folk-arts have thriven in the older parts of Canada to a surprising degree. Rhymes and sayings expressive of folk-wisdom are almost inexhaustible. The language itself, by its archaic terminology, phonetics, and local diversities, offers untapped materials to the linguist. And the slow cultural adaptation of Europeans to the New World is itself worth careful observation: the contact of the European with American elements and geographic features brought about a unique racial experience.

Let a few samples of titles (only titles unfortunately) of songs, of tales and legends, of specialized and folk arts and crafts, perhaps also of linguistic features, tell the story.

Folk-songs and tales form the major part of the French repertory in North America. The hoard of folk-songs includes, besides that of Quebec and Acadia, the materials from the old French colonies of the upper Missouri, the Red River, and Louisiana. Within Canada, the French field is split into two or three semi-independent areas: the St. Lawrence valley, Acadia (mostly in the Maritime Provinces), and the North-West where the Métis population of the prairies still survives.

The repertory of songs embraces those brought over from the northern

and western provinces of France by the colonists of the second part of the seventeenth century; these colonists, about 9,000 in number in 1680, were the true founders of New France. The remainder of the collection is made up mostly of crude compositions by untutored singers who had inherited the spirit, but not the technique, of the ancient *jongleurs* de France. The *jongleurs* were responsible for much of the folk repertory of the motherland and its wandering sons in the New World.

Some of the songs brought over from France went back centuries, if not a millennium, for instance "Dame Lombarde," of the northern Italian princess who poisoned her impetuous husband with a serpent's venom which she poured into his wine. Indeed, this story of poisoning commemorates an incident of the Lombard conquest, of the sixth century. Almost as old in conception are the three versions of the folk-canticle "Saint Alexis": the theme itself seems to have originated in Asia Minor as early as the fourth century, and to have entered Italy at the port of Ostia not long after; it certainly had made its appearance in France some time in the eleventh century, since a poem on Saint Alexis is one of the three oldest records in the French *langue vulgaire*—the "Passion de Notre-Seigneur" and "Saint Léger" being the two others.

Not quite so old, yet venerable, are the "Sacrilège" and the "Docteur qui vend son âme au démon," two songs with a religious turn. The "Sacrilège," concerning an offense to the Sacred Wafer, which was secreted after communion and traded to an impious pawn-shop keeper, relates a miraculous retribution of the year 1290 in the reign of Philippe Le Bel, when the property of such a man was confiscated by the King and awarded to the Confrérie de Sainte-Anne or Masterjoiners.

The old song of the "Docteur qui vend son âme au démon" belongs to the Theophilian legend long familiar in medieval Europe. A German alchemist signs with his blood a diabolic pact, but in the end (in the Canadian version) manages to cheat the devil of his due, thanks to his clever valet who enlists the support of the Virgin. This last detail brings the story of the doctor into the cycle of the miracles attributed, in other songs, to the Virgin, to Christ returning to earth, and to a number of saints. The "Passion de Jésus-Christ," "Notre-Seigneur s'habille en pauvre," "Le Petit Pauvre et le Mauvais Riche" (the Lazarus parable) are of the same type.

Another group is headed by such epic compositions as "Le Roi Renaud" and "Germaine," the first derived long ago from the Scandinavian "Vise du Sieur Olaf," the second, from "L'Epouse du Croisé" of the thirteenth century. They belong to the days of the Arthurian and *Table ronde* legends.

Later but still fairly old songs are those inspired by historic events, for example, "Le Mariage anglais" (probably about 1490), "Prince Eugène" (1526), "Le Prince d'Orange" (1507), "Les Trois Roses empoisonnées"

(1599), "La Trahison du maréchal Biron" (1602), and "Cartouche et Mandrin" (eighteenth century).

The love lyrics—shepherd songs, *aubades*, and nocturnes—are a literature by themselves; they are the folk equivalent of the troubadour literature for which medieval France is famous, no less than for its Gothic cathedrals and tapestries.

The drinking or bacchic songs, the mnemonic ditties, the rigmaroles, are numerous and ageless. There are six or seven hundred drinking songs extolling the virtues of wine—for a part of Canada too cold to grow grapes! The rigmaroles, such as "Le Premier Jour de mai, que donnerai-je à m'amie?" number about sixty.

Hundreds, perhaps as many as one or two thousand, folk-songs consist of *complaintes* or "come-all-ye's," workaday songs, dances, lullabies, ranging from the remote past to the last few centuries. In this group belong "A la Claire Fontaine," "A Bordeaux beau port de mer," and "Derrière chez nous yat un champ de pois." At all times lilting work-songs were needed by the folk in their toil and daily activities, to cheer the spirit and to speed along collective work. The early Canadians excelled particularly in canoe-songs: the *voyageurs* in the North-West disseminated a taste for French culture by means of their incessant singing to the echoes of wild America.

The wealth of this unique repertory of song (by far the largest and the best in the French language) is not merely to be measured by the themes and tunes of countless verses. Some account must also be given of the variety in prosody and musical modes.

The prosodic resources of the folk-songs are surprisingly rich and complex. On the whole these resources differ from those of the troubadours and the writers of verse, for instance, in the treatment of lines of sixteen and fourteen syllables, with a caesura. The fourteen-syllable lines are familiar in some Romance languages, in Spanish in particular, and to a lesser degree in French folk-songs. In Canada they fall into five groups or patterns, according to the place of the caesura in the line.

Out of the possible forms for the twelve-syllable line only the Alexandrine of classical verse is current in written literature. But several others varying in the caesura and *désinence* appear in folk-songs. One such line consists of 8f + 4 syllables;[1] for instance, in "L'Hirondelle, messagère des amours":

Traversant les mers et les terres sans s'y lasser,
Tout droit sur le mât du navire s'est reposé. . . .

Out of eighty-one songs, ten have the sixteen-syllable line (8f + 8, 8 + 8f, 8 + 8); twenty-one the fourteen-syllable line (with varied caesurae); seventeen the ten-syllable form (of five different types); and thirty-three the eight-syllable line.

[1]F here stands for *féminine*: the ordinarily mute *e* is sounded, making the first part of the line consist of nine syllables.

No less remarkable in many folk-songs are the strophical forms, for instance the "tercet" with an echo—the last two lines ending with rhymes, but the first (longer, cut by a caesura, and ending with a mute) remaining unmatched.

Quand le soldat arrive en ville, [bis]
Bien mal chaussé, bien mal vêtu:
"Pauvre soldat, d'où reviens-tu?"
—"Le Retour du soldat"

"Celle que ton cœur aime, je ne la connais pas."
"Tu voleras de bocage en bocage;
Tu trouveras ma bergère à l'ombrage."
—"Rossignolet sauvage"

The inverted caesura—with one caesura preceded by a mute and the next by a masculine ending—is also a folk-song feature of interest and value.

Vous faudrait un amant qui cueillerait les roses,
Les roses qui fleurissent dedans votre jardin
Permettez-moi, la belle, d'y revenir demain. . . .

Non, je ne permets pas que l'on cueille mes roses,
Sans m'apporter la lune et le soleil dans la main.
Galant, veuillez m'en croire, suivez votre chemin. . . .
—"Apprends-moi ton langage"

L'aimer autant qu'il m'aime, non non, je ne puis pas!
De trop aimer, ce n'est pas là l'usage;
De l'épouser, je n'ai pas l'avantage. . . .
—"Le Roi des amoureux"

What is called the "césure épique," familiar in written French verse during the age of the troubadours, remains a commonplace in folk-songs. It appears everywhere, even in folk-songs composed in Canada, in our time. The mute at the caesura is uttered in the singing, even when it is followed by a consonant in the second half of the line:

Un jour, le prince Eugène, étant dedans Paris,
S'en fut conduire trois dames, tout droit à leur logis. . . .

One of the most common prosodic devices, particularly in the folk-songs of the narrative type, is the "laisse épique." Here a series of lines—as many as ten or fifteen, as in the *Chanson de Roland*—ends with the same assonance; for instance:

Mit sa main sur la bride, le pied dans l'étrier,
A parti le dimanche, le lundi fut blessé.
Reçut trois coups de lance qu'un Anglais' i a donnés.
En eut un dans la jambe et deux dans le côté.
Faut amener le prêtre mais pour le confesser. . . .
—"Le Prince d'Orange"

The musical or melodic aspect of the folk-songs shows no less independence. The old modes have not only survived here; they are more

typical of the repertory than are the classical "majeur" mode and its attenuated "A minor." The Dorian mode or "1er ton" (D) prevails in a substantial number of tunes, mostly epic in type, like "Jean Renaud," "Germaine," "Le Mariage anglais." The mode of A (Aeolian) is the proper vehicle for grave subjects; that of E (Phrygian) only occasionally makes an appearance. The blunt mode of F (Lydian) sometimes brings out its harsh "triton," in paddling-songs of the *voyageurs*. The tender, dreamy mode of G (Mixo-Lydian) expresses love and longing in many sweet or brooding tunes.

The rhythm in folk-songs has a lilt decidedly its own. It is free, varied, diversified, often syncopated or off the beat. At times it is so lively that, as a critic once expressed it, it would arouse the dead out of their sleep. It is often coupled with onomatopoeic refrains, the length of which gives prolonged support to labour and toil.

THE FUTURE OF PHILOSOPHY

JOHN A. IRVING

IN a period when the administrations of certain American universities (Columbia, Chicago, Colgate) have introduced spectacular educational practices and when the "Post-War Planning" committees of others (Harvard, Yale, Princeton) have issued exhaustive reinterpretations of the idea of a liberal education, the report of the less publicized and more intensive investigation which is contained in a new volume[1] may easily be overlooked. Early in 1943, the Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association decided to undertake an examination "of the present state of philosophy and of the role philosophy might play in the post-war world." Five eminent philosophers of Yale, Cornell, Wisconsin, and Brown were appointed to a "Commission on the Function of Philosophy in Liberal Education." Financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, the commissioners held seven regional conferences throughout the United States during 1943 and 1944, at four of which Canada was represented: at Chicago (by R. C. Lodge of Manitoba), at Berkeley (by the present writer, then of British Columbia), at Los Angeles, New Orleans, Baltimore, New York (by George Humphrey of Queen's), and at Boston (by Cecil Currie of McGill).

The membership of these conferences (at which the average number of participants was twenty-nine) included not only professional philosophers but also scholars in other fields of learning: poets, editors, lawyers, clergymen, administrators, business men, and government officials—a selection wide enough to have prompted the waggish remark that among those not consulted there stand out only trade-unionists and actual college students! The five commissioners intruded themselves as little as possible at the conference discussions, which for the most part were carried on simply and informally by the local members. At Berkeley, for example, having opened the meeting with the most innocent of Socratic questions, the commissioners gave the impression, thereafter, of being merely unusually conscientious recording angels. And one may claim that their book, likewise, represents an honest effort to test the pulse of philosophy in America. In addition to the testimony of the regional conferences, the commission received, from a wide variety of persons interested in the future of philosophy, some 280 letters which have formed the basis of a separate journal article.[2]

The opening chapter of the book, entitled "The Climate of Opinion," and written with sinuous wit and clarity, enumerates the various attitudes which the commissioners encountered on their philosophical pilgrimage. Despite the very large membership of the American Philosophical Associa-

[1] *Philosophy in American Education: Its Tasks and Opportunities.* By BRAND BLANSHARD, CURT J. DUCASSE, CHARLES W. HENDEL, ARTHUR E. MURPHY and MAX C. OTTO. New York and London: Harper [Toronto: Musson]. 1945. Pp. xiii, 306. ($4.00)

[2] Brand Blanshard, ed., "From the Commission's Mailbag" (*Philosophical Review*, LIV, May, 1945, 197-259).

tion, the hundreds of colleges and universities which teach philosophy, the numerous philosophical periodicals, and the world-wide renown of John Dewey, they feel that American philosophy is currently in an unsatisfactory condition. Their pessimism is due only in part to the zero rating which military boards gave to philosophy as a subject and to the troubled conscience which characterized exponents of the humanities everywhere during the period of the war. For they are deeply conscious of the changing position of philosophy both in the organization of knowledge and in the universities: it is no longer recognized as the "queen of the sciences."[3]

At the same time, they were faced with the widespread conviction that, whatever may be wrong with higher education, "philosophy is an essential ingredient in the remedy." In their efforts to understand the meaning of a liberal education, Americans are demanding that philosophy should provide students and the public with an integration of the fragmentary knowledge of specialists, a community of ideas and standards for the life of reason, a reinterpretation of democracy, and a new "philosophy of life" amid the contemporary "disintegration of religious faith." Simultaneously, within the philosophic community itself, four clearly defined questions, all of which have a bearing on the future of philosophy in a liberal education, are being discussed. Is philosophy a purely theoretical and contemplative subject or is it an instrument of action and adjustment? Has the philosopher an evangelical or a social function? Does philosophy have a special subject-matter of its own or is it, as Wittgenstein and the logical positivists have insisted, a technique for "the logical clarification of our thoughts"? Should philosophy be a required or an optional subject in the college curriculum? Confronted with such demands and debates, the commissioners found that five reproaches are commonly directed at philosophers from without the philosophic community: they live in ivory towers engrossed with solemn trifles, cultivate endless controversy for its own sake, promote through dialectics a generally negative attitude to cherished beliefs, fail to keep up with the advance of science, and write in a bleak, inhumane manner. But they also discovered that these strictures are made not because the public expects nothing from philosophy but rather because it expects too much. For Americans, to whom the relativisms and irrationalisms of the twentieth century are as familiar as filling-stations, see in philosophy one of mankind's chief hopes.

With such a climate of opinion as its background, the structure of the book reflects the threefold task which the commissioners set before themselves: (1) fact-finding, regarding the contemporary situation in philosophy and American education; (2) theoretical, the forming of clear and con-

[3]For an independent confirmation of their estimate of the "depressed condition" of American philosophy, see James B. Conant, "The American Community of Scholars" (*Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1946, 89). President Conant emphasizes sharply the fact that philosophers do not exert anything like the influence of liberal theologians or political scientists on the American public.

sistent ideas about "the function of philosophy in liberal education and in the development of a free and reflective life in the community"; (3) practical, "a study of the ways and means by which the teaching of philosophy and other possible activities of the philosophical profession might realize more adequately the true functions of philosophy in education and life."

I

In its development as an autonomous and essential element of higher education philosophy has passed through three stages in the United States. Towards the end of the nineteenth century speculative idealism, drawing its inspiration from Kant and Hegel and taught in the grand manner by men like Howison, Royce, Creighton, and Wenley, dominated philosophical departments. Idealism had a breadth, an authority, and a speculative insight into ultimate reality unrivalled by any subsequent system. Its exponents were the critics not only of science and theology but of all other special approaches to reality. While the commissioners exhibit a pronounced nostalgia for the prestige and popularity which philosophy enjoyed in those days, they realize very clearly that idealism could have performed its distinctive philosophical function "only from the standpoint and in the name of a 'reality' transcending all human and temporal limitations."

For all its speculative grandeur and its quasi-religious inspiration, idealism failed to mould the temper of twentieth-century America. It was followed, if not replaced, by a philosophical position more definitely attuned to the practical atmosphere of the times—the pragmatism of James and Dewey. The pragmatists attempted to exhibit philosophy as "a creative and liberating agency in ongoing human activity." Emphasizing the common nexus of theory and practice, they studied the psychological and sociological functions of philosophical ideas. Confronted with the rawness of a pioneer civilization, they proclaimed their faith in the capacity of man's intelligence to solve all the issues raised in the flow of time. In the instrumentalist version of Dewey, pragmatism fashioned the nation's educational philosophy for succeeding generations. But it also raised to the level of self-conscious knowledge in America the broadest implications of science, democracy, evolution, and progress. Why, then, can the commissioners not accept pragmatism? They are only mildly sceptical of its defence of "the ultimacy of the human standpoint," but they deplore its negative analysis of the problems of traditional philosophy. Further, although admitting the extensive influence of pragmatism, they question seriously its adequacy as a technical philosophical position. However, as one of their number (Otto) is a member of this school, they waver uneasily over a final judgment. In any case, they are saved by history: before pragmatism had consolidated its claims new trends had appeared.

No single position is characteristic of the most recent period in American philosophy: so many schools have arisen that it may appropriately be

called the age of the "isms." Along with the older brands of idealism and pragmatism, there developed several varieties of realism, emergent naturalism, and finally, logical positivism. Each new concept in the sciences, each new social enthusiasm, gave birth to a new "ism," until the American intellectual scene became a veritable fashion-parade of ideas. And all of these "isms" were taught in the universities with a genteel tolerance, an urbane scepticism, that reached its apotheosis in Santayana's generous recommendation, "let each clean the windows of his own soul in his own fashion and enjoy the cosmic view as, from his particular angle, it could be surveyed." Amid this general disintegration only the logical positivists remained absolutistic and intolerant. Clearing the boards of all the traditional philosophies by their definition of meaning in terms of empirical verification, they sought anew, through symbolic logic, the unity of the world. In answer to the logical positivists the commissioners rightly take their stand on the ancient view of philosophy as comprehensive human wisdom. Nevertheless, one is left with the feeling that many younger American philosophers will not accept their evaluation of the future of logical positivism.[4] It is, therefore, to be regretted that a representative of the logical positivist approach to philosophy (say W. V. Quine of Harvard or Ernest Nagel of Columbia) was not included in the personnel of the commission. Such a concession would not have been too radical in view of the penetration of logical positivism into the philosophical departments of all except one or two of the leading American universities.

American philosophy in the last generation has been weak in precisely those aspects which are of most interest to the general public: value-theory and moral and political philosophy. Psychologists, sociologists, and even geographers have rushed in to meet the public need in these areas of thought, but the public remains unsatisfied with such pseudo-philosophies. Americans are now demanding a return to "philosophy in the great tradition, philosophy as a source of wisdom and rationally grounded judgment." Although an observer of the recent philosophic scene may well be reminded of the scholastic grammarians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the commissioners conclude that never before has philosophy had such a propitious opportunity to play a leading role in liberal education, in the community and in civilization at large.

II

At the beginning of their discussion of the task of philosophy in the contemporary world the commissioners attempt to establish a clear understanding of the essential relation between philosophy as a process of inquiry

[4]Considerable dissatisfaction with the commission's report was expressed at a meeting of the Rockefeller Foundation Post-War Fellows in Philosophy held at Sarah Lawrence College, November 8-10, 1946. In recent years many of the most brilliant graduate students in philosophy at Harvard, Chicago, Columbia, and California have been strongly influenced by the doctrines of logical positivism.

and philosophy as an accredited product. As a process of inquiry, philosophy is as austere and technical a subject as mathematics or physics. At its best, philosophy should be the intellectual conscience of the community, and it should "measure all special interests, half-truths, and half-hearted ideals which claim final authority or ultimate validity, by the most penetrating and comprehensive standards of truth and adequacy that can rationally be maintained." In this sense, philosophy cannot be a substitute for faith. The main contribution of philosophy to faith will be philosophy itself, and no faith that is consistent with honest and comprehensive inquiry will suffer from its activity. As a product, philosophy may be called "the garnered wisdom of the ages put to current use as faith for living." But the integrity of philosophy as a product is not derived from any set of doctrinally acceptable tenets but rather, as William James realized seventy years ago, from "the living, philosophic attitude of mind, the independent, personal look at all the data of life, and the eagerness to harmonize them." Nor is there an essential "gap" between philosophy and life, if by living we mean a continuous process of fulfilment and not a mere subservience to venerable dogmas.

It is as a process of inquiry that philosophy can make a necessary and invaluable contribution to the current educational confusion in the United States, a confusion which has been caused by the accelerating advance of knowledge and by the elective system introduced by President Eliot at Harvard in 1872. The elective system, although somewhat modified in the leading universities in recent years, rests on three untenable assumptions: that all subjects are of equal disciplinary value; that an education can be compounded out of hours and credits; and that the student is himself competent to fix the pattern of his education. The commissioners maintain that the confusion cannot be overcome merely by a return to a programme of required courses: there must also be an *integration* or *co-ordination* of the student's whole programme of studies. They insist that philosophy, more than history, literature, or natural science, is pre-eminently the agent of integration. "As an agent for unifying knowledge, philosophy is in a unique position. For it is really not so much a subject alongside other subjects as a kind of reflective activity that may inform them all, and it is only through such activity that order and perspective in knowledge are to be achieved." In this sense also, philosophy can meet the demand, so vigorously expressed by Walter Lippmann, for a common intellectual idiom in a civilization that has become over-technical and over-specialized. Further, by functioning as a central subject, it can mitigate even the intellectual insularity bred by vocationalism, and, through the disclosure of unity in diversity, re-establish a community of minds.

At a time when the whole idea of college education is on trial in the United States, the commissioners realize that one of their essential obligations is the development of a philosophy of liberal education. Of the two main proposals currently before the American public, one advocates a

return to the type of education provided in the medieval universities, while the other proclaims that "scientific methods of inquiry are the only available roads to knowledge." The first is rejected on the ground that it is impossible to revive the environmental conditions under which the medieval synthesis arose and functioned (*vestigia nulla retrorsum*); while the second is criticized sharply for its dogmatic naturalism, its naive psychology of the learning process, and its restricted conception of scientific method. In opposition to such one-sided theories it is maintained that a just appreciation of the universal nature of man leads inevitably to the realization that education has many dimensions. The education of the whole man involves a development not only of his intellectual powers; it must also give him a knowledge of the practical skills necessary for the various material and social operations of life, a capacity for aesthetic and artistic perception, a disciplined body and will, and finally, moral and spiritual insight. What, then, is the distinctive meaning of a liberal education?

The meaning of a liberal education can best be given in terms of the Greek *arete*, a combination of intellectual and ethical "virtue." Such an education liberates both the mind and character, so that the individual is no longer in bondage either to blind impulse or to ignorance, prejudice, or narrowness. This means achieving a perspective which brings with it freedom of choice, the appreciation of many values, detachment, self-discipline, social responsibility. Several factors contribute to perspective: growth of experience in breadth and in depth, and awareness both of the *results* and the *processes* by which knowledge is attained. A college curriculum should be so integrated as to give the student perspective in each of the four areas of mathematical logic, scientific method, philosophy, and aesthetic appreciation. But mere integration of the curriculum is not enough. If a student is to have his intellectual initiative so quickened that he will develop at college a life-long love of knowledge he must come under the influence of great teachers, "whose own continuing growth is an inspiring example; whose insight into the human worth of their subject gives it dignity and dramatic import; and whose adventurous joy in the further exploration of their field is manifest to their students."

The essential perspective of a liberal education is ultimately contributed by philosophy. As the most critical and rigorous of all processes of inquiry, a process in which everyone must at some time engage, philosophy raises the human mind to its highest level of self-conscious awareness of the world and of man's place and prospects in it. Philosophy offers a wisdom that will enable a man to integrate the whole of his being, a wisdom not subject, like all other personal goods, to the strange mutations of time.

In the larger community likewise, philosophy as practical wisdom can provide a technique of *creative bargaining* which may help to resolve the wide-spread social struggles which are the heritage of two world wars. Creative bargaining is a social fine art in which an attempt is made to appreciate, first, the conflicting aims of antagonistic groups and, secondly,

the way in which social and economic factors are responsible for those aims. It is the search for a larger synthesis in which the conflicting aims may be absorbed and new aims developed. To the process of creative bargaining philosophy can contribute generalizing power, theoretical clarification, and a deepened and broadened conception of its significance in the society of the future. In its widest social implications the outlook of philosophy is parallel with the view of life acquired by everyone in the experience of living, but it is an enlarged, a more critically refined view.

Perhaps the greatest task of philosophy in the future is the reinterpretation of the meaning of civilization. The classical interpretations, such as those given by Thucydides, Polybius, or Montesquieu, have always involved a generous partnership of philosophy with history or political science. The time has come again for philosophy to link theory and the knowledge of practice by bringing itself into fruitful relationships with psychology and the social sciences. For it is increasingly apparent that if the social sciences without philosophy are blind, philosophy without the social sciences is empty.[5]

III

The commissioners conclude their report with a lengthy analysis of the procedures that might be adopted in the organization and actual teaching of philosophical courses in the universities and the community at large. During their travels they detected a growing conviction among educators that philosophy should be a *required* subject in any college programme. But they wisely eschew a discussion of this question, for they expect that the importance of philosophy in general education will need no further emphasis.

General education, to which students in most American universities devote their first two years, is defined as "*the part of college education intended to provide perspective in breadth*—the sort of perspective to be gained through elementary but attentive study of a number of subjects together representative of the main types of human experience." The introductory course in philosophy has a threefold function in general education. It should make explicit the chief problems in religion, science, education, art,

[5]In the article previously quoted, President Conant has given additional emphasis to this view: "Now it is my contention that the professor of philosophy who is concerned with ethics belongs rightly in a totally different area from his departmental colleagues who consort with mathematicians. He belongs along with the professor of jurisprudence, of comparative law, of political theory, of labor relations, of business management. . . . The answer would seem to be for the professional philosophers to strengthen their connections with those departments of a university which are dealing with the immediate and practical problems of the moment, to recapture their associations with those who teach political theory, economics, law, and sociology. . . . Might it not be possible, for example, for departments of philosophy to arrange courses which would be of special interest to the returning veteran because they represented a fusion between philosophical ethics and political theory and sociology?"

morality, and social policy; it should be in itself an actual example of open-minded, intellectually honest, critical investigation of these problems; and it should give students an opportunity to engage in the actual practice of disciplined philosophical reflection through essays and discussions. Above all, it must enable the student to realize that philosophy is a process of inquiry and not a standardized set of results. After taking the introductory course, usually in his sophomore year, the student should ordinarily have available, in his upper years, both basic courses in philosophy and special courses in which philosophy is related to other disciplines and programmes of study.

The basic courses are the history of philosophy, ethics, logic, and metaphysics. The history of philosophy should not be taught as an egocentric exhibition of the endless errors of the past, but approached with the humility of a genuine empiricism which "inspires us to see what can be *learned* from others." Such an objective empiricism will reveal philosophy as "an enduring form of culture, an activity of the human mind through the ages, reckoning with perennial concerns." In the selection of representative philosophers of the ancient, medieval, or modern periods it seems advisable to emphasize the pluralistic character of thought, its diversity and its competing possibilities, rather than its unity. Further, as we are now living in a world of interacting cultures and philosophies, the European tradition alone is not sufficient. It must be supplemented by the materials of the Oriental peoples, Russia, and Latin America. The privileged basic course is ethics, for its principal problems are of immediate concern to nearly everyone, and students ordinarily have already faced them. Then, too, its schools are clearly defined, and there seems also to be a larger measure of agreement than in any other branch of philosophy. But there is evidently considerable disagreement among American philosophers regarding the proper content of ethics courses. The commissioners are agreed, however, that the business of the philosopher is very different from that of the preacher, the confessor, and the psychiatrist. They favour an approach which combines the history of ethics with a critical analysis of basic concepts. Their discussion, next, of logic reflects the current controversy between the Aristotelians and the advocates of symbolic logic. While not disparaging symbolic logic, they have serious doubts of its efficacy at the undergraduate level. The course in logic should be so organized as to introduce the algebraization of logical processes, but it should aim mainly at developing the practice of correct thinking in daily life and at familiarizing the student with the foundations of scientific method. Finally, the basic course in metaphysics, which deals with the nature and structure of reality, can liberalize the student's mind in three ways. It can introduce him to the great insights that have been developed regarding the ultimate nature of the world; it can make intelligible the deeper contemporary movements of thought; and it can help him to systematize his own world-view. At no previous time have the insights and methods of metaphysics

been so much needed as today, when the student is confronted with specious ideologies of every sort.

If, as Mark Van Doren has claimed,[6] philosophy is the first need "everywhere" in a liberal curriculum, it is the responsibility of philosophy departments to offer integrative and co-operative courses that will have a special value for other important fields of knowledge. Many plans, in many areas of co-operative action, which were laid before the commissioners, are briefly outlined and evaluated. To the humanities philosophy can make contributions through the analytic disciplines of aesthetics and philosophical linguistics, the history of ideas, and moral criticism. In the social sciences it can clarify the fundamental epistemological and methodological conceptions, and provide techniques for relating facts and values to programmes of social action.[7] Philosophy has long been closely identified with mathematics and the natural sciences. Courses in the theory and methodology of science have recently become wide-spread in the United States. But there is a great need for more effective courses in which "philosophical analysis would be thoroughly integrated with the study of the specific subject-matter." Education, through the teachings of Dewey, has already been profoundly influenced by philosophical ideas. Here, too, a deeper type of analysis and criticism is required in the future. Having discovered also that current courses in the philosophy of religion often fail to rise above "the level of obscurantism and special pleading," they recommend strongly that courses in religion which are offered by philosophy departments should be grounded "substantially in the facts of religious behaviour and the history of religious institutions and ideas." Finally, the commissioners discuss the relationships that may be established in the future between philosophy and the study of foreign cultures (Latin America, the Orient, and Soviet Russia are especially mentioned) which was forced upon Americans during the war and which will be extended in the future.

The developments of philosophy that are envisaged in this report will require a considerable change in the procedures of graduate schools as well as a fundamental revision of basic community attitudes. But the commissioners are not discouraged, for, being Americans, they see in difficulties a challenge to action.

IV

On any count this report is a great document in the contemporary effort to understand the idea of a liberal education. Although it deals primarily with the values of philosophy it contains a multitude of observations and insights that light up many other aspects of human thought and action.

[6] *Liberal Education* (New York, 1943), 114.

[7] A more comprehensive discussion of the interrelationships between philosophy, the social sciences, and social action is given in the present writer's "Education for an Enduring Peace" (*Queen's Quarterly*, LII, 1945, 400-7).

The book is written in a simple and eloquent style remarkably free from the professional argot that philosophers customarily employ; no attempt is made to equate obscurity with profundity. It seems almost a miracle that out of the mass of material derived from formal and informal interviews and discussions they could have hammered such a well-articulated synthesis. The five authors belong to different generations and different traditions of thought but their report displays such uniform good temper and such unusual objectivity that it seems to compel agreement at almost every turn. The report will long remain a definitive statement of the place of philosophy in liberal education.

It would be a disservice, however, if one failed to mention various stresses and strains which are apparent in American culture and which have intruded into the book. The most important of these is the conflict between the exponents of the humanities and the sciences. Undoubtedly the majority of the commissioners would have wished to place philosophy on a pinnacle above this struggle. Owing to the inclusion of a pragmatist in their number they never quite succeed. Philosophy, like an Homeric god, has to descend into the plain and do battle, now on behalf of the humanities, now on behalf of the scientific outlook. There is, therefore, more than a suggestion that in their treatment of many important questions the commissioners have been unduly influenced by their own philosophical predilections. Another weakness appears most notably in their conception of the essential vocation of philosophy to integrate and unify. The commissioners hark back, perhaps unconsciously, to the great age of Royce and Howison, an age in which the education of four of them was completed. One receives the impression that they were too preoccupied with the memories of elderly men and turned a patronizing, if kindly, ear to the claims of the younger generation. There is a constant attempt to suppress the roar of the battle with the logical positivists, but the roar though muffled is plainly audible in the undertones of the book.

The report also gives the impression that, while gathering their material, the commissioners were subjected to powerful pressure from a public which is constantly demanding that philosophy should provide the salvation it received formerly from religion. They resist this pressure with all the energy that the philosophic intelligence can command, but still signs of concern about the demand are never far beneath the surface in many of their chapters.

Possibly the greatest weakness of the investigation was the failure to consider more adequately the interests and attitudes of actual college students. Had they taken the eager and forward-looking students whom one finds in the American universities into their confidence, they might well have been forced to give a different orientation to the treatment of many of their problems. It is not unusual, however, for educators to take seriously the advice of everybody except those most intimately concerned with the question at issue.

But these criticisms in no way mar the value of the book for Canadian educators. Whatever may be the weaknesses of philosophy in the United States, Canadians must now realize that the subject is in a very undeveloped condition in this country. By American standards philosophy is strongly established in only one Canadian university. In all but three universities it is still gravely hampered by at least an administrative, if not an organic, union with psychology.[8] The emphasis in the organization and teaching of undergraduate courses is almost entirely historical, and the historical presentation is mainly in terms of content.

Very considerable reforms in the organization of the faculties of libera arts in Canada are long overdue, but nowhere more than in the field of philosophy. If philosophy is to make itself felt as a driving force in Canadian education it must be established everywhere as a separate university department. Its professors must envisage the teaching of philosophy in terms of a process of inquiry rather than in terms of mere content. The personnel of the departments of philosophy must be greatly enlarged and much more adequate library facilities than exist today in all but two of our universities must be provided. These are merely the elementary lessons of this report for Canadians. That we are still at this level would astonish the commissioners.

No contrast could be more striking than that presented by the vigorous discussions regarding the future of liberal education now going on in the United States and the silence that is all but complete in Canada. It is an unfortunate aspect of our national life that Canadian university presidents have not offered at least a modicum of the dynamic leadership in education that has been given in the United States by men like Conant of Harvard, Hutchins of Chicago, Seymour of Yale, or Dodds of Princeton. Is it unreasonable to hope that this book, coupled with the forthcoming report on a survey of the humanities in Canada, undertaken by the Humanities Research Council, will stir them, however slightly, from their apathy? For if university presidents do not give the educational leadership that is so desperately needed in Canada, from what quarter may we expect it? This book shows once again that the Americans, with the sure instincts of an ascending civilization, have pointed the way.

[8]There have been recent reports that the University of Saskatchewan will shortly follow the example of Toronto, McGill, and Manitoba and establish separate departments in philosophy and psychology. Such a separation will surely be as advantageous to psychologists as to philosophers.

REVIEWS

ELIZABETHAN AND JACOBEAN*

DOUGLAS BUSH

Professor Wilson's Alexander Lectures, delivered at the University of Toronto in November, 1943, must have been good to hear, and they are assuredly good to read and re-read. His subject, in brief, is the transition from Elizabethan to Jacobean literature. After two general discussions, "Inheritance" and "The Elizabethans and the Jacobeans," he proceeds to survey and analyse the process of transition in four areas, prose, poetry, drama, and Shakespeare. The book is not large, and it does not attempt formal history, but it is a very substantial, stimulating, and delightful study of a fascinating theme.

Questions of this kind, in regard to any period, often invite from amateurs facile or speculative formulas and patterns. Although Professor Wilson, confronting such a complex problem, deprecates his own learning and gift for generalization, he is of course a notable master of the period. Even if his name did not carry authority, we should have a guarantee of wisdom in the initial recognition that "epochs of literature do not wait upon the deaths of kings and queens, and it was in the fifteen-nineties, while *The Faerie Queene* was fresh from the press, that the chief modes of Jacobean literature became apparent. In that decade Donne, Jonson, and Bacon first declared themselves, and before the death of the Queen, Shakespeare wrote his *Hamlet*."

The first lecture illustrates as well as any the author's happy knack for covering a great deal of ground with unhurried ease. Its theme is "the many links which bound both Elizabethans and Jacobeans to their past." The creed of Renaissance humanism is attested by such diverse witnesses as Lord Burghley and Bacon, Nashe and Dekker. In a few pages more we are carried through another set of concepts on which books have been written of late, the vitality of Christian belief and such concomitant articles of faith as "order" and "degree" in the soul and the cosmos. The new astronomy did not really disturb many minds. Thought and feeling still worked, in terms of analogy and correspondence, within the Christian frame; yet that frame was spacious and flexible enough to accommodate both tragic speculations on the destiny of man and what the one-track minds of later ages would regard as impossible inconsistencies. For evidence Professor Wilson appeals not so much to the obvious exemplars of orthodoxy as to Ralegh and Marlowe. If Marlowe was the *enfant terrible* of conventional literary history, he still wrote "the one important play of that age which is explicitly Christian and religious in plot," and in which "the orthodox doctrines of redemption and damnation" are "announced with a power not approached in English drama before or since." And while drama

**Elizabethan and Jacobean.* By F. P. WILSON. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1945. Pp. viii, 144. ($2.25)

in general was necessarily "concerned with men and women and their ways upon earth, this background of a Christian universe under divine ordinance is assumed and is present in allusions the full force of which escape a reader unfamiliar with their world."

Having stressed the basic fact of conservatism, Professor Wilson turns to the other side of the picture. He rejects the common but false contrast between Elizabethan optimism and Jacobean pessimism, and he finds the Jacobeans, like their predecessors, mainly preoccupied with religion and moral philosophy. Yet he sees a very real change. "What distinguishes the Jacobean age from the Elizabethan is its more exact, more searching, more detailed inquiry into moral and political questions and its interest in the analysis of the mysteries and perturbations of the human mind." That distinctive and far-reaching change owed its special stimulus to a number of Continental thinkers, and its operation is illustrated from Machiavelli and Montaigne. The new spirit required a new kind of prose and a new kind of poetry. The established forms and rhetorical patterns and devices had been the appropriate vehicles for the established verities, but a medium was needed for a new kind of apprehension and inquiry, "sceptical, tentative, and self-conscious in its exploration of hidden motives." The main body of the book is given to an examination of these changes in modes of thought, feeling, and expression. The lectures on prose and poetry, expanded since their delivery, allow a welcome amplitude.

Elizabethan prose could be plain, in utilitarian handbooks, narratives of travel, or the rigorous expositions of such a divine as William Perkins, but the form and texture of more literary prose were in general more or less governed and coloured by the rhetorical rules, schemes, and figures which almost everyone had studied at school. The genius of Elizabethan rhetoric was, as we just observed, adapted rather to the propagation of authoritative precept than to the exploration of experience. The anti-Ciceronian movement, represented by Bacon, Hall, and others, did not banish rhetoric, but it inaugurated a new and more colloquially realistic kind of rhetoric, the pregnant, suggestive brevity of Seneca, Tacitus, and the modern Lipsius. Here Professor Wilson is traversing ground which Professor Croll, as he says, has mapped out, but, as always, he has his own fresh quotations and juxtapositions, his own fresh comments. One comment, for instance, is both modern and Senecan—that Bishop Andrewes' "sentences seem to advance by jet-propulsion." And though much of Professor Wilson's freshness comes from his minute knowledge of many texts, common and uncommon, much of it also comes from his larger consciousness of the English scene as a whole (and of England as a part of Europe). "And if something of the narrowness and rigidity of his doctrine has got into the phrasing and rhythms of Perkins, the clenched fist and never the open palm, we may see in the grace of Hooker's diction and the modulation of his clauses the earliest manifestation of that movement—'comely but not gaudy'—which was to produce the sermons of Andrewes, the beautiful

neatness of George Herbert's poems, the decency of a Laudian church or of the community at Little Gidding."

The chapter on poetry begins—after remarks on Spenser which are all too brief—with those two partial allies in rebellion, Donne and Jonson, both, though very conscious artists, more concerned with matter than with words. These two remain in some sense criteria in the assessment of other poets, but this chapter is perhaps less closely knit to the main theme than other sections, and becomes a selective review of transitional poets, Ralegh, the unduly neglected Daniel, Sir John Davies, religious writers, and others. Professor Wilson winds up with Drayton, who went through a long and remarkable transition of his own, which was not altogether according to the Jacobean pattern. "In what seemed to him an iron age he wrote his most golden poetry; in a time that seemed ignoble and unheroic he sought nobility and heroism."

The last two lectures must be touched more briefly—because of the reviewer's diminishing space, not any diminution in the lecturer's quality. In drama the change in temper is traced, against a background of social and religious change, in Marlowe, Jonson, Beaumont and Fletcher, Chapman, Webster, and others. And then comes the partly parallel but far greater and richer evolution in Shakespeare. A single lecture on Shakespeare might well daunt a stout heart, but Professor Wilson, as usual, avoids *clichés* and combines concreteness with breadth and depth of understanding. As a piece of fitting and unforced eloquence, one might quote the last paragraph of the lecture and the book:

> The qualities in these plays which have led some critics to call them myths of immortality escape critical analysis. Behind the apparently simple statement and rhythm of Ariel's lyric 'Full fathom five thy father lies' is a lifetime of reflection upon change and mortality, and we are tempted to say with Ferdinand:
>
> This is no mortal business, nor no sound
> That the earth owes.
>
> The reverberations of Shakespeare's latest verse give a sense of timelessness, of a spiritual world beyond place and time, which is new in his art. It is not allegory like the houses with high towers and pinnacles merging into 'castles in the air' of Ibsen's Master Builder, but a spirit deeply set in the woven strands of imagery, and the complexities of syntax and rhythm.
>
> But what music? . . .
> The music of the spheres. . . . Most heavenly music:
> It nips me unto listening, and thick slumber
> Hangs upon mine eyes; let me rest.
>
> The lines like Prospero's comment on his conjured spirits seem to symbolize the visionary qualities of some passages in these last plays, and to suggest the poet's intuition of the mystery of life and immortality. It is as if he himself had heard 'the music of the spheres' and humanity was beginning to grow dim.

This bald outline has given only hints of the lecturer's capacity for making the familiar fresh and for adding much that is unfamiliar. Both his learning and his insight are active and intimate. He has read everything for himself and, while never eccentric, he is not commonplace. He

moves with ease because he is at home in both major and minor literature, and the reader learns much without being "informed" of anything. One might describe his urbanity and flavour as mellow, if the word was not overworn and did not suggest some lack of edge, and Professor Wilson's mind has an edge. Above all, perhaps, he has what has been characteristic of the best English scholarship, a wise sense of the past as part of a living tradition, not as a section of a library. It will be a matter of general satisfaction that he has lately been appointed to the Merton Professorship of English at Oxford, in succession to David Nichol Smith.

GROVE'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY*

B. K. SANDWELL

It may sometimes occur to even the most ardent admirers of *A Search for America* to wonder whether Frederick Philip Grove the man—that granite figure upon which the storms of implacable fate have beaten in vain for forty years—may not outlive Frederick Philip Grove the novelist. Posterity can hardly fail to be interested in a life so continuously and profoundly at odds with the predominant forces of its era, especially if it turns out that the struggle was due to that life being prophetic of new forces to come. But posterity might conceivably cease to be interested in more than a few of the creations of Grove's imagination, not because they are not greatly imagined, but because they are not bodied forth in a great literary style.

Almost the whole of Grove's writing produces, to a singular degree, the impression of being a good translation of a much better original in some other language. Nor is that surprising. Grove is by origin the absolute European—neither English nor Scottish nor Scandinavian nor German nor French. The languages of half-a-dozen countries were his from earliest youth, with little preference between them. In a sense he has no mother tongue. His style has the clarity of a man writing with great care in a slightly foreign language, but not the beauty or the grandeur of a man writing in his own language which he passionately loves. The overmastering drive of literary creation as he describes it, and he describes it in this book very fully, seems to relate entirely to the visualizing of the characters and situations, not to the getting of them down in words, which in Grove's mind seems to be a journeyman's job not clearly distinguishable from the labour of typing the script.

It is possible that in this matter of style, as well as in his views and attitudes concerning man and life, Grove may be in advance of his time. We may be about to move, in literary style as well as in politics, into a

*_In Search of Myself._ By FREDERICK PHILIP GROVE. Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada. 1946. Pp. xii, 458. ($4.00)

much more cosmopolitan era, of which the American variant of English is likely to be the communicating language. Since the decline of Latin as the common cultural language of Europe and the rise of the national tongues —that is to say throughout the "modern" era—the great classic works have been written in a style which was characteristic of the language to which they belonged, and which could seldom be perfectly reproduced in any other. This was because they were written within the framework of a national culture which was closely bound up with the language. In North America great numbers of human beings from many different cultures of this kind have been fused by the melting-pot process into a single (and as yet not very profound) culture, and a similar process seems about to begin in a large part of Europe. Whatever may be the new language of this melting-pot culture, it is not likely to be as vigorous as a purely national language. If the ideas to be expressed are great enough, and if the culture eventually becomes a really profound one, the language, whatever it is, will presumably develop in time a new grandeur of its own; but it will scarcely be claimed that the North American language has got very far in that process.

It was because he was a "European" and not a "national" that Grove was drawn to North America in the first place. For before he was twenty he came to the conclusion that Europe was doomed. "I began to feel," he tells us, "that it might explode at any moment." This was before 1892, and subsequent events may have unconsciously coloured his recollection of what he was *thinking* at that time; but what he *did* confirms the picture in every detail. He came here because you could not, even in 1892, be a "European" writer and write in Europe; you could merely be a French or German or Norwegian writer preaching Europeanism. (There have been a few such writers in more recent years, but they have never seemed to be growing out of a native soil; they are missionaries from an intellectual foreign land.) In North America you could be a North American writer and get away from nationalisms; and there are interesting indications that it was because western Canada had then even less of nationalism than the United States, that Grove preferred Manitoba to Minnesota. The "God's country" attitude of the Americans seems to have repelled him, and he would certainly find the frontier settlements of Manitoba at the turn of the century much less concerned about allegiances than those of Minnesota. The settlers of those days were not primarily Canadian and they were willing to cease being German and Dutch and Norwegian; they were at the stage of being just men and women.

Until he was twenty, Grove moved about Europe freely in the independence of a millionaire's son whose father never bothered him with anything except cheques to pay his bills. From twenty to forty he moved about the North American prairies in the equal independence of a man with muscular arms and legs, and strictly limited wants. A hobo field worker in those days was a very genuine sort of aristocrat so long as he

did not clutter himself up with a wife. During both periods, from the time he was sixteen, Grove was firmly convinced that he had something to say to the world about man and the purposes of his life, and that fiction was his way of saying it. In Europe he had money and with it access to the society of the intellectual world of six capital cities. In North America he had no money and no society except that of his fellow farm-hands. It is difficult for us now, after thirty years of an educational activity noble in purpose if not always perfectly efficient in action, to realize the utter intellectual vacuum that existed, in all but a few centres of population, from the head of the Lakes to the Rocky Mountains.

Grove did not resent this vacuum at all, and the one serious harm that it did him he was unaware of until much later. It kept him from knowing that no publisher would look at a handwritten script of several hundred thousand words, and he kept on writing such scripts and sending them out and getting them back in total ignorance that they were not even being read. This ruthless self-isolation seems to have been a necessary and inevitable part of his literary method—unless that is putting it the wrong way round, and the method is itself the product of twenty years of complete isolation in a *milieu* which was certainly not highly receptive to foreign intellectuals, and which he did not know how to deal with. But there are throughout his work many indications that he is by nature a lone thinker, that his instinct tells him that everything he writes must arise complete and unaided out of his own subconscious cerebration.

The subject of pioneer life on the prairies, which Grove had decided to make his own because it seemed to be the only field in which man still came to grips with nature with a minimum of aid from modern "progress," has not actually been left wholly untouched by either literary artists or scientific investigators in the last half-century, especially in the United States. But Grove gives no indication of having ever referred to any work done by others than himself. He had to incubate his views from the results of his own observations; and even these observations had to cease the instant that the desired picture had been achieved in his mind. There is a most significant note in this book, telling how, when a single contact with a newly arrived land-seeker had inspired the idea of the tremendous character of Abe Spalding in *Fruits of the Earth*, "it seemed imperative that I should never see, never hear that man again." Further study of the human character of this man would destroy or whittle down the epic creation which it had inspired. It is the poet's approach, not the investigator's, and it has to be intensely individual. For a short time Grove believed that he could work along the same lines as Hamsun, who was working in a closely similar field; but he soon found that they had nothing to give to one another. No other writer seems to have influenced him at all.

Grove's hostility to the *bourgeois* concept of life, with its overwhelming accent on the rights of property, is the driving force of most of his work,

and is closely associated with his hostility to the excessive nationalism of this era. He is an aristocrat, who has had to work in a *bourgeois* society in which the concept of "noblesse oblige" and its concomitant concept of "blood will tell" have been relegated to the garbage heap. In such a society a moderate measure of *bourgeois* "security"—say an assured income of a thousand dollars a year—was necessary if he was to use his gifts for the good of humanity as he conceives it; and the story of his attempts to attain that degree of security is one of the most heart-rending things in our literature. That degree of security would have relieved him of every possible care and have prevented the illnesses and accidents which have so grievously hampered his work. He is utterly without that passion for possessions which makes the people of this generation the helpless slaves of the things they possess. He regards an excess of possessions as immoral, and his concept of the obligations of those who have towards those who have not is stated in a striking paragraph at the end of this book: "In an arctic expedition so-and-so much food is taken. If one of the members surreptitiously uses more than his share, all the others may be in serious danger. But so long as there is not an absolute surplus in the production of mankind, mankind as such must be considered as a unit embarked on the expedition of life; and mankind includes every Siberian, every Indian, every Chinese who may starve in a famine. Until we have acquired that universal outlook, there can be no true civilization on earth."

It may be interesting to contrast this with the ultimate expression of the *bourgeois* concept as stated in a paragraph ascribed by Lord Brougham to Malthus (I have never been able to locate the passage, but the ideas and the rhetoric are perfectly Malthusian): "A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from his parents, on whom he has a just demand, and if the society do not want his labor, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, no business to be where he is. At nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him. She tells him to be gone."

Needless to say, Grove's remedy is not the Communist one, with its equally intense preoccupation with material goods and its concern about what class shall boss the production and distribution of them. The reform he wants is in the spirit of man, and consists in a great reduction in the importance attached to material goods. It is a reform that would be easier if it were not for the growing risk of unemployment, with the consequent urge to acquire material goods as a protective cushion rather than for their want-filling capacity.

Whether Grove is a Canadian author is a matter of definition. He certainly elected of his own choice to do his writing in Canada. But he is not an author in the current Canadian tradition. At a time when Canadian literature is reacting from colonialism to an exaggerated nationalism he is a cosmopolitan and an ardent anti-nationalist. At a time when Canadian writers are still held down by the inhibitions of Victorianism (a Puritanism

run to seed and decaying on the stalk) he practices the honest frankness of a continental Europe which never knew Puritanism—a very different thing from the exhibitionist frankness of the current American output. At a time when Canadian authors are called upon to depict the Canadian scene to the patriotic end that Canadians may learn to understand it and to love it better, he depicts only that part of it which imposes on mankind the bitterest hardships in the struggle for survival. By this means he has influenced Canadian literature, and much for its good, by diverting it slightly from its too facile optimism. But his proper function, obviously, was to reach the whole audience of North America, not as a Canadian author but as a North American one; and he was barred from doing so by the unconquerable belief of the United States part of that audience that nothing of importance could come out of Canada except romances of the Mounted Police and of the habitants, and that everything that could be said about the frontier life had already been said by United States writers.

ENGLAND'S HELICON: 1600-1660*

ARTHUR BARKER

Only the contemporary volume of the new *Oxford History of English Literature* is likely to be as difficult to write as the volume on the earlier seventeenth century so superbly handled by Professor Douglas Bush. From 1660 to 1900 the main movements of mind and art are relatively clear, but "normality consists in incongruity" in the period which begins by being "more than half mediaeval" and ends by being "more than half modern." The historian who would define the pattern of new notions and ideas vigorously agitated against a background of ancient traditions newly vitalized, has before him a hard task and more than one heroic argument. The task is the more difficult, though the more rewarding, because the echoes of our own time sound back so insistently and deceptively across the intervening centuries of Augustan peace, Romantic wonder, and Victorian progress. "This is a very accusative age," said Sir Edward Dering early in the debates in the Long Parliament; its modern interpreters are very nearly as divided and distinguished. Moreover literature was then not so much a specialized calling—its English "art" had not yet indeed been clearly formulated—as but one activity of men otherwise much engaged, in religion, politics, science, the keeping of libraries, the manufacturing of glass, ironmongering, and the general exploration of new worlds of activity and experience. And if their rapidly expanding horizon made it hard for them to see life steadily, they were still impelled even in their lyrics to see it as a whole—though a fragmented whole. Consequently the historian

**English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century, 1600-1660.* By DOUGLAS BUSH. Vol. V of the *Oxford History of English Literature*, ed. F. P. Wilson and Bonamy Dobrée. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1945. Pp. viii, 622. ($6.50)

of their literature, like their ideal poet, is required to be a man of broad and varied knowledge; he must be able to use for his own purposes the instruments of other fields of scholarship without sacrificing to merely murderous dissection the spontaneous response to life and letters which was so abundantly theirs.

Largely because of the similarities, real or supposed, between the intellectual and emotional problems of the seventeenth century and those of our late dry season, an immense amount of specialized work on it has accumulated in the past twenty-five years. Some of this has been extraordinarily subjective, some avowedly propagandist, and on the other hand a good deal has, of course, been academically dessicated. But the hundred and seventy odd pages of this volume's descriptive bibliography record an enlightened editorial and critical activity on every aspect of the period, proceeding "even to a rarity and admiration." There has however been no really comprehensive and authoritative charting of the currents of the age since Professor Sir Herbert Grierson's Messenger Lectures of 1926-7. This section of the new history was therefore especially needed; and the general editors, F. P. Wilson and Bonamy Dobrée, were guided by a sound judgment when they invited Professor Bush to provide the just supply of learning and taste which would bring the period's varied interests into historical coherence and relation.

Apart from its comprehensive scholarship, the impression of continuity amid variety is the most striking quality of the history. The first chapter's review of the forces operating in and on the literature reminds us of the accumulated Renaissance pressures, and traces the Elizabethan bequests of troubled inspiration, political, religious, economic, social, and philosophical. To the old though important story of the first two of these bequests, research is still adding significant details. Recent studies contribute much to a fresh and extensive treatment of the second and third of them, especially in the account of the effect of accelerated economic and social change on education, the reading public, and the book trade. But it is the philosophical bequest which rightly provides the centre of continuity in the Christian humanism inherited from the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Its fusion "of Christian faith and pagan reason into a stable framework of religious, ethical, political, economic, and cultural thought" lies behind the "simultaneous double vision" of the age, its vivid sense of godliness and beastliness, of righteousness and sinfulness, of grace and nature, of the ideal and the real, and consequently is the source of its "simultaneous embracing of different planes of knowledge and experience," and of its intensely imaginative search for dynamic harmony in the individual soul and in every department of activity from the metaphor to political organization and religious belief.

The subjectively simple view of the early seventeenth century as a period of admirably Satanic rebelliousness and of legalistic rigidity belongs to the nineteenth century and results in a sad distortion in the interpre-

tation of its art. What is significant about the period is not mere eccentricity but eccentricity striving to keep its circles just. The fusion of the Christian and the classical was never static, and in the seventeenth century it was rapidly disintegrating; but it was by no means simply from the mutability of a swiftly changing world that the great literary artists derived their inspiration. The emphasis of this volume on their inspired pursuit of a living order rather than on the extremes of fragmentary individualism or ossified orthodoxy restores the pattern of the age in its true proportions.

The survey's coherence is felt throughout its analysis of the various expressions of the central tradition in the work of men like Chapman, Jonson, Andrewes, Walton, Vaughan, Marvell, Whichcote, Cudworth, and of its disintegration and the establishing of a new tradition in the work of men like Donne, Bacon, Browne, Hobbes, Cowley. Yet the pattern is not developed in such simple terms; good history is not so written. Nor is the reading of the age by any means confined to the airy reaches and shady spaces of philosophy. The grouping of the material "about types of literature and modes of thought"—instead of the more conventional grouping about men which, as the Preface remarks, some might have preferred —has not led to an obscuring of individuality in favour of philosophic unity. Though the work of the major authors is split up (except in the case of Milton) so that the very full index is likely to be well thumbed, each author is the subject of particular analysis and evaluation. It also becomes apparent in the opening chapter of the survey, on "Popular Literature and Translations," that Professor Bush is nearly as familiar with the Water Poet's "sweet deale of scimble scamble stuffe" and with the literature of "this precious stinke," the "new art of whiffing," as he is with the classical and biblical traditions which supply the age with so much of its power.

"The age was the most erudite in English history," he remarks in his concluding chapter, "yet in no age has literature been at once so close to learning and philosophy on the one hand and to life and action on the other." Each of the three groups into which the chapters of the survey fall leads one from common life and action to learning and philosophy: first, from the slender inheritance of the Spenserians through the popular song-books and topical ballads to the delicately balanced classicism of Jonson and the bright eminence of the religious metaphysicals; secondly, from the new literature of middle-class travel and of exploration, through the essays and characters which came home to men's bosoms and more and more to their businesses, to the historical and biographical records of experience, to Raleigh's unfinished contemplation of the world's course and Walton's hagiography and nostalgic self-portraiture; thirdly, from the political thought distorted and deepened by the violent activity of the Civil War, through the scientific perambulation of Bacon and his successors, with their Atlantic though not wholly Utopian vision of a new world, by way of Burton and Hobbes to the religious thought of Donne, the am-

phibious Browne, the great Anglicans, and the Cambridge Platonists. Thus organized the survey moves steadily forward, without losing its contact with reality, from the life and literature of ordinary men and their new pipe-dreams to the final eminence of the two chapters on heroic verse and on Milton, and to the contemplation of the great epic in which so much of the experience, learning, and spirit of the age is embodied in such strange cosmic isolation.

Throughout the survey use is, of course, being made of the special studies of the investigators to whom tribute is generously paid in the bibliography; but the distillation of these studies turns history and report into literary criticism, since every item is approached with a lively awareness of literary values. Only a few examples can be mentioned here to illustrate the volume's critical range: the account of Chapman's freedom in translation and its relation to his ethical standards; the delicate appreciation of the two poets in Herbert; the analysis of the complex reverberations, classical, biblical, and metaphysical, in Marvell's "To His Coy Mistress"; the pages on the nervous precision of the new prose and its relation to changing mental attitudes; the skilful summary of the philosophy of Hobbes, notably successful in its effort "to draw out leviathan with a hook"; and the fully articulated account of Bacon as scientist, philosopher, stylist, and propagandist—perhaps the core of the book. It need hardly be added, after the recent review in this journal of the Messenger Lectures on *Paradise Lost*, that the chapter on Milton is a most judicious account of his career and a very important contribution to Milton criticism.

It may perhaps be regretted that the accounts of the confused yet pregnant literary theory of the time were not drawn together in a chapter devoted to the function of literature, especially since what is said of Jonson and Daniel, for example, is so suggestively related to the humanistic development. And without being moved by the special enthusiasms of a partisan reviewer, one may regret that the chronological limits were allowed to operate to the exclusion of Donne's early poems, particularly when one recalls that Jonson "affirmeth Donne to have written all his best poems ere he was 25 years old." The pages on his religious poetry and his religious thought are among the most vivid in the volume, and one understands more clearly from their analysis of his intense but limited religious experience how it was that he was condemned always to be tuning his instrument at the door. Yet the full account which his career demands might have resulted in a fuller understanding of the instrument and of the echoes from the past he was passionately striving to harmonize. The modern sensibility which found a model in his technique has tended to obscure the centre of his consciousness, and what is needed is a new examination of his compass and his chart in the light of the historical pattern so sensitively defined in this book. The sensitiveness is everywhere apparent in the deft use of brief but pithy quotations, in the constant

feeling for the connection between style and belief, in the discriminating appreciation of poetic effects, in the precise differentiation between shades of thought, and not least in the definition of a pattern which clarifies without dampening "the soaring fire which in this age was distributed with such Pentecostal generosity."

SPIRITUALIA SUB METAPHORIS CORPORALIUM[1]

W. S. Heckscher

Historians of art, in their investigation of the formative phase of the Gothic style and the part played in it by Suger, Abbot of St.-Denis (from 1122 to 1151), have been fortunate in that "time's mercy" has preserved the great abbot's careful accounts and powerful apologias of his own activities, both as a patron and as a director of the manifold artistic and administrative tasks that engaged the workshops and that filled the *Raritätenkammern* of the abbey church of St.-Denis in the fateful second quarter of the twelfth century.[2] Less fortunate, however, has been the general uncertainty that has dimmed the discussion where the prerequisite was a precise, unambiguous rendering of certain portions of Suger's texts. The main reason for this sad state of affairs may be sought in the circumstance that even the medievalists among the historians of art are seldom either fully equipped or truly inclined to handle medieval Latin properly. (But who is!) Moreover Suger's writings abound in uncommon linguistic difficulties which result from his strongly individualistic style, from his variegated sources of inspiration, and from the fact that he often discusses parts of the abbey church or *objets d'art* which are extant no longer. Panofsky's book, offering a meticulously careful translation concurrently with the complete original text,[3] which is followed up with a rich apparatus of annotations, has done much more than fill painful *lacunae* in our knowledge. The book is the outcome of decades of searching acquaintanceship with Suger and his text. Panofsky's contribution is threefold: he has given us a masterful yet restrained translation of both prose and verse; he has found the key to Suger's guiding "philosophy" in the very writings of "St. Denis," and he has related this hitherto unrecognized source to those of Suger's thoughts which come closest to what might be called a subconscious awareness of the new Gothic qualities as against those of the

[1]Abbot Suger, *On the Abbey Church of St.-Denis and Its Art Treasures*. Edited, translated, and annotated by Erwin Panofsky. Princeton: Princeton University Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1946. Pp. xiv, 250, 26 pl. ($3.75)

[2]St.-Denis, "the Westminster Abbey of France," a pre-Carolingian foundation, had in Suger's day, and partly through him, become the guardian of France's history (so that a popular epic may claim to have been found "under its main-altar"), shelter of the Oriflamme (the war-banner of the French kings up to the battle of Agincourt), haven of venerated relics, and primordial structure of the Gothic style.

[3]Only one fairly long but irrelevant piece of "de administratione" is omitted.

Romanesque past; finally, he has probed and clarified some of the most intricate problems with which the historians of art and liturgy are confronted.[4] By treating the texts involved with lucidity and a musical ear and the persons under discussion with rare and genial empathy, Panofsky has turned the comparatively slender volume into what Germans would call "eine Fundgrube des Wissens" which no medievalist, in whatever field he specializes, can afford to disregard.

Perhaps it is not without a certain ironical significance that the appearance of Panofsky's "Suger" was considerably delayed by the fact that the great rush order of Smyth's report on atomic energy crowded it off the Princeton presses. Turning to Suger from the atom and its menacing implications for the free development of the individual, the reader is bound to be filled with a nostalgia that is not altogether without envy. And Suger—who had risen from poverty and humbleness of origin—was only one of the many of his age who, even if compared with the self-willed personalities of the Renaissance, stand out on account of their amazingly unimpeded "spread."[5] It may be said in generalizing terms that offices and ideas, "estates" and men, tend to fall much more rigidly into their "predestined place" with the beginning of the thirteenth century, which by and large systematizes and depersonalizes what the twelfth century had evoked and gathered. It was in a way fitting for his twelfth-century background that Suger could be not only a great churchman, and as such a poet and an artist, but also a powerful statesman and diplomat, and as such a jurist and a biographer of kings as well.

If one were to look for the general characteristics of a twelfth-century "style in personality," it would be tempting to point at Wibald, Abbot of Korvei and Stavelot, Suger's great contemporary, who to a simply amazing extent represents a variation on the same theme. Like Suger, Wibald was the confidant and adviser of kings, the regent of his realm during the second crusade; and while Suger was military adviser for a siege, Wibald was admiral of the Mediterranean fleet. Both men were the most outspoken exponents of the intentions of the See of Rome within their respective countries; both were filled with keen patriotism;[6] both managed to transfer their administrative ability in matters of state to the microcosms of their

[4] I have in the present review tried to stress some of the general cultural aspects and have refrained from a discussion of the archaeological and iconographical problems involved; much will have to be said on the latter after the appearance of the second volume of S. McKnight Crosby's *The Abbey of St.-Denis*.

[5] The *granus salis* to this statement is provided by Panofsky's discussion of Suger's vainglorioussness: "He may be said to have gratified his ego by renouncing his identity: he expanded himself until he had become identical with the Abbey. In spreading his inscriptions and portraits all over the church, he took possession of it but at the same time divested himself, to some extent, of his existence as a private individual."

[6] Suger showed his by scorning and defying both the British and the Germans in no uncertain terms, Wibald by scolding a friend who spelled his name *Gu*ibaldus by pointedly adding, to a little lesson in orthography: "et nos Germanici sumus, non Galli Comati."

monasteries and abbey churches.[7] It is in this sphere, however, that a fruitful comparison will end, for Suger emerges, especially as a patron of the arts, as by far the greater personality.[8]

Panofsky's introduction compresses into thirty-seven pages what the *New Yorker* would call Suger's "Profile." This account contains the quintessence of the author's findings. It might have turned out to be nothing but a happy grazing ground for the initiated, but it is much more than that because it has the levitation of both humorous and psychological insight, hardly ever transgressing the limits of legitimate interpretation. Personally, I would hesitate to condemn St. Bernard for the pun—"a pun scarcely pardonable in even a saint"—by which he commends Suger for having "learned to suck [*sugere*] the breasts of Divine Wisdom instead of the lips of the flatterers." The image of lactation with its magic and mystical connotations, and among them especially that of indoctrination, is much too common in the Middle Ages to leave any room for indelicate *double entente*,[9] while, apart from that common stream of tradition, St. Bernard's play on the word "Suger" seems to be nothing but a reflection of the saint's deep and very personal concern with the problem of motherhood and lactation.[10]

[7]Wibald not only inscribed his name on the south façade of his reconstructed monastery but also added the words Γνῶθι σεαυτόν, a procedure as unique in the twelfth century as it would seem unlikely to occur in the thirteenth.

[8]Wibald's very witty correspondence with a tardy jeweller, his influence on the book-illumination of Korvei as well as the repair of dilapidated buildings, are mere *curiosa* beside Suger's potent singleness of purpose, whose revolutionary effect was, as Panofsky puts it, "as if a President of the United States were to have had the White House rebuilt by Frank Lloyd Wright."

[9]For instances of medieval "milk-magic" cf. *Analecta Bollandiana*, ed. by de Smedt *et al.*, XXI, Index *s.v.* "lac" and Stith Thompson's *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature*, VI, *s.v.* "milk." The image of the *sapientia lactans* is still merrily alive on the seal of Cambridge University which shows the naked *Alma Mater Cantabrigia* with milk streaming from her breasts. The oldest realistic representation of a *sapientia lactans* known to me is found in an early fifteenth-century MS (*Cod. Palatinus Lat.* 1066, fol. 235 *verso*): as part of a series of Virtues and Vices two bearded gentlemen, who are kneeling and holding hands, are shown at the breasts of an enthroned lady, identified by an inscription as "ymago sapiencie"; cf. H. Liebeschütz, "Fulgentius Metaforalis" (*Studien der Bibl. Warburg*, IV, plate X, fig. 12). The picture occurs once more a hundred years later in an alchemistic treatise; cf. C. G. Jung, *Psychologie und Alchemie* (Zürich, 1944), fig. 201. This representation is, iconographically speaking, a descendent of the suckling "Terra"; textually it probably derives from the *Ecclesia*, "cujus ubera sunt duo testamenta de quibus rudes animae lac doctrinae sumunt, sicut parvuli lac de uberibus matrum sugunt" (Honorius of Autun; cf. E. Panofsky, *Studies in Iconology* (New York, 1939), 157, note 97).

[10]St. Bernard's mother, a forceful aristocratic lady, who, even after her death, remained a dominant factor in the saint's life, was reported as having said that "she would never consent to her children being nourished from other women's breasts, so that she might as it were somehow infuse them with her maternal virtue through her maternal milk" (*Legenda Aurea*, ed. by Graesse, 528). No wonder then that her son should devote an entire homily to a mystical interpretation of the milk and breasts of the *sponsa* of the *Song of Songs*, in which there occur phrases which leave little doubt as to the close rapport

In the beautiful discussion of the intrinsic contrast between St. Bernard of Clairvaux and Suger, mention might have been made of the saint's reputation as a "youthful writer of facetious songs and worldly melodies"[11] which puts him into a category with men like Archbishop Gabriele Paleotti whose *Discorso intorno le immagini sacre e profane*, of the year 1582, sounding as it does unmistakable undertones of love for corporeal beauty, is very much of the nature of St. Bernard's glowing description of the sumptuousness of the chandeliers of the churches.

I had always believed that Suger's use of "claritas" was well enough explained from Apocalypse 21 : 11 or from such reference works as Alanus's *Dictiones Dictionum* (*s.v.* "claritas": "proprie dicitur divina natura"), or, *ex post*, from St. Thomas's famous definition of beauty—all of which somehow fit in with Suger's symbolical use of the term. However Panofsky is able to demonstrate that Suger very closely follows the particular method that is contained in Dionysius Areopagita's neo-Platonic *de Coelestia Hierarchia* and Ioannes Scotus Erigena's commentary to it. Thus spiritually guided by the light-metaphysics of St.-Denis's (putative) patron saint,[12] Suger arrives at a conception that allows of an almost pantheistic acceptance of beauty in every thing created (Ioannes: "lapis iste vel hic lignum mihi lumen est") which ultimately reflects the light of the Godhead itself: "This ascent from the material to the immaterial world is what the

in the saint's mind between lactation and indoctrination ("quidquid facile et dulciter sugitur, lac videtur." . . . "non est enim omne lac parvulorum"; *In Cantica, sermones* XXVII and IX). The *Acta Sanctorum Bolland.* (August 20), section XLVI, 207 r., make mention of a miracle which took place at Chatillon where a statue of the Virgin Mary "is said to have bedewed St. Bernard with her milk at a moment when he had been inflamed with a singular love for the Virgin. . . . And it is recorded that the miracle occurred when St. Bernard uttered the words: 'Monstra te esse matrem.'" Well may St. Bernard have had in mind a *dictum* which first is found in Clement of Alexandria's *Paedagogus* (lib. I, ch. vi; ed. by Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, VIII, col. 307), "fons enim nutrimenti lac est, quo etiam mulier ostenditur et vere peperisse, et esse mater." Medieval writers were well aware of the fact that milk derives from blood, and that milk and blood are closely related as the nutriments of the unborn and the born child respectively, whereas mystically blood and milk are the symbols of the Passion and the Teaching of Christ (Clement deals with this; *loc. cit.*). Significantly enough, St. Bernard has, for centuries, been regarded as the author of the basic formula for the "dual intercession" of (1) Christ showing his wounds, the "clementiae monumenta," to God, and (2) Mary (in a pleading gesture that ultimately derives from classical antiquity) showing her breasts, the "caritatis insignia," to her Son, a configuration that became popular through the typological series of the *Speculum humanae salvationis*, 1324 ff. (cf. E. Panofsky, "Imago Pietatis," in *W. Friedländer Festschrift*, 286 and note 75). Thus it is understandable if a late sixteenth-century engraver would combine, in a true revival of medieval thought, the St. Bernard "Lactatio" with a representation of the intercession of Mary and Christ; cf. B. Knipping, *De Iconografie van de Contra-Reformatie*, II, 35 and fig. 25.

[11]This may be apocryphal as it is reported by Abelard's disciple, Berengar (cf. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, 178, col. 1857), but the saint's youth is full of temptations and self-castigations to support its tenor.

[12]Whom Dante still celebrates as "the candle that, in human guise, most penetratingly perceived the nature and office of the angels."

Pseudo-Areopagite and John the Scot describe . . . as the 'anagogical approach' (. . . 'the upward-leading method'); and this is what Suger professed as a theologian, proclaimed as a poet, and practised as a patron of the arts and as an arranger of liturgical spectacles."

It is with somewhat of a relief that we find that not all the "Suger-questions" can be answered:

> Did Suger realize that his concentration of artists "from all parts of the kingdom" inaugurated that great selective synthesis of all French regional styles in the hitherto relatively barren Isle-de-France which we call Gothic? Did he suspect that the rose in the west façade—so far as we know the first appearance of this motif in this place—was one of the great innovations in architectural history. . . ? Did he know, or sense, that his unreflecting enthusiasm for the Pseudo-Areopagite's and John the Scot's light metaphysics placed him in the van of an intellectual movement that was to result in the proto-scientific theories of Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon, on the one hand, and in a Christian Platonism ranging from William of Auvergne, Henry of Ghent and Ulric of Strassburg to Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, on the other?

SHORTER NOTICE

Saints and Strangers. By GEORGE F. WILLISON. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock [Toronto: McClelland and Stewart]. 1945. Pp. vii, 513. ($4.75)

The Completion of Independence, 1790-1830. By JOHN ALLEN KROUT and DIXON RYAN FOX. Vol. V of the *History of American Life*, ed. A. M. Schlesinger and D. R. Fox. New York: Macmillan Co. [Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada]. 1944. Pp. xxiii, 487. ($4.00)

THESE two volumes of American history have rather more in common than the general subject-matter. They are both period-studies, though of unequal social areas. They are both accounts of national beginnings, the first in the colony at Plymouth, the second (after the Revolution) in the young republic whose citizens, like their Puritan ancestors of a century and a half earlier, were often elated with the sense of sharing in a great political adventure which the world would admire and Heaven approve. Both books are designed to be popular, in no disparaging sense of the word: they are not written primarily for the specialist in American history, nor, at the other extreme, for the great mass of people who get most of their knowledge of times past from historical fiction and the movies, but for the not inconsiderable number between who will exert themselves to learn, but are grateful for books in which historical and social generalization is enlivened by anecdote and illustration.

Saints and Strangers is a book on two related subjects: first and most important, the history of the Plymouth settlement in the seventeenth century, and second, the growth of a national mythology concerning the

Pilgrims from its modest beginnings about the time of the Revolution down to our own day. The main part of the book tells of the genesis of the Pilgrim society among the Brownists of the East Midlands toward the end of Elizabeth's reign, relates the exodus first to Holland and then to the promised land of America, and describes the varying fortunes of a community that was never very prosperous or secure down to the time of its annexation by the more vigorous, wealthy, and aggressive Puritan colony of Massachusetts in 1692. Mr. Willison is to be congratulated on the skill he has shown in drawing on the scores of surviving records and memoirs to produce a unified and lively narrative. The emphasis falls rather more on personalities and events than on ideas. Puritan thought is certainly not ignored, but is given incidental and unsystematic treatment. The reader will probably remember best certain actions and persons: the lucky discovery of the Indian cache on Corn Hill; the delightfully comic episode of the visit to Massasoit by Winslow and Hopkins; the fearful conclusion of King Philip's War; William Bradford, the wise governor and eloquent historian; the cheeky and irrepressible Isaac Allerton, "the first Yankee trader"; the soldier Miles Standish, honoured by all though a "stranger" who never became a member of the church; and the far-travelled Squanto, who after his enforced sojourn in Spain and England got back to his native shore in time to greet and surprise the Pilgrims on their arrival and become, as they gratefully acknowledged, "a speciall instrumente sent of God for their good beyond their expectation."

As for the account of the rise of the Plymouth legend, it throws a revealing light on the way nationalist patriotism, family pride, local interests, and poetic fancy turn history to their own purposes. The story of how Plymouth Rock was identified, one hundred and fifty years after the landing, and the record of the later fortunes of that geologically venerable but historically dubious relic should prove highly entertaining to anyone except a member of the local Chamber of Commerce. Equally amusing is the story of how Felicia Hemans, with the vaguest ideas about American history and geography, came to write her admired poem on the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers, and so made a contribution as important as Longfellow's to the legend. Needless to say, Mr. Willison with all his historical apparatus will never be able to destroy what the poets and others have created. As a citizen of Plymouth wrote a century ago in reply to the sceptics of his time: "We much prefer established error to novel truth."

The Completion of Independence is a social history of much wider range. Its scope and emphasis may be suggested by some of the chapter-headings: "The Atlantic Ports," "Republican Aristocrats," "The Business Scene," "Country Life," "The Quickening of Nationalism," "The Conservative Tradition," "Lawyers and Doctors," "Cultural Aspirations and Achievements." The chapters are, in general, separate studies, rather than sections in a chronologically organized narrative. It is assumed that the reader has an adequate preliminary knowledge of the sequence of political events,

from the establishment of the federal constitution and authority until the rise of Jacksonian democracy. Social history is inevitably eclectic and supplementary: it gathers evidence from innumerable sources and contributes to the understanding of politics, economics, and literature. Readers of *The Completion of Independence* will be particularly impressed by the skill with which vast amounts of varied information have been gathered, related, and condensed into small space. Two or three brief sentences are followed by a foot-note reference to the volumes, articles, or documents upon which the generalization is based. The succinct quality of the narrative is pleasing at first, but one could wish for a more expansive treatment of some of the subjects. The sober and repressed style, though excellent for the close marshalling of information, does not quite communicate the feeling of what was reputedly a time of national buoyancy and assurance.

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